•  12
  •  14
    Response to Heathwood and Bradley
    Res Philosophica 101 (1): 151-161. 2024.
  •  40
    On fellowship
    Philosophical Studies 181 (1): 133-152. 2024.
    This paper explores a form of communion between persons that the philosophy of value has a tendency to ignore. In discussions of interpersonal relationships and experiences, focus is almost always directed to the phenomenon of friendship and family: two or more individuals that share a history, have longstanding relationships of mutual care. Friendship is said, among other things, to be of intrinsic value, to directly benefit the friend, to generate special obligations, and to yield advances in …Read more
  •  6
    The Staircase Scene: Supererogation and Moral Attunement
    In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation, Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 87-104. 2023.
    This paper considers a pair of mutually puzzling first-order intuitions: a case in which it seems both supererogatory for an agent to perform a specified act, and also seems as though were that act not performed, this would have been a failure of moral obligations. I argue that these intuitive reactions are difficult to dislodge and resist accommodation by standard accounts of supererogation. I then argue that this puzzle motivates a new form of supererogatory action: action that, though morally…Read more
  •  19
    Ill-Being for Subjectivists
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46 87-107. 2022.
    The axiological phenomenon of ill-being has been thought to be a special problem for subjectivist theories. I argue here that this common supposition is false. I argue that no leading theory of subjectivism need be unable to accommodate the phenomenon of ill-being. In addition, subjectivists on the whole are licensed to adopt somewhat more outré alternatives, including adopting a disunified approach to ill-being, or rejecting the notion altogether.
  •  15
    The Natural and the Publick Good: Two Puzzles in Hutcheson's Axiology
    Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2): 163-182. 2022.
    Whatever the finer details, Francis Hutcheson is clearly some form of proto-, quasi-, pseudo-utilitarian. But for any utilitarian, the full picture of their moral theory will only emerge once we understand their theory of the good. What, according to said utilitarian, is the nature of happiness? How do we aggregate happiness across persons? In this paper, I discuss two important aspects of Hutcheson's utilitarian axiology each with their own puzzles of interpretation. The first involves Hutcheso…Read more
  •  44
    Friendship and the wishes of the dead
    Legal Theory 28 (2): 124-145. 2022.
    ABSTRACTThe wishes of the dead seem to have normative significance. We not only respect last wills and testaments, but we take seriously what the dead loved, what they valued, even after they have long escaped this mortal coil. But this presents a philosophical puzzle. Is this a normatively justified practice? Why should the fact that some dead person preferred state of affairs x to state of affairs y be a reason to bring about x rather than y—especially if there is otherwise reason to promote y…Read more
  •  173
    Subjectivism without Desire
    Philosophical Review 121 (3): 407-442. 2012.
    Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first importance, t…Read more
  •  18
    Francis Hutcheson
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.
  •  38
    A Theory of Prudence
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    Much of knowing what to do is knowing what to do for ourselves, but knowing how to act in our best interest is complex---we must know what benefits us, what burdens us, and how these facts present and constitute considerations in favor of action. Additionally, we must know how we should weigh our interests at different times---past, present, and future. Dale Dorsey argues that a theory of prudence is needed: a theory of how we ought to act when we are acting for ourselves. A Theory of Prudence p…Read more
  •  168
    Equality-tempered prioritarianism
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1): 45-61. 2014.
    In this paper, I present and explore an alternative to a standard prioritarian axiology. Equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the value of welfare increases should be balanced against the value of equality. However, given that, under prioritarianism, the value of marginal welfare benefits decreases as the welfare of beneficiaries increases, equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the intrinsic value of equality will be sufficient to alter a prioritarian verdict only in cases in whic…Read more
  •  69
    On Distinctively Normative Norms
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4): 414-436. 2019.
  •  83
    Respecting the Game: Blame and Practice Failure
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3): 683-703. 2019.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  74
    The Normative Significance of Self
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1): 1-25. 2016.
    A number of recent works in the metaethics of practical rationality have suggested that features of a person’s character, commitments, projects, practical identities and social roles have important normative consequences. For instance, I might commit to caring for a loved one, or I might become an artist, or take on the role of father to a child. In each case, it seems right to say that the normative landscape I face has been altered by this new fact – to put them under one general heading, the …Read more
  •  93
    Preferences and Prudential Reasons
    Utilitas 31 (2): 157-178. 2019.
  •  107
    Prudence and past selves
    Philosophical Studies 175 (8): 1901-1925. 2018.
    An important platitude about prudential rationality is that I should not refuse to sacrifice a smaller amount of present welfare for the sake of larger future benefits. I ought, in other words, to treat my present and future as of equal prudential significance. The demands of prudence are less clear, however, when it comes to one’s past selves. In this paper, I argue that past benefits are possible in two ways, and that this fact cannot be easily accommodated by traditional approaches to prudent…Read more
  •  94
    Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4): 465-484. 2017.
