Cornelis de Waal

The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce brings together 35 essays on the American philosopher and polymath Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) with the aim of showing how his work is still relevant today. The volume takes its cues from Peirce's work in phenomenology and normative philosophy-where the latter includes, besides aesthetics and ethics, also logic. Within the domain of logic, attention is given to his work in formal logic as well as his work in graphical or diagrammatic logic. Ample attention is given also to Peirce's pragmatism and his metaphysics. The volume further includes biographical papers as well as papers on abduction, semiotics, linguistics, physics, biology, religion, history, science, and education.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 ed. by Stetson J. RobinsonCornelis de WaalEdited by Stetson J. RobinsonThe Correspondence of Charles S. Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company, 1890–1913 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022. 666pp., incl. indexThe fifth volume in the Peirceana series brings us the extensive correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court Publishing Company (abbreviated to OCP by Robinson). The double-barreled opening shot consists of two letters (one by Francis Russell and one by Open Court’s Editor Paul Carus) aimed at soliciting a contribution from [End Page 109] Peirce for the inaugural issue of a new quarterly journal to be published by the Open Court, called The Monist. Carus had been particularly impressed by Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science papers, which had appeared over a decade earlier in Popular Science Monthly, and to which Russell had drawn Carus’s attention.1 Peirce quickly responded, suggesting not one but an entire series of articles, the first of which to be titled “The Architecture of Theories.” It proved the beginning of a productive but also turbulent relationship between Peirce and the publishing company. The final letter in the exchange comes again from Carus, written September 10, 1913, about seven months before Peirce died.The Open Court Collection at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, from which much of the correspondence is drawn, is a truly magnificent collection. It contains not only business correspondence and financial records, but also the various stages of the publishing process. It includes the original texts that Peirce sent to the publisher, as well as the often heavily corrected galleys and proofs—material that is used appreciatively by the Peirce Edition Project for its critical edition of Peirce’s Writings. When we combine this record with the Nachlass of a philosopher who lived in a continuously expanding mansion with a penchant for keeping each and every scrap of paper, we get a remarkably full picture of everything that went into the publication of Peirce’s work with the Open Court. In contrast, we know painfully little of what went on at the Century Company, which published the Century Dictionary to which Peirce so heavily contributed, or of James Mark Baldwin’s treatment of Peirce’s submissions when he compiled his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Neither venture seems to have left any records, apart from what survived within Peirce’s own papers— at least no such records have so far been found. We know a bit more about Peirce’s dealings with The Nation, but again, almost exclusively because of what has been preserved in Peirce’s papers.Robinson’s hefty tome makes the correspondence between Peirce and the Open Court widely available for the first time. The book opens with a short explanation of the editorial method, a helpful chronology, and a brief historical introduction describing Peirce’s relationship with the Open Court. The work also contains fourteen illustrations, mostly of letters. The introduction to the volume is brief and largely piggybacks on a handful of sources, such as the Introduction to Volume 8 of the Writings, rather than that it was inspired by the collection of letters that follows it, or by a closer familiarity with the archival holdings of the Open Court.2 In his introduction, Robinson divides Peirce’s relationship with the publishing company in four periods: A very active 1890–1894, which includes Peirce’s familiar Monist Metaphysical papers, his contributions to the fortnightly The Open Court, and his [End Page 110] attempts at writing an elementary arithmetic. This period ends with a falling out between Peirce and Hegeler. It is followed by a far more subdued 1894–1897, where the relationship with the publisher is largely restored by Russell, and which results in an extensive discussion by Peirce of the third volume of Ernst Schröder’s Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, which appeared in two parts in The Monist. This period too ends with a falling out. The activity picks up again in 1904, resulting in Peirce’s famous pragmatism papers as well as the “Some Amazing Mazes” series of 1908...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 ed. by Francesco BellucciCornelis de WaalEdited by Francesco BellucciCharles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020; no index.With Francesco Bellucci's Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894–1912 and the Peirceana series, which Bellucci co-edits with Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, the center of gravity in Peirce studies has dramatically shifted to Europe. The powerhouses of old, such as the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University and the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism at Texas Tech University, appear pretty much dead in the water. And this new center of gravity is by no means limited to secondary literature. Bellucci's edition of Peirce's writings on semiotics and Pietarinen's multi-volume Logic of the Future present us with well-thought-out and responsibly edited volumes of primary literature that will leave their mark on Peirce scholarship for decades to come. And there are other volumes on the way.Bellucci's volume spans almost two decades of Peirce's life—a period during which Peirce had retreated to Milford, Pennsylvania, spending most of his time with his pen on paper. The main purpose of Bellucci's volume is to give us better access to material that has not yet been published—material that is, as Bellucci contends, "essential to understand Peirce's views about signs, their classification, and the relations between semiotics and logical inquiry" (p.1).In line with this, Bellucci starts off where the Writings break off. The last volume of the Writings, which appeared well over a decade ago, ends midway 1892, and Bellucci's volume opens with the sixth chapter of Peirce's 1894 logic book How to Reason, "The Essence of Reasoning." Bellucci thereby skips the second chapter of that same logic book, even though it deals directly with the question "What is a Sign?" He does this on the ground that that chapter is already published in the second [End Page 265] volume of The Essential Peirce (p.3). Bellucci's Selected Writings on Semiotics is thus best considered a professional tool aimed at filling gaps in the literature for Peirce scholars who are already familiar with, or knowledgeable of, what is already out there. Making these texts available is especially important since the manuscripts they are based on are not widely accessible and are in various states of disarray.Each text in Bellucci's volume comes with a (sometimes-extensive) editorial note that is largely bibliographical and, like the Writings, explains which manuscript sheets constitute the text by supplementing the Robin Catalogue designation with the page reference system devised by the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism. The headnote is followed by explanatory annotations, emendations, and alterations, not unlike the system used for the Writings. In this way the reader can easily ascertain where Bellucci made corrections to the original text and what changes Peirce made himself when he was in the process of writing. Putting the apparatus immediately following each text is a much better choice than hiding everything in the back of the volume, as was done in the Writings. Given the nature of this edition, however, it would have been better to have the editorial note precede the text, as is done, for instance in The Essential Peirce, rather than follow it (or use two notes), as that would have made it easier for the reader to position the text within Peirce's oeuvre before beginning to read it (for instance, by reading "What is a Sign?" before starting "The Essence of Reasoning").Bellucci's Selected Writings on Semiotics includes eighteen selections in total, each of which is described briefly in the volume's Introduction with a rationale for including it. As with the Writings, titles not given by Peirce are printed in italic square brackets. At times a more forceful editorial hand in establishing the titles themselves would have been helpful. Selection 10, for instance, "The Basis of Pragmaticism," suggests that it would include two pieces already found in The Essential Peirce, namely "The Basis of Pragmaticism in Phaneroscopy," and "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the...

This unique introduction fully engages and clearly explains pragmatism, an approach to knowledge and philosophy that rejects outmoded conceptions of objectivity while avoiding relativism and subjectivism. It follows pragmatism's focus on the process of inquiry rather than on abstract justifications meant to appease the skeptic. According to pragmatists, getting to know the world is a creative human enterprise, wherein we fashion our concepts in terms of how they affect us practically, including in future inquiry. This book fully illuminates that enterprise and the resulting radical rethinking of basic philosophical conceptions like truth, reality, and reason. Author Cornelis de Waal helps the reader recognize, understand, and assess classical and current pragmatist contributions--from Charles S. Peirce to Cornel West--evaluate existing views from a pragmatist angle, formulate pragmatist critiques, and develop a pragmatist viewpoint on a specific issue. The book discusses: Classical pragmatists, including Peirce, James, Dewey, and Addams; Contemporary figures, including Rorty, Putnam, Haack, and West; Connections with other twentieth-century approaches, including phenomenology, critical theory, and logical positivism; Peirce's pragmatic maxim and its relation to James's will-to-believe; Applications to philosophy of law, feminism, and issues of race and racism.

Charles Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science is an early work in the philosophy of science and the official birthplace of pragmatism. It contains Peirce’s two most influential papers: “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” as well as discussions on the theory of probability, the ground of induction, the relation between science and religion, and the logic of abduction. Unsatisfied with the result and driven by a constant, almost feverish urge to improve his work, Peirce spent considerable time and effort revising these papers. After the turn of the century these efforts gained significant momentum when Peirce sought to establish his role in the development of pragmatism while distancing himself from the more popular versions that had become current. The present edition brings together the original series as it appeared in Popular Science Monthly and a selection of Peirce’s later revisions, many of which remained hidden in the mass of messy manuscripts that were left behind after his death in 1914.

Cheryl Misak’s Cambridge Pragmatism is a key work for anyone who seeks to gain a deeper understanding of twentieth-century philosophy, especially during its first half. It is commonly assumed that pragmatism petered out in the early part of the century, only to resurface in the 1970s, most notably with the work of Richard Rorty. Much of what inspired this assumption was that most major figures were keen to distance themselves from a movement that named itself pragmatism. To many, it suggested that we should give up on getting things right and focus instead on practical concerns. This view was fueled in part by James’s powerful statement that truth is the cash value of our ideas, which was interpreted...

Peirce's conception of truth in terms of the final opinion reached in the long run by a community of inquirers marks a significant departure from traditional conceptions of truth, not only because it introduces a temporal dimension, but also because it explicitly connects it to groups of people and to what those people do. If we compare this with Aristotle's classic definition—"to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not"2—we see that there is no temporal dimension there and that it solely references an individual. In fact, truth is often cast as a correspondence between objects and their representation, in thought, language, or art, without any reference to those who think, speak, or paint, or...

Fourteen philosophers share their experience teaching Peirce to undergraduates in a variety of settings and a variety of courses. The latter include introductory philosophy courses as well as upper-level courses in American philosophy, philosophy of religion, logic, philosophy of science, medieval philosophy, semiotics, metaphysics, etc., and even an upper-level course devoted entirely to Peirce. The project originates in a session devoted to teaching Peirce held at the 2007 annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. The session, organized by James Campbell and Richard Hart, was co-sponsored by the American Association of Philosophy Teachers.

