University of California, Davis
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
  •  9
    Change and Identity Over Time
    In Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley. 2013.
    This essay explores what is at stake while considering the change and identity of objects over time. Philosophers worry about an object having incompatible properties in part due to the fact that it is ruled out by Leibniz's Law. They have preferred to hold on to Leibniz's Law and to find some other way to resolve the problem of an object's changing its properties over time. The chapter examines three accounts of how objects change over time without violating Leibniz's Law: endurance, perdurance…Read more
  •  6
    Creationism, Easy Ontology, and Indeterminacy
    In Miguel Garcia-Godinez (ed.), Thomasson on Ontology, Springer Verlag. pp. 265-283. 2023.
    Amie Thomasson is well known both for defending Creationism about fictional characters (see her 1999, 2003, 2009, 2010, 2015a, and 2016) and for endorsing easy ontology (2015b). My aim in this chapter is to argue that there’s a tension between these two views. Creationism commits one to the existence of fictional characters (as abstract objects). Easy ontology commits one to the existence of abundant properties. I will argue that anyone who endorses both the existence of fictional characters and…Read more
  • Are modal facts brute facts?
    In Elly Vintiadis & Constantinos Mekios (eds.), Brute Facts, Oxford University Press. 2018.
  •  27
    The Anti-Realist Boogeyman (And How To Avoid Him)
    Philosophia 51 (1): 189-204. 2022.
    I distinguish Local Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing some of the objects we have epistemic access to) from Global Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing all of the objects we have epistemic access to). I explicate and clarify Local Constructivism and show how the metaphysical concerns which motivate endorsing Local Constructivism about some objects (e.g. social objects, modal objects) differ from the epistemic and semantic concerns which mo…Read more
  •  34
    The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing
    Metaphysica 23 (1): 73-80. 2022.
    Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.
  •  72
    Constructivism in Metaphysics
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    Constructivism in Metaphysics Although there is no canonical definition of “Constructivism” within analytic metaphysics, here is a good starting definition: Constructivism: Some existing entities are constructed by us in that they depend substantively on us. Exactly what it is for an entity to “depend substantively on us” varies between views. Constructivism is a broad view … Continue reading Constructivism in Metaphysics →
  •  37
    Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy
    Erkenntnis 86 (6): 1615-1633. 2019.
    I argue there are some objects which do not respect the Law of the Excluded Middle, i.e., which are such that, for some property F, the disjunction Fo v ~Fo fails to be true. I call such objects “odd objects” and present three examples—fictional objects, nonsort objects, and quantum objects. I argue that each of these objects is best understood as violating LEM. I, then, discuss Jessica Wilson’s account of metaphysical indeterminacy. I show how the indeterminacy which arises with odd objects can…Read more
  •  85
    The Hard Question for Hylomorphism
    Metaphysics 1 (1): 52-62. 2018.
    The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form),…Read more
  •  90
    Ontology Made Easy
    Philosophical Review 127 (1): 145-149. 2018.
  •  81
    Do Events Have Their Parts Essentially?
    Acta Analytica 32 (3): 313-320. 2017.
    We argue that mereological essentialism for events is independent of mereological essentialism for objects, and that the philosophical fallout of embracing mereological essentialism for events is minimal. We first outline what we should consider to be the parts of events, and then highlight why one would naturally be inclined to think that the object-question and the event-question are linked. Then, we argue that they are not. We also diagnose why this is the case and emphasize the upshot. In pa…Read more
  •  87
    The Role of Structure: a critical notice of Sider’s Writing the Book of the World (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1): 129-147. 2014.
    I critically evaluate the notion of structure Ted Sider presents in Writing the Book of the World. A prerequisite to understanding Sider's notion of structure is understanding Sider's take on ideology and ontology. In Section II, I discuss this. In Section III, I consider arguments in favor of structure. In Section IV, I examine one debate that is considered by Sider to be nonsubstantive: the debate over modality. I conclude, in Section V, by examining the reception Writing the Book of the World…Read more
  •  109
    Writing the Book of the World (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 202-205. 2013.
  •  19
    A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time
    Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 282-285. 2015.
  •  65
    In standard modal logic, □ ≡ ∼◊ ∼ and ◊ ≡ ∼□∼. I will, first, examine why in tense-logic, Arthur Prior thinks that ∼ ◊ ∼ is weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ is weaker than ◊. I will, then, examine whether there are similar motivations in modal logic to take ∼ ◊ ∼ to be weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ to be weaker than ◊. The upshot will be that, just as certain metaphysical views within the philosophy of time motivate one to deny the standard tense equivalences, certain metaphysical views within the metaphysics …Read more
  •  55
    Lewisian-Style Counterfactual Analysis of Causation: A New Solution to the Overdetermination Problem
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (4): 461-476. 2010.
    Causal overdetermination – i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z – has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination…Read more
  •  71
    Philosophical Methodology in Modal Epistemology
    Essays in Philosophy 13 (1): 183-195. 2012.
    This paper examines the legitimacy of two common methodologies within philosophy: thought experiments and conceptual analysis. In particular, I examine the uses to which these two methodologies have been put within modal epistemology. I argue that, although both methods can be used to reveal conditional essentialist claims (e.g. necessarily: if x is water, then x is H20), neither can be used to reveal the de re essentialists claims (e.g. x is water and x is essentially H20) they’re often taken t…Read more
  •  141
    Bridging the Modal Gap
    Journal of Philosophy 107 (8): 432-443. 2010.
  •  34
    The Future of the Philosophy of Time
    Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 851-853. 2015.