Daniel Adsett

In this dissertation I advance a Jaspersian account of the formation and possession of irrational attitudes. This account stands in opposition to two competing views – externalism and internalism with respect to rational and irrational attitudes. According to externalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they fail to satisfy standards or criteria independent of the subject, such as laws of logic, methods for evidence acquisition, and rules of decision theory. According to internalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they are not supported by reasons selected by the subject. In this dissertation, I take Donald Davidson’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of externalism and John Searle’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of internalism. While articulating and identifying the merits of externalism and internalism with respect to rational or irrational attitudes, I argue that each account ends up in difficulties: Davidson’s externalism cannot account for the experience of freedom, an individual’s subjectivity, and is unable to avoid an infinite regress of rules; Searle’s internalism struggles to avoid solipsism and an infinite regress of reasons. Karl Jaspers’ account of rational and irrational attitude formation, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of Davidson’s and Searle’s views while preserving the merits of each. On Jaspers’ account, a subject possesses rational attitudes insofar as that subject holds those attitudes to be always open to revision while, at the same time, using those attitudes to bring unity to all manner of phenomena and other attitudes. Irrationality, by contrast, occurs, on the Jaspersian view, when a subject holds onto attitudes with complete and absolute resolution and interprets all else according to these attitudes. Having defined a Jaspersian account of rational and irrational attitudes, I show how it accounts for the irrationality of delusional beliefs and the irrationality of certain worldviews. On Jaspers’ view, I argue, delusions and worldviews are irrational insofar as they are held with absolute conviction, are unamenable to modification, and are used to understand all available evidence, views, and opinions.

In his mature philosophical writings, Karl Jaspers juxtaposes his own theory of reason with what he considers irrational and dogmatising tendencies in the works of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth. On Jaspers's view, both Bultmann and Barth construct theologies that serve as a priori frameworks through which to understand all the contingencies of existence. In opposition to such dogmatisms, Jaspers advances a hermeneutics that forbids, in advance, any permanent conclusions by proposing that we understand religious, artistic, and other approaches to transcendence as ciphers. Such ciphers, Jaspers holds, offer no fixed and final interpretation of transcendence but offer a way to remain non-dogmatically open to a wide range of possible understandings of it. As opening up a non-dogmatic form of communication, cipher-reading is guided by reason's will to openness and communication. However, as I ultimately point out, Jaspers's own effort to develop a non-dogmatic hermeneutics is beset by some of the very difficulties he identifies in the theologies of Barth and Bultmann.

Traditionally, analogical ontologies—ontologies that are hierarchically structured with beings participating in a primary being—have been defended by those who criticize secularism. Secularism, it is said, depends on the leveling out of being, the elimination of hierarchies in favor of ontologies in which beings differ only according to intensity. John Milbank, for example, argues that secularism became a possibility only once medieval analogical ontologies were supplanted by univocal accounts of being. In this paper, however, I argue that an endorsement of an analogical ontology is not restricted to pre-moderns and those critical of secularism. It is possible, I argue, to conceive of a secular version of analogical ontology. Martin Heidegger’s mid-career account of being offers us an example of such an ontology. In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct Heidegger’s mid-career ontology as analogically and secularly organized. In doing so, I challenge Milbank’s claim that secular ontologies are necessarily non-analogical.

Traditionally, analogical ontologies—ontologies that are hierarchically structured with beings participating in a primary being—have been defended by those who criticize secularism. Secularism, it is said, depends on the leveling out of being, the elimination of hierarchies in favor of ontologies in which beings differ only according to intensity. John Milbank, for example, argues that secularism became a possibility only once medieval analogical ontologies were supplanted by univocal accounts of being. In this paper, however, I argue that an endorsement of an analogical ontology is not restricted to pre-moderns and those critical of secularism. It is possible, I argue, to conceive of a secular version of analogical ontology. Martin Heidegger’s mid-career account of being offers us an example of such an ontology. In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct Heidegger’s mid-career ontology as analogically and secularly organized. In doing so, I challenge Milbank’s claim that secular ontologies are necessarily non-analogical.