This article focuses on George Herbert Mead's life and his philosophy of the act. Mead divides the act into four stages: impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. The impulse sets the organism in motion, whereas consummation marks the satisfaction of the desire that initiated the act. Hence, consummation brings the act to a close. This should not be taken as a linear chain of responses to neatly self-contained problematic situations. Organisms often multitask, and problematic situations are typically nested, as when an animal in its search for food is being attacked by a predator.

In this essay I explore the potential contribution of Peirce's theory of scientific inquiry to moral philosophy. After a brief introduction, I outline Peirce's theory of inquiry. Next, I address why Peirce believed that this theory of inquiry is inapplicable to what he called "matters of vital importance," the latter including genuine moral problems. This leaves us in the end with two options: We can try to develop an alternative way of addressing moral problems or we can seek to reconcile moral problems with scientific inquiry as described by Peirce. Though Peirce seems to argue for the former, I argue for the latter.

Taking an 1893 exchange between Charles S. Peirce and Open Court editor Paul Carus as its point of departure, the paper explores the relation between religion and science while making the case that the attitude that scientists have to their subject is akin to a religious devotion. In this way it is argued that a reconciliation between science and religion cannot be confined to religion blindly accepting the results from science, but that such a reconciliation is possible only when both (re)connect with what truly inspires them, the experience of reverent wonder about the world within which they find themselves.

In this volume comprised of sixteen essays and rebuttals, author and professor of philosophy Susan Haack responds to her fellow philosophers and her critics on a wide range of topics that involve much more than the esoteric nature of contemporary philosophy. Instead, as is Haack's forte, she asserts her views on important current issues such as how scientists conduct their work, the ethics of affirmative action and the pitfalls of preferential hiring, and how the distorted reality the postmodern thinkers have presented has corrupted legal thinking. Her charge is to bring clarity, precision, integrity, and most of all, practicality to her field of study.

In this article I trace some of the main tenets of the struggle between nominalism and realism as identified by John Deely in his Four ages of understanding. The aim is to assess Deely’s claim that the Age of Modernity was nominalist and that the coming age, the Age of Postmodernism — which he portrays as a renaissance of the late middle ages and as starting with Peirce — is realist. After a general overview of how Peirce interpreted the nominalist-realist controversy, Deely gives special attention to Thomas Aquinas’s On being and essence and the realism it entails. A subsequent discussion of the Modern Period shows that the issue of nominalism and realism is very much tied up with di¤erent conceptions of the intellect. Deely credits the theory of evolution with bringing us a conception of the intellect that is closer to that of the Middle Ages and that opens the way for a truly realistic ‘‘fourth age’’ of the understanding

The paper argues against the claim held, e.g., by Leibniz, that Locke employs a double standard for determining whether an object before the mind (i.e., an idea) is real. Using Locke's ectype-archetype distinction it is shown that this charge is the result of confusing Locke's criterion of reality with its application. Depending on whether it applies to a simple, substance or mode idea, the criterion works out differently. Next it is argued that although Locke maintains only a single criterion, this criterion is untenable, since it fails to properly distinguish real from fantastical ideas.

Scott Aikin’s Evidentialism and the Will to Believe is the first book-length discussion of W.K. Clifford’s 1877 “The Ethics of Belief ” and William James’s 1896 “The Will to Believe.” Except for twenty pages, the book splits evenly between a detailed discussion of the two essays. A good book demands some good criticism, and I am hoping that the comments I make are read in that light. Evidentialism and the Will to Believe appears in the Bloomsbury Research in Analytic Philosophy series. Presumably because the book was written for this series, the discussion of historical context is kept to a minimum, and references to other writings of Clifford and James, and to the secondary literature, are scant.

This paper explores Berkeley's denial of matter in the light of criticisms voiced by Charles S. Peirce, who wrote two extensive review essays, one in 1871 and one in 1901, on the Fraser editions of Berkeley's Works. Elaborating upon Peirce's criticisms and utilizing Peirce's semiotics and pragmatism (two doctrines for which Peirce gives partial credit to Berkeley), it is shown that Berkeley's argument against matter is inconclusive, that the hypothesis of matter can be made to fit within Berkeley's thought, and that doing so need not undermine the latter's esse is percipi doctrine.

In 1893, The World’s Parliament of Religions met in Chicago from the 15th of May until the 28th of October. 2013 marked the 120th anniversary of this gathering where the leading representatives of the religions of the world engaged in dialogue. To commemorate this event, Special Collections Research Center at Southern Illinois University Carbondale in conjunction with the Hegeler Carus Foundation hosted a symposium on the relationship between science, religion, and philosophy. One of the themes of the Parliament was “…the actual harmony of science and religion; and the origin and nature of the alleged conflict between them.” Featured speakers addressed these issues igniting fascinating conversations. These are the papers that were presented