Cristián Rettig

Universidad Adolfo Ibañez
  •  49
    Reflective Equilibrium: Justification without Intuitions
    Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 39-54. 2017.
    Does the method of reflective equilibrium involve ethical intuitions? If not, what are the so-called “considered judgments” invoked at the beginning of the process of reflective equilibrium? Contrary to the principal tendency in moral and political philosophy, I provide a negative answer to the first question. I hold that ethical intuitions are non-inferential beliefs. I then claim that RE does not involve ethical intuitions because its coherentist character rejects, by definition, any type of n…Read more
  •  47
    The Claimability Condition: Rights as Action‐Guiding Standards
    Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (2): 322-340. 2019.
    Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against whom S may claim her right to P (O’Neill 1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2016…Read more
  •  34
    Is there a Human Right to Subsistence Goods?
    Journal of Philosophical Research 46 243-260. 2021.
    The much-discussed “claimability objection” holds that it is unjustified to believe that all individuals have a human right to subsistence because the bearers of the correlative duties are not sufficiently determined. This argument is based on the so-called “claimability-condition”: S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined. Practice-based theorists defend the human right to subsistence by arguing that if we take the existing human rights practice seriously, th…Read more
  •  30
    Conflicts of Rights and Action‐Guidingness
    Ratio Juris 36 (2): 136-152. 2023.
    In this paper, we raise two points. First, any rights‐based theory should provide a method by which to guide reasoning in addressing conflicts of rights. The reason, we argue, is that these theories must provide guidance on what should be done. Second, this method must contain two key recommendations: (1) We should try to find a deliberative mechanism through which none of the rights is simply eliminated from the scene; (2) these rights may be balanced against each other to define which right sh…Read more
  •  29
    Human Rights under Emergency
    Social Theory and Practice 49 (3): 437-462. 2023.
    International human rights law allows states to derogate some of their human rights obligations in times of public emergency. This essay attempts a normative assessment of the practice of derogation. We discuss, specifically, whether derogation is compatible with the logics and morality of rights. We notice that a major inconsistency between rights and derogation derives from the unilateral character of derogation: derogating parties are assigned a power-right to annul their own rights-based obl…Read more
  •  12
    Towards an action-guiding theory of human rights
    Journal of Global Ethics 19 (2): 206-220. 2023.
    What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns the distribution of corr…Read more
  •  9
    In this paper, I argue that specificationism deprives rights of any significant role in practical reasoning before it arrives at a conclusion, while the generalist conception preserves the practical role we intuitively assign to rights in reasoning directed to action. Assuming that a conception of rights faithful to ordinary practical reasoning is preferable, this fact gives a strong reason to prefer generalism over specificationism, although not without qualification. To be satisfactory from th…Read more
  •  8
    Towards an Action-guiding theory of Human Rights
    Journal of Global Ethics 1 1-15. 2023.
    What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns the distribution of corr…Read more
  •  6
    Defending the “claimability objection” from non-conventional arguments
    Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 21 (2): 173-192. 2022.
    According to the well-known “claimability objection” posed by O’Neill, it is unjustified to hold that each individual has a human right to socioeconomic goods because the duty-bearers are not sufficiently determined. Even though this objection has been defended in the literature from many counter-arguments, attacks against the claimability objection based on non-conventional conceptions of human rights remain unexplored. In this paper, I aim to fill this significant gap in the philosophical lite…Read more
  •  1
    Complex Collective Duties & Action-Guidance
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 64 (156): 793-809. 2023.
    RESUMO Em geral, podemos encontrar na literatura (tanto na popular quanto na acadêmica) atribuições de deveres coletivos complexos a coletivos não estruturados extensos de indivíduos. Por “deveres coletivos complexos”, quero dizer deveres coletivos que, de maneira plausível, exigem que os membros individuais de um coletivo não estruturado extenso empreguem tipos diferentes de ações contributivas para alcançarem um objetivo coletivo - por exemplo, o suposto dever coletivo universal de acabar com …Read more