Cristina Lafont

In this essay I defend an institutional approach to democratic legitimacy against proceduralist approaches that are commonly endorsed by deliberative democrats. Although deliberative democrats defend a complex view of democratic legitimacy that aims to account for both the procedural and substantive dimensions of legitimacy, most accounts of the relationship between these dimensions currently on offer are too proceduralist to be plausible (I). By contrast, I argue that adopting an institutional approach helps provide a more convincing account of the interplay between procedural and substantive aspects of democratic legitimacy which in turn illuminates the intricate relationship between public deliberation and decision-making procedures such as voting (II). This account also enables us to see what is wrong with interpreting the legitimacy of majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions in terms of an alleged conflict between popular sovereignty and rights protections. In opposition to this view, I argue that the proper standard for judging the democratic legitimacy of both majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions is whether they enable an ongoing recursive process of deliberative contestation or whether they generate antidemocratic shortcuts instead (III).

Martin Heidegger generalizes hermeneutics from a traditional method for interpreting authoritative texts (mainly sacred or legal texts) to a way of understanding human beings themselves. It is precisely because human beings are nothing but interpretation all the way down that the activity of interpreting a meaningful text offers the most appropriate model for understanding any human experience whatsoever. Recognizing the linguistically articulated intelligibility that Dasein shares with others by virtue of sharing a natural language leads to the crucial hermeneutic claim of Being and Time, namely, the priority of understanding over perception. The most challenging feature of Heidegger's application of his projective view of interpretation to cognition is the transformation of the traditional conception of a priori knowledge that follows from it. This transformation lies behind Heidegger's choice of the term “fore‐structure of understanding” to explicitly mark the presuppositional character of all interpretation.

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most significant contributors to the development of hermeneutics in contemporary philosophy. His specific approach to critical theory is heavily indebted to the hermeneutic conception of language. This chapter highlights the basic features of that approach through an analysis of the main philosophical issues at the center of Habermas's sustained engagement with Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. The hermeneutic model of a linguistically articulated lifeworld that makes mutual understanding possible is the key conceptual resource that enabled Habermas to break with the paradigm of mentalism that was predominant in the work of the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists. The chapter focuses on the normative difficulty that arises in an attempt to integrate hermeneutics and critical theory. It remains an open question whether the Habermasian approach to critical theory can succeed in its goals.

The separation of church and state is generally taken to be a requirement of constitutional democracies. However, there is little agreement on the precise meaning of the ideal of separation. Some liberal conceptions of democratic legitimacy interpret the ideal of separation such that religious beliefs and reasons should be excluded from political justification. This exclusivist view raises fears that a commitment to liberal democracy is suitable only for secular citizens and religious citizens who are practical atheists, but not for genuinely religious citizens. Against this view, liberal critics argue that the democratic ideal of equal treatment requires the inclusion of religious reasons on equal footing with secular reasons in political deliberation. This inclusivist view, however, raises fears that a commitment to democracy is suitable only for members of religious majorities. For, according to this view, a majority of religious citizens could impose coercive policies on secular citizens or citizens of different faiths without any obligation to give them reasons that they can reasonably accept. Against both views, I defend a conception of political justification and democratic legitimacy that does not rely on the religious–secular distinction in order to show how the normative commitments of constitutional democracies can be reflectively endorsed by all democratic citizens, whether religious or secular.

En este trabajo analizo las propuestas de insertar minipúblicos deliberativos en el proceso político para superar las numerosas “brechas” de representación que aquejan actualmente a los sistemas de partidos tradicionales. Sostengo que la noción de representación que subyace a muchas de estas propuestas tiene algunas similitudes importantes con la noción de representación como “encarnación” del pueblo propia del populismo. A partir de un análisis comparativo entre las variedades populistas y lotocráticas de la representación como “encarnación” del pueblo, destaco dos características que comparten y que son perjudiciales para la democracia. Sobre la base de este análisis, defiendo una forma de entender la relación entre los participantes de los minipúblicos y la ciudadanía en general que evita los rasgos problemáticos de la concepción populista de la representación como encarnación. Para finalizar, expongo cómo las propuestas de usos de los minipúblicos basados en la “confianza” ciega es problemática y abogo, en cambio, por usos participativos de los minipúblicos que realmente empoderarían a la ciudadanía.

In her book A Duty to Resist, Candice Delmas defends the view that we are not only permitted to disobey gravely unjust laws, but we may have a duty to do so. Moreover, not only civil but also uncivil disobedience may be justified in such cases. To justify both claims she argues that the same principles that justify a duty to obey the law—such as the principle of fairness, Samaritan duty, and associative obligations—also justify a duty to disobey the law. The problem with this argumentative strategy is that it amounts to an attempt to derive the duty to disobey gravely unjust laws (or to resist them) from less stringent duties than the ones that can plausibly ground it. Against this strategy, I argue that the focus on laws that violate fundamental rights is what does all the normative work for justifying the duty to disobey/resist such laws, and the appeal to weaker principles is not only superfluous but also misleading. It has negative consequences for our understanding of what is owed to victims, in virtue of what, and by whom.

InA Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that “to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice.” Although it may indeed seem intuitively plausible that a principle based on “threat advantage” cannot count as a principle of justice, it is an altogether different matter to explain why this is so. The question is especially pressing if one bears in mind that such a principle of bargaining in fact underlies many institutionally regulated interactions. Moreover, to the extent that morality is thought of as a mechanism for guaranteeing mutual advantage in the resolution of conflicts, it may indeed seem necessary that it reflect the bargaining power of the parties (in order to make sure that it is indeed advantageous for all of them). In fact, there is a prominent tradition of social-contract theories (from Hobbes to Gauthier) that work under this assumption and claim to provide an answer to what justice requires as much as Rawls's theory does. So seen, the burden of proof seems to fall rather on the shoulders of those committed to claim both that morality is a mechanism that works to the advantage of all and that it nevertheless requires neutralizing all differences in bargaining power.

