Dan Haas

Red Deer College
  •  85
    In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 797-811. 2013.
    I defend a hard-line reply to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom accuses compatibilists who take a hard-line reply to his manipulation argument of adopting inappropriate initial attitudes towards the cases central to his argument. If Pereboom is correct he has shown that a hard-line response is inadequate. Fortunately for the compatibilist, Pereboom’s list of appropriate initial attitudes is incomplete and at least one of the initial attitudes he leaves out provides room f…Read more
  •  49
    Merit, fit, and basic desert
    Philosophical Explorations 16 (2): 226-239. 2013.
    Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches to moral …Read more
  •  3
    A leading objection to the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (the manipulation argument) involves a thought-experiment in which a person is manipulated such that she satisfies the most robust compatibilist conditions for morally responsible agency. It seems counter-intuitive to hold this person morally responsible for what she has been manipulated to do, and so, the argument goes, compatibilism is flawed. I argue that compatibilists should maintain that agents who experience …Read more
  •  2
    Moral Foundations are not Moral Propositions
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (154). 2019.
    Joshua May responds to skepticism about moral knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral foundations. I demonstrate that the moral foundations literature is not able to do the work May needs. It demonstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefore, May's attempt to defeat general skepticism fails.