    ABSTRACT:Current literature in moral and political philosophy is rife with discussion of adaptive preferences. This is no accident: while preferences are generally thought to play an important role in a number of normative domains, adaptive preferences seem exceptions to this general rule—they seem problematic in a way that preference-respecting theories of these domains cannot adequately capture. Thus, adaptive preferences are often taken to be theoretically explanatory: a reason for adjusting …Read more
  •  93
    A Good Death
    Utilitas 29 (2): 153-174. 2017.
  •  130
    A Perfectionist Humean Constructivism
    Ethics 128 (3): 574-602. 2018.
    In this article, I articulate and explore a novel constructivist approach to metanormativity that is inspired by David Hume’s metaesthetics. This view, which I call perfectionist Humean constructivism, rejects the claim that practical reasons are constructed by each individual’s valuing attitudes, holding instead that they are constructed by humanity’s shared evaluative nature. I hold that this approach can plausibly respond to a persistent worry for extant versions of Humean constructivism with…Read more
  •  71
    A Near‐Term Bias Reconsidered
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2): 461-477. 2018.
    Standard accounts of prudential rationality enjoin temporal neutrality. “Rationality,” or so says Rawls, “requires an impartial concern for all parts of our life.” And while I accept this form of temporal neutrality, I argue in this paper that a powerful rationale exists for a competing form of prudential rationality according to which it is permissible to be biased toward near-future rather than far-future parts of one’s life. After arguing that traditional defenses of temporal neutrality do no…Read more
  •  158
    The demandingness of act consequentialism is well-known and has received much sophisticated treatment.1 Few have been content to defend AC’s demands. Much of the response has been to jettison AC in favor of a similar, though significantly less demanding view.2 The popularity of this response is easy to understand. Excessive demandingness appears to be a strong mark against any moral theory. And if excessive demandingness is a worry of this kind, AC’s goose appears cooked: attempts to show that A…Read more
  •  33
    The Basic Minimum: A Welfarist Approach
    Cambridge University Press. 2012.
    A common presupposition in contemporary moral and political philosophy is that individuals should be provided with some basic threshold of goods, capabilities, or well-being. But if there is such a basic minimum, how should this be understood? Dale Dorsey offers an underexplored answer: that the basic minimum should be characterized not as the achievement of a set of capabilities, or as access to some specified bundle of resources, but as the maintenance of a minimal threshold of human welfare. …Read more
  •  51
    Objectivity and Perfection in Hume’s Hedonism
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (2): 245-270. 2015.
    In this paper, I investigate David Hume’s theory of well-being or prudential value. That Hume was some sort of hedonist is typically taken for granted in discussions of his value theory, but I argue that Hume was a hedonist of pathbreaking sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with a form of perfectionism yielding a version of qualitative hedonism that not only solves puzzles surrounding Hume’s moral theory, but is interesting and important in its own right.
  •  100
    Hume's internalism reconsidered
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3): 1-24. 2007.
    A practical reason is the sort of thing that is supposed to, as it were, “count in favor of” my doing something. That a proposition p is true is reason for me to believe it. In the same way, the fact that some act is, say, morally required, prudentially required, aesthetically beautiful, etc., might be reasons to perform it. Intuitively speaking, if I could save millions from devastating poverty, I have a reason to do it–a reason that, again intuitively speaking, appears decisive. In this way it…Read more
  •  169
    Can instrumental value be intrinsic?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2): 137-157. 2012.
    In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with intrinsic value cannot properly distinguish between value as an end and va…Read more
  •  286
    The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It
    Utilitas 25 (3): 355-382. 2013.
    Many find it plausible to posit a category of supererogatory actions. But the supererogatory resists easy analysis. Traditionally, supererogatory actions are characterized as actions that are morally good, but not morally required; actions that go the call of our moral obligations. As I shall argue in this article, however, the traditional analysis can be accepted only by a view with troubling consequences concerning the structure of the moral point of view. I propose a different analysis that i…Read more
  •  380
    Three arguments for perfectionism
    Noûs 44 (1): 59-79. 2010.
    Perfectionism, or the claim that human well-being consists in the development and exercise of one’s natural or essential capacities, is in growth mode. With its long and distinguished historical pedigree, perfectionism has emerged as a powerful antedote to what are perceived as significant problems in desiderative and hedonist accounts of well-being. However, perfectionism is one among many views that deny the influence of our desires, or that cut the link between well-being and a raw appeal to …Read more
  •  212
    Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle
    Philosophical Studies 157 (2): 267-285. 2012.
    An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ 's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, …Read more
  •  92
    Global justice and the limits of human rights
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221). 2005.
    To a great extent, recent discussion of global obligations has been couched in the language of human rights. I argue that this is a mistake. If, as many theorists have supposed, a normative theory applicable to obligations of global justice must also respect the needs of justice internal to recipient nations, any such theory cannot take human rights as an important moral notion. Human rights are inapplicable for the domestic justice of poor nations, and thus cannot form a plausible basis for int…Read more