•  33
    Logic Through a Leibnizian Lens
    Philosophers' Imprint 19 (28). 2019.
    Leibniz's conceptual containment theory says that singular propositions of the form a is F are true when the complete concept of being a contains the concept of being F. In this paper, I provide a new semantics for first-order logic built around this idea. The semantics resolves longstanding problems for Leibniz's theory and can represent, without possible worlds, both hyperintensional distinctions among properties and a certain kind of presumably impossible situation that standard approaches ca…Read more
  •  9
    Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 36 (2): 265-271. 2019.
  •  183
    Modal Intensionalism
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (6): 309-334. 2015.
    We sometimes say things like this: “being an animal is part of being a dog.” We associate the part with a precondition for exemplifying the whole. A new semantics for modal logic results when we take this way of speaking seriously. We need not treat necessary truths as truths in all possible worlds. Instead, we may treat them as preconditions for the existence of any world at all. I present this semantics for modal propositional logic and argue that it operates on a more basic level of modal rea…Read more
  •  137
    Modal Semantics without Worlds
    Philosophy Compass 11 (11): 702-715. 2016.
    Over the last half century, possible worlds have bled into almost every area of philosophy. In the metaphysics of modality, for example, philosophers have used possible worlds almost exclusively to illuminate discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility. But recently, some have grown dissatisfied with possible worlds. Why are horses necessarily mammals? Because the property of being a horse bears a special relationship to the property of being a mammal, they say. Not because every hors…Read more