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11Liberal Perfectionism and EpistocracyPublic Affairs Quarterly 37 (4): 307-330. 2023.This essay explores the possible justification that liberal perfectionism may provide to an epistocratic regime. I suggest that epistocratic mechanisms and rules can maintain and improve epistemic autonomy, which itself contributes to the form of personal autonomy to which perfectionists grant a moral priority. Though not decisive, I claim that the Perfectionist Argument for Epistocracy partially justifies epistocracy. Because this argument is developed in the context of liberal social forms, th…Read more
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4International audience.
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4Philosophy and Economics: Recent Issues and Perspectives. Introduction to the Special IssueRevue d'Economie Politique 128 (2): 177. 2018.International audience.
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5Philosophy and Economics: Recent Issues and PerspectivesRevue d'Economie Politique 128 (2). 2018.International audience.
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7In Search of a Stable ConsensusJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24 (2). 2023.Rawls’s political turn is the result of his struggle with the problem of stability in his theory of justice. Rawls’s late solution uses the concept of public reason. It requires that the members of the well-ordered society should abide by a political conception of justice for shared public reasons, thus fostering an overlapping consensus. This solution has been criticized by post-Rawlsian scholars endorsing a Diversity-Convergence account of the stability problem. I complement Rawls’s model of p…Read more
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12How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic ProgramErkenntnis 88 (2): 419-440. 2021.This article proposes two interpretations of the concept of belief hierarchies in Bayesian game theory: the behaviorist interpretation and the mentalist interpretation. On the former, belief hierarchies are derived from the players’ preferences over acts. On the latter, they are causal mechanisms that are responsible for the players’ choices and preferences over acts. The claim is that the epistemic program in game theory is potentially confronted with a dilemma regarding which interpretation sh…Read more
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7Social Contract, Extended Goodness, and Moral DisagreementErasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 14 (2). 2021.This article discusses the role played by interpersonal comparisons in matters of justice and equity. The role of such interpersonal comparisons has initially been made explicit in the context of social choice theory through the concept of extended preferences. Social choice theorists have generally claimed that extended preferences should be taken as being uniform across a population. Three related claims are made within this perspective. First, though it is sometimes opposed to social choice t…Read more
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6Consent and Behavioral Public Policies: A Social Choice PerspectiveRes Publica 29 (1): 141-163. 2022.This paper explores the extent to which behavioral public policies can be both efficient and democratic by reflecting on the conditions under which individuals could rationally consent to them. Consent refers to a moral requirement that a behavioral public policy should respect what I call a person’s value autonomy and conception of the good. Behavioral public policies can take many forms. Based on a social choice framework, I argue that fully paternalistic and prudential behavioral public polic…Read more
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8Neo-Samuelsonian Welfare Economics: From Economic to Normative AgencyRevue de Philosophie Économique 21 (1): 129-161. 2021.Cet article envisage deux types de fondements possibles pour une « économie du bien-être néo-samuelsonnienne ». On défend l’idée que l’approche néo-samuelsonnienne en économie mène à un problème de réconciliation entre l’économie positive et l’économie normative, en raison du fait que l’agent économique n’est plus nécessairement l’unité normativement pertinente. Deux formes de réconciliation ayant des implications radicalement différentes pour le statut de l’économie normative sont envisagées. L…Read more
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10From Utilitarianism to Paternalism: When Behavioral Economics meets Moral PhilosophyRevue de Philosophie Économique 2 73-106. 2015.
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9Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values: Revisiting the History of Welfare Economics, Roger E. Backhouse, Antoinette Baujard and Tamotsu Nishizawa (Eds). Cambridge University Press, 2021, ix + 338 pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 38 (2): 326-332. 2022.
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8The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social OntologyJournal of Social Ontology 7 (1): 73-96. 2021.This paper pursues a naturalist endeavor in social ontology by arguing that the Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium account of institutions can help to advance the debate over the nature of social kinds. This account of institutions emerges from a growing number of works in economics that use game theory to study the role and the functioning of institutions in human societies. I intend to show how recent developments in the economic analysis of rules and institutions can help solve issues that are general…Read more
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16How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory: A Dilemma for the Epistemic ProgramErkenntnis 88 (2): 1-22. 2021.This article proposes two interpretations of the concept of belief hierarchies in Bayesian game theory: the behaviorist interpretation and the mentalist interpretation. On the former, belief hierarchies are derived from the players’ preferences over acts. On the latter, they are causal mechanisms that are responsible for the players’ choices and preferences over acts. The claim is that the epistemic program in game theory is potentially confronted with a dilemma regarding which interpretation sh…Read more
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43The ‘Epistemic Critique’ of Epistocracy and Its InadequacySocial Epistemology 35 (5): 502-514. 2021..
