Craig W. Fox

In an influential series of papers, Cleland (2001, 2002, 2011) argued that historical natural scientists employ a distinctive methodology—which exploits Lewis (1979)s asymmetry of over determination—that is capable of putting knowledge of the deep past on an epistemic par with experimental knowledge. Currie (2018) clarified the nature of the asymmetry claim and used it to argue for a more restricted form of optimism toward the historical sciences. This optimism is licensed by the evidential redundancy that the asymmetry of over determination guarantees.In this chapter I show that the argument for the asymmetry of over determination is circular and the thesis is false. Over determination toward the past is smuggled in from the start by ruling out of consideration so-called backtracking counterfactuals. By banning backtracking counterfactuals, consideration is restricted to possible worlds in which the over determination thesis holds. But in the actual world, the present is compatible with many different histories.

Historical contingency is commonly associated with unpredictability and outcome variability. As such, it can be seen as an undesirable aspect of experimental investigations. Many might agree that experimental methodologies that include enough control help to by-pass this problem and thereby make for more secure knowledge. Against this received view, we argue that, for at least some historically contingent processes, an over-emphasis on control might mislead by obscuring the very object of investigation or by preventing fruitful discoveries. In discussing cases from evolutionary biology, developmental biology, and geochemistry/astrophysics, we show how investigating through approaches that don’t prioritize environmental control, while allowing for greater variability of outcomes, better respects the object/environment entanglement of these systems. Finally, we defend the idea that, despite the lower level of control, these types of experiments do not have a lower epistemic value than more highly controlled experiments.

The Earth has not always been accompanied by its celestial partner, the Moon. In fact, the Moon was acquired by the Earth about 100 million years after the start of the solar system. It was acquired in the aftermath of a massive collision between the Earth and another planet, dubbed “Theia,” the mythological mother of the Greek goddess of the Moon. Most of the iron-rich cores of Earth and Theia merged almost immediately, while the rest of the two planets vaporized. Some of the impact ejecta was lost, but enough remained in gravitationally bound orbit around what was then $ 98\% $ of current-sized Earth. What remained of the impact eject derived from the outer, silicate portion of the Earth, cooled rapidly, condensed and accreted to form the body we are so accustomed to seeing in our sky. I want to know how we can know all of that. Hempel (1942) famously argued that theories and hypotheses concerning history cannot meet the standard of a true scientific theory, and can, at best, only offer explanation sketches, i.e. how-possible scenarios, and at worst, amount to nothing more than in-principle untestable tales, i.e. just-so stories. This seed of distrust concerning scientific theories that have a narrative form has persisted, even if no one still thinks that Hempel's explication of what makes a theory justly scientific is adequate. Yet we do seem to have much genuine scientific knowledge of the deep past. Such knowledge must, then, be justified or confirmed on the basis of some alternative inferential methodology that both makes up for the inability of historical scientists to perform controlled laboratory tests on past complex events and which makes the narrative form of theories inessential. This dissertation develops a new empiricist framework that answers Hempel’s challenge to the untestability of stories concerning the deep past.

From late 1684 through mid-1685, Isaac Newton turned to developing and refining the conceptual foundations presupposed by his emerging physics. Analysis of his manuscripts from this period reveals that Newton’s understanding of the relativity of acceleration led him to seek a spatiotemporally invariant quantity of matter. He found two such quantities and then designed an experiment to discover their relationship. Interpreting the experiment, however, required distinguishing a new notion of force. Others have recognized the conceptual distinction between inertial and gravitational mass. I show here that Newton clearly saw this distinction and that he provisionally established their equivalence.