University of California, Davis
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Areas of Interest
  •  127
    Bridging the Modal Gap
    Journal of Philosophy 107 (8): 432-443. 2010.
  •  95
    Writing the Book of the World (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 202-205. 2013.
  •  75
    The Role of Structure: a critical notice of Sider’s Writing the Book of the World (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1): 129-147. 2014.
    I critically evaluate the notion of structure Ted Sider presents in Writing the Book of the World. A prerequisite to understanding Sider's notion of structure is understanding Sider's take on ideology and ontology. In Section II, I discuss this. In Section III, I consider arguments in favor of structure. In Section IV, I examine one debate that is considered by Sider to be nonsubstantive: the debate over modality. I conclude, in Section V, by examining the reception Writing the Book of the World…Read more
  •  72
    Ontology Made Easy
    Philosophical Review 127 (1): 145-149. 2018.
  •  63
    Philosophical Methodology in Modal Epistemology
    Essays in Philosophy 13 (1): 11. 2012.
    This paper examines the legitimacy of two common methodologies within philosophy: thought experiments and conceptual analysis. In particular, I examine the uses to which these two methodologies have been put within modal epistemology. I argue that, although both methods can be used to reveal conditional essentialist claims , neither can be used to reveal the de re essentialists claims they’re often taken to reveal.
  •  56
    In standard modal logic, □ ≡ ∼◊ ∼ and ◊ ≡ ∼□∼. I will, first, examine why in tense-logic, Arthur Prior thinks that ∼ ◊ ∼ is weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ is weaker than ◊. I will, then, examine whether there are similar motivations in modal logic to take ∼ ◊ ∼ to be weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ to be weaker than ◊. The upshot will be that, just as certain metaphysical views within the philosophy of time motivate one to deny the standard tense equivalences, certain metaphysical views within the metaphysics …Read more
  •  52
    Do Events Have Their Parts Essentially?
    Acta Analytica 32 (3): 313-320. 2017.
    We argue that mereological essentialism for events is independent of mereological essentialism for objects, and that the philosophical fallout of embracing mereological essentialism for events is minimal. We first outline what we should consider to be the parts of events, and then highlight why one would naturally be inclined to think that the object-question and the event-question are linked. Then, we argue that they are not. We also diagnose why this is the case and emphasize the upshot. In pa…Read more
  •  45
    The Hard Question for Hylomorphism
    Metaphysics 1 (1): 52-62. 2018.
    The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form),…Read more
  •  44
    Lewisian-Style Counterfactual Analysis of Causation: A New Solution to the Overdetermination Problem
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (4): 461-476. 2010.
    Causal overdetermination – i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z – has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination…Read more
  •  30
    The Future of the Philosophy of Time
    Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 851-853. 2015.
  •  28
    Constructivism in Metaphysics
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    Constructivism in Metaphysics Although there is no canonical definition of “Constructivism” within analytic metaphysics, here is a good starting definition: Constructivism: Some existing entities are constructed by us in that they depend substantively on us. Exactly what it is for an entity to “depend substantively on us” varies between views. Constructivism is a broad view … Continue reading Constructivism in Metaphysics →
  •  24
    Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy
    Erkenntnis 1-19. forthcoming.
    I argue there are some objects which do not respect the Law of the Excluded Middle, i.e., which are such that, for some property F, the disjunction Fo v ~Fo fails to be true. I call such objects “odd objects” and present three examples—fictional objects, nonsort objects, and quantum objects. I argue that each of these objects is best understood as violating LEM. I, then, discuss Jessica Wilson’s account of metaphysical indeterminacy. I show how the indeterminacy which arises with odd objects can…Read more
  •  15
    A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time
    Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 282-285. 2015.