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6Neo-Samuelsonian Welfare Economics: From Economic to Normative AgencyRevue de Philosophie Économique 21 (1): 129-161. 2021.Cet article envisage deux types de fondements possibles pour une « économie du bien-être néo-samuelsonnienne ». On défend l’idée que l’approche néo-samuelsonnienne en économie mène à un problème de réconciliation entre l’économie positive et l’économie normative, en raison du fait que l’agent économique n’est plus nécessairement l’unité normativement pertinente. Deux formes de réconciliation ayant des implications radicalement différentes pour le statut de l’économie normative sont envisagées. L…Read more
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13History, Analytic Narratives, and the Rules-in-Equilibrium View of InstitutionsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (5): 391-417. 2020.Analytic narratives are case studies of historical events and/or institutions that are formed by the combination of the narrative method characteristic of historical and historiographical wor...
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12Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey’s ruleSynthese 198 (8): 7627-7645. 2020.This paper provides a conceptual exploration of the implication of Jeffrey’s rule of belief revision to account for rule-following behavior in a game-theoretic framework. Jeffrey’s rule reflects the fact that in many cases learning something new does not imply that one has full assurance about the true content of the information. In other words, the same information may be both perceived and interpreted in several different ways. I develop an account of rule-following behavior according to which…Read more
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17Naturalism and Moral ConventionalismErasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (1): 50-79. 2018.This article provides a critical examination of Ken Binmore’s theory of the social contract in light of philosophical discussions about moral naturalism and moral conventionalism. Binmore’s account builds on the popular philosophical device of the original position but gives it a naturalistic twist. I argue that this makes it vulnerable to moral skepticism. I explore a possible answer to the moral skeptic’s challenge, building on the fact that Binmore’s account displays a variant of moral conven…Read more
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26Collective intentionality in economics: making Searle's theory of institutional facts relevant for game theoryErasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 6 (1): 1. 2013.Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessar…Read more
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20Institutions, rule-following and game theoryEconomics and Philosophy 33 (1): 43-72. 2017.:Most game-theoretic accounts of institutions reduce institutions to behavioural patterns the players are incentivized to implement. An alternative account linking institutions to rule-following behaviour in a game-theoretic framework is developed on the basis of David Lewis’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein's respective accounts of conventions and language games. Institutions are formalized as epistemic games where the players share some forms of practical reasoning. An institution is a rule-governed g…Read more
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61Models in Economics Are Not (Always) Nomological MachinesPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4): 424-459. 2013.This paper evaluates Nancy Cartwright’s critique of economic models. Cartwright argues that economics fails to build relevant “nomological machines” able to isolate capacities. In this paper, I contend that many economic models are not used as nomological machines. I give some evidence for this claim and build on an inferential and pragmatic approach to economic modeling. Modeling in economics responds to peculiar inferential norms where a “good” model is essentially a model that enhances our kn…Read more
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25A framework for community-based salience: Common knowledge, common understanding and community membershipEconomics and Philosophy 30 (3): 365-395. 2014.This article presents a community-based account of salience as an alternative and a complement to the ‘natural salience’ approach which is endorsed by almost all game theorists who use this concept. While in the naturalistic approach, salience is understood as an objective and natural property of some entities, the community-based account claims that salience is a function of community membership. Building on David Lewis’s theory of common knowledge and on some of its recent refined accounts, I …Read more
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12Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade, Avner Greif, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2006Revue de Philosophie Économique 2 (2): 121-125. 2009.
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27Sen’s criticism of revealed preference theory and its ‘neo-samuelsonian critique’: a methodological and theoretical assessmentJournal of Economic Methodology 23 (4): 349-373. 2016.This paper evaluates how Amartya Sen’s critique of revealed preference theory stands against the latter’s contemporary, ‘neo-Samuelsonian’ version. Neo- Samuelsonians have argued that Sen’s arguments against RPT are innocuous, in particular once it is acknowledged that RPT does not assume away the existence of motivations or other latent psychological or cognitive processes. Sen’s claims that preferences and choices need to be distinguished and that external factors need to be taken into account…Read more