ABSTRACT Pablo Gilabert's book Human Dignity and Human Rights offers a bold and fascinating account of the claim that human rights are grounded in human dignity. I am quite sympathetic to the dignitarian approach articulated in the book and agree with many of its argumentative goals. My critical comments are therefore lodged in the spirit of a family quarrel. I focus on three issues: the relationship between the humanistic and political perspectives on human rights (1), the suitability of the substantive account of human dignity offered in the book to function as the ground of human rights (2) and the plausibility of a sufficientarian interpretation of the aims of human rights practice (3).

In this essay, I address several questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to the special issue on my book Democracy without Shortcuts. In particular, I address some implications of my critique of deep pluralism; distinguish between three senses of ‘blind deference’: political, reflective, and informational; draw a critical parallelism between the populist conception of representation as embodiment and the conception of ‘citizen-representatives’ often ascribed to participants in deliberative minipublics; defend the democratic attractiveness of participatory uses over empowered uses of deliberative minipublics; clarify why accepting public reason constraints does not imply limiting deliberation to questions about constitutional rights, and argue that overcoming a state-centric conception of democracy does not require replacing the ‘all subjected’ principle with the ‘all affected’ principle.

In this essay, I address some questions and challenges brought about by Thomas Christiano in his inspiring review of my book Democracy without Shortcuts. First, I defend the democratic credentials of the conception of self-government that I articulate in the book against conceptions of self-determination that are allegedly compatible with non-democratic government. To do so, I clarify some aspects of the notion of “blind deference” that I use in the book as a contrast concept to identify a minimal, necessary condition for democratic self-government. In a second step, I clarify my criticism of deep pluralist conceptions of democracy and argue that Christiano’s own criticism does not seem to address the main challenge to which pure proceduralism is supposed to provide an answer. Lastly, I address Christiano’s contention that my criticism of lottocracy does not address the worries that lottocrats are responding to. I distinguish between populist and epistocratic worries and argue that both of them have anti-democratic roots and thus should be criticized rather than “responded to” in their own terms.

This book articulates a participatory conception of deliberative democracy that takes the democratic ideal of self-government seriously. It aims to improve citizens' democratic control and vindicate the value of citizens' participation against conceptions that threaten to undermine it. The book critically analyzes deep pluralist, epistocratic, and lottocratic conceptions of democracy. Their defenders propose various institutional ''shortcuts'' to help solve problems of democratic governance such as overcoming disagreements, citizens' political ignorance, or poor-quality deliberation. However, all these shortcut proposals require citizens to blindly defer to actors over whose decisions they cannot exercise control. Implementing such proposals would therefore undermine democracy. Moreover, it seems naive to assume that a community can reach better outcomes 'faster' if it bypasses the beliefs and attitudes of its citizens. Unfortunately, there are no 'shortcuts' to make a community better than its members. The only road to better outcomes is the long, participatory road that is taken when citizens forge a collective will by changing one another's hearts and minds. However difficult the process of justifying political decisions to one another may be, skipping it cannot get us any closer to the democratic ideal. Starting from this conviction, the book defends a conception of democracy ''without shortcuts''. This conception sheds new light on long-standing debates about the proper scope of public reason, the role of religion in politics, and the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. It also proposes new ways to unleash the democratic potential of institutional innovations such as deliberative minipublics.

In this essay I address the difficult question of how citizens with conflicting religious and secular views can fulfill the democratic obligation of justifying the imposition of coercive policies to others with reasons that they can also accept. After discussing the difficulties of proposals that either exclude religious beliefs from public deliberation or include them without any restrictions, I argue instead for a policy of mutual accountability that imposes the same deliberative rights and obligations on all democratic citizens. The main advantage of this proposal is that it recognizes the right of all democratic citizens to adopt their own cognitive stance in political deliberation in the public sphere without giving up on the democratic obligation to provide reasons acceptable to everyone to justify coercive policies with which all citizens must comply.

This book is one of the most comprehensive and detailed commentaries on both divisions of Heidegger’s Being and Time available in English. The chapters on division 1 were originally published in 1964 under the title Heidegger’s Philosophy: A Guide to His Basic Thought. The new edition prepared by John Llewelyn includes Magda King’s commentaries on division 2 of Being and Time, which are now published for the first time posthumously. The renderings of Heidegger’s German terms have also been revised to correspond to Joan Stambaugh’s new translation of Being and Time. In its new shape, this book is an excellent guide through Heidegger’s master work.

In a recent article Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane defend the view that one of the necessary conditions for the legitimacy of global governance institutions such as the WTO and the IMF is that they respect basic human rights. I certainly agree that setting the minimal threshold of moral acceptability any lower would be entirely unreasonable. But, unfortunately, the view that global governance institutions have human rights obligations is far from uncontroversial. These institutions themselves go to great lengths to deny such a claim. Their official stance finds strong normative support in the state-centric conception of human rights that dominates both normative debates about human rights and current human rights practice. In this article I challenge some of the normative assumptions behind the state-centric conception in order to defend a pluralist conception that ascribes human rights obligations not only to states but also to non-state actors such as global governance institutions. After briefly analyzing some of the proposals currently under discussion about how to legally entrench the obligation to respect human rights in those institutions, I will defend the feasibility of those proposals against the objection that their implementation is incompatible with the current state-system and thus it would require the creation of a world state.