Daniel G. Campos

in two letters concerning the Spanish-American War of 1898, Charles Sanders Peirce openly expresses some egregious prejudices against several groups of people, including Hispanics—people of at least partly Spanish origin in the Iberian Peninsula or the Americas (L 254 and L 339; reprint, translation to Spanish, and commentary in Nubiola and Zalamea 76–811). In an undated letter to his cousin Henry Cabot Lodge, a Massachusetts politician, Peirce writes regarding the war: “I don’t believe the Spaniards will make a good fight; for as I have studied them in Spain, the whole people has been corrupted with the centuries of cruelty, injustice and rapine they have indulged in, and have little real manhood left” (L 254; ..

in their book American Philosophy: From Wounded Knee to the Present, contemporary philosophers Erin McKenna and Scott Pratt identify "living in a context of difference" as the central philosophical issue in the history of the United States. They credit W. E. B. Du Bois with having identified racial difference as one particular version of this general issue: "Du Bois once declared that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the problem of the coexistence of differences that figure in our existence as members of communities". For McKenna and Pratt, this continues to be the central philosophical problem in the United States, and perhaps globally, today: "From the...

Henry David Thoreau’s discussion of the highest value of wild apples and my own reflection upon my experience, interacting with the sea and enjoying its products during my Central American upbringing, motivate this discussion of how human beings may apprehend nature’s highest worth. I propose that in order to apprehend nature’s highest value it is necessary to understand the complete transaction between human beings and nature—an active transaction that requires from the human being a continuous movement along experience, reflection, and responsible action. I argue that the economic valuation of natural products—via the contemporary economic concepts of utility, use-value, existence-value, and willingness-to-pay—is insufficient to comprehend the full worth of nature because it reduces the human being-nature transaction to mere economic terms. Hence, a reading of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Nature provides insight into the services—commodity, beauty, language, and discipline—that the human being receives, as part of the transaction, from nature. In turn, a reading of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac complements the Emersonian position by considering the human being’s position as a member of a natural community. Finally, I propose that in order to apprehend the worth of nature, it is further necessary to move from the reflective understanding of the human being-nature transaction into necessary action, that is, into the assumption of responsibility towards nature.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of the philosophical analysis of sport in Latin America from the nineteenth century to the present. To do so, this paper identifies the main themes and the leading works that emerged throughout this period as well as their relation to regional philosophical traditions. Likewise, to situate the philosophical analysis of sport in Latin America in a broader perspective, this paper makes reference to its relation to the philosophy of sport in parts of the English-speaking world and the Iberian Peninsula . This paper also includes an account of the character and extent of philosophical thinking in relation to sport in contemporary Latin America and speculations about the future of the discipline in the region

: C.S. Peirce defines mathematics in two ways: first as "the science which draws necessary conclusions," and second as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.227–244). Given the dual definition, Peirce notes, a question arises: Should we exclude the work of poietic hypothesis-making from the domain of pure mathematical reasoning? (CP 4.238). This paper examines Peirce's answer to the question. Some commentators hold that for Peirce the framing of mathematical hypotheses requires poietic genius but is not scientific work. I propose, to the contrary, that although Peirce occasionally seems to exclude the poietic creation of hypotheses altogether from pure mathematical reasoning, Peirce's position is rather that the creation of mathematical hypotheses is poietic, but it is not merely poietic, and accordingly, that hypothesis-framing is part of mathematical reasoning that involves an element of poiesis but is not merely poietic either. Scientific considerations also inhere in the process of hypothesis-making, without excluding the poietic element. In the end, I propose that hypothesis-making in mathematics stands between artistic and scientific poietic creativity with respect to imaginative freedom from logical and actual constraints upon reasoning

I address the philosophical debate over whether the mathematical theory of probability arose on the basis of empirical observations or of purely theoretical speculations. The debate tends to pose a strict dichotomy between empirical problem-solving and pure theorizing. I alternatively suggest that, in the case of mathematical probability, an empirical problem-context acted as an enabling condition for the possibility of mathematical innovation, but that the activity of the early mathematical probabilists gradually became the study of a theoretical system of ideas. This case has some implications for a more general philosophical view on the context of mathematical discovery. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I articulate Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of mathematical education as related to his conception of mathematics, the nature of its method of inquiry, and especially, the reasoning abilities required for mathematical inquiry. The main thesis is that Peirce’s philosophy of mathematical education primarily aims at fostering the development of the students’ semeiotic abilities of imagination, concentration, and generalization required for conducting mathematical inquiry by way of experimentation upon diagrams. This involves an emphasis on the relation between theory and practice and between mathematics and other fields including the arts and sciences. For achieving its goals, the article is divided in three sections. First, I expound Peirce’s philosophical account of mathematical reasoning. Second, I illustrate this account by way of a geometrical example, placing special emphasis on its relation to mathematical education. Finally, I put forth some Peircean philosophical principles for mathematical education.

This essay provides an account of the lived personal experience of immigration at three levels: general aims; relations to place and to other persons; and feelings and sensibility. The account is structured by Charles Peirce's phenomenological categories, but the emphasis is on describing the experience. For the experiential descriptions, the essay also relies on the work of Latin Americans such as Octavio Paz and Mario Benedetti and Anglo Americans such as Henry Thoreau, John McDermott, Jane Addams, and Lara Trout.

Henry David Thoreau’s discussion of the highest value of wild apples and my own reflection upon my experience, interacting with the sea and enjoying its products during my Central American upbringing, motivate this discussion of how human beings may apprehend nature’s highest worth. I propose that in order to apprehend nature’s highest value it is necessary to understand the complete transaction between human beings and nature—an active transaction that requires from the human being a continuous movement along experience, reflection, and responsible action. I argue that the economic valuation of natural products—via the contemporary economic concepts of utility, use-value, existence-value, and willingness-to-pay—is insufficient to comprehend the full worth of nature because it reduces the human being-nature transaction to mere economic terms. Hence, a reading of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Nature provides insight into the services—commodity, beauty, language, and discipline—that the human being receives, as part of the transaction, from nature. In turn, a reading of Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac complements the Emersonian position by considering the human being’s position as a member of a natural community. Finally, I propose that in order to apprehend the worth of nature, it is further necessary to move from the reflective understanding of the human being-nature transaction into necessary action, that is, into the assumption of responsibility towards nature.

This book is a Spanish translation of two of Charles S. Peirce's late texts on pragmatism, namely, "What Pragmatism Is" (originally published in The Monist, 1905) and "Pragmatism" (MS 318, 1907).1 The essays are introduced by translator Sara Barrena, who based her edition on the texts published in The Essential Peirce.2 The introduction consists of brief sections that present a biographical sketch of Peirce; an account of his original formulation of pragmatism; a summary of its evolution into his later pragmaticism, including a synthesis of his arguments in the two translated texts; and Barrena's own conclusions about the import of Peirce's pragmaticism in the context of his philosophical system. The publication ..

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peireean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peireean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peireean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton's thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference