Dale Tuggy

Some have argued that unipersonal concepts of God collapse into incoherence, so that such a being is no more possible than a square circle, or at least that such theologies are, as non-trinitarian, significantly less probable than some trinitarian theologies. I discuss the general strategy and examine recent arguments by William Lane Craig, C. Stephen Layman, Thomas V. Morris, and Richard Swinburne based on divine love, flourishing, and glory. I show why none of these arguments is compelling, as each has at least one weak premise.

Hasker’s “social” Trinity theory is subject to considerable philosophical problems. More importantly, the theory clashes with the clear New Testament teaching that the one God just is the Father alone. Further, in light of five undeniable facts about the New Testament texts, we can know that the authors of the New Testament thought that the only God was just the Father himself, not the Trinity. Hasker can neither deny these facts nor defeat the strong evidence they provide that in affirming a triune God in the late 4th century, catholic tradition departed from apostolic teaching about the one God.

In this paper we argue that the moral value of an agent is determined solely by their dispositions to act intentionally and freely. We then put this conclusion to work. It resolves a putative moral paradox first posed by Saul Smilansky, and it undermines a prominent line of argument for a variety of Trinitarian theology. Finally, we derive our conclusion about the moral worth of agents not only from our initial series of thought experiments, but also from Abrahamic theism itself. This means that Smilansky’s paradox can only possibly be rehabilitated by an atheist, and that the aforementioned line of argumentation for the Trinity is radically self-undermining, since it relies upon the denial of a corollary of Abrahamic theism.

After laying out five criteria for a successful libertarian account of free will in chapter 1, in chapter 2 I examine the four best recent alternatives to traditional agent causation theories, by Carl Ginet, Stewart Goetz, Randolph Clarke, and Robert Kane. I find that each of these proposals clearly fails on its own terms. In addition, I highlight other problems they face. First, all are theories of free action done for a reason, and not free action simpliciter. It seems best to account for the latter first. Second, the proposals by Clarke and Kane depend crucially on the notion that events of an agent's having of reasons "probabilistically cause" her free actions. I develop an argument that there is the notion of probabilistic causation is at least as problematic as agent causation, so long as we are conceiving of causation in a realistic, non-reductive way. Third, the proposals of Clarke and Kane inherit problems plaguing all causal theories of action. The situation warrants a careful reconsideration of the prospects of agent causation theories. In chapters 3 and 4 I give a critical account of the theories of Richard Taylor and Roderick Chisholm, who re-popularized agent causation theories in the late fifties and sixties. Ironically, both later abandoned agent causation. I lay out the development of and motivations for their theories of agent causation, as well as their stated reasons for abandoning them. In chapter 5, I lay out my theory of agent causation in detail, which owes more to Thomas Reid and William Rowe than to Taylor or Chisholm. I argue that this account succeeds where the recent theories of Timothy O'Connor and William Rowe do not. In the sixth chapter I spell out the different ways in which an event can be controlled by a person, address problems of action individuation, and show why the account meets the five desiderata of chapter 1

Religious believers react in one of four ways to apparent contradictions among their beliefs: Redirection, Resistance, Restraint, or Resolution. This paper evaluates positive mysterian Resistance, the view that believers may rationally believe and know apparently contradictory religious doctrines. After locating this theory by comparing and contrasting it with others, I explore the best developed version of it, that of James Anderson’s Paradox in Christian Theology. I argue that it faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance

In recent work, philosophical theologians Michael Rea and Jeffrey Brower have formulated a precise way of understanding the doctrine of the Trinity along the lines of a contemporary constitution theory of material objects. Here I explain the theological and philosophical thinking behind their proposal, and give seven objections to it. Stepping back to consider methodology, I distinguish several goals a Trinity theory may aim at, and argue that the theory at hand achieves some but not others. Most importantly, it fails as a Rational Reconstruction of creedal trinitarian claims.

I summarize and criticize Edward Wierenga’s "Trinity and Polytheism". The account suffers from both methodological and substantial problems. It shares the former with much recent work--unprincipled choice of orthodox constraints, theoretical defeatism, lack of positive aims, infidelity to its chosen historical source, and being constrained by a nonauthoritative creed. Substantial problems include poor fit with the Bible, a crucial ambiguity concerning God, and a problematic distinction between ’divinity’ and ’godhood’. I argue that the account doesn’t deliver a believable Trinitarian doctrine

Roman Catholic theologians long denied that Jesus had faith in God, and Jesus having faith in God seems in conflict with traditional claims that Jesus is fully divine. What the New Testament means by “faith” is explored, and in light of this we consider arguments from orthodox Incarnation theory to the conclusion that Jesus did not have and could not have had faith in God. Relevantly, the New Testament clearly asserts in five ways that Jesus had faith in God. This exposes problems for traditional Incarnation theories, some of which are addressed by recent “Kenosis” accounts. But these too are problematic.

In recent years, many resourceful thinkers have brought a new clarity to the issues surrounding the doctrine of the Trinity. Two incompatible families of Trinitarian doctrine have been clearly distinguished: Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism. I argue here that no theory in either camp has yet evaded the triune pitfalls of inconsistency, unintelligibility, and poor fit with the Bible. These two main approaches appear to be hopeless, and I argue that appeals to ‘mystery’ are no way to avoid the difficulties at hand. Thus, the Trinitarian project is as yet unfinished.

Open theists agree that God lacks what is normally called “comprehensive” foreknowledge, but why believe this? Open theists answer in three ways, which I call the narrow road, the wide road, and the shortcut to open theism. Here I argue that (1) the narrow road faces a difficulty concerning the doctrine of divine omniscience which doesn’t arise for the wide road, (2) the wide road is well-motivated and appealing, given certain philosophical commitments, (3) the shortcut is too simple to work, and (4) William Lane Craig’s objections to the wide road fail. I conclude with some observations about the state of the dispute between open theists and their critics.