Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
  •  1268
    A Lockean argument for universal access to health care
    Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (2): 166-191. 2011.
    This essay defends the controversial and indeed counterintuitive claim that there is a good argument to be made from a Lockean perspective for government action to guarantee access to health care. The essay maintains that this argument is in some regards more robust than the well-known argument in defense of universal health care spelled out by Norman Daniels, which this essay also examines in some detail. Locke's view that government should protect people's lives, property, and freedom–where fr…Read more
  •  592
    Debate: To nudge or not to nudge
    Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1): 123-136. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  498
    There are simple mechanical systems that elude causal representation. We describe one that cannot be represented in a single directed acyclic graph. Our case suggests limitations on the use of causal graphs for causal inference and makes salient the point that causal relations among variables depend upon details of causal setups, including values of variables.
  •  255
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in genera…Read more
  •  241
    Polling and public policy
    Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3): 241-247. 2004.
    : This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in determinin…Read more
  •  167
    Philosophy of economics
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
  •  167
    Egalitarianism Reconsidered
    with Matt Sensat Waldren
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4): 567-586. 2011.
    This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Mart…Read more
  •  165
    Hedonism and welfare economics: Daniel M. Hausman
    Economics and Philosophy 26 (3): 321-344. 2010.
    This essay criticizes the proposal recently defended by a number of prominent economists that welfare economics be redirected away from the satisfaction of people's preferences and toward making people happy instead. Although information about happiness may sometimes be of use, the notion of happiness is sufficiently ambiguous and the objections to identifying welfare with happiness are sufficiently serious that welfare economists are better off using preference satisfaction as a measure of welf…Read more
  •  159
    Are markets morally free zones?
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4): 317-333. 1989.
    Markets are central institutions in societies such as ours, and it seems appropriate to ask whether markets treat individuals justly or unjustly and whether choices individuals make concerning their market behavior are just or unjust. After all, markets influence most important features of our lives from the environment in which we live to the ways in which we find pleasure and fulfillment. Within market life we collectively determine the shape of human existence.<1>.
  •  138
    Revealed preference, belief, and game theory
    Economics and Philosophy 16 (1): 99-115. 2000.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
  •  128
    Mistakes about Preferences in the Social Sciences
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1): 3-25. 2011.
    Preferences are the central notion in mainstream economic theory, yet economists say little about what preferences are. This article argues that preferences in mainstream positive economics are comparative evaluations with respect to everything relevant to value or choice, and it argues against three mistaken views of preferences: that they are matters of taste, concerning which rational assessment is inappropriate, that preferences coincide with judgments of expected self-interested benefit, an…Read more
  •  128
    Equality versus priority: A misleading distinction
    Economics and Philosophy 31 (2): 229-238. 2015.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its co…Read more
  •  115
    Problems with Realism in Economics: Daniel M. Hausman
    Economics and Philosophy 14 (2): 185-213. 1998.
    This essay attempts to distinguish the pressing issues for economists and economic methodologists concerning realism in economics from those issues that are of comparatively slight importance. In particular I shall argue that issues concerning the goals of science are of considerable interest in economics, unlike issues concerning the evidence for claims about unobservables, which have comparatively little relevance. In making this argument, this essay raises doubts about the two programs in con…Read more
  •  106
    Modularity and the causal Markov condition: A restatement
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1): 147-161. 2004.
    expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be r…Read more
  •  103
    Fairness and social norms
    Philosophy of Science 75 (5): 850-860. 2008.
    This essay comments on the theory of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri in The Grammar of Society. It applauds her theory of norms but argues that it cannot account for the experimental results concerning ultimatum games. A theory of fairness is also needed. It develops a number of specific criticisms of her way of incorporating the influence of norms into preferences. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5197 Helen C. Whit…Read more
  •  102
    When Jack and Jill Make a Deal*: DANIEL M. HAUSMAN
    Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (1): 95-113. 1992.
    In ordinary circumstances, human actions have a myriad of unintended and often unforeseen consequences for the lives of other people. Problems of pollution are serious examples, but spillovers and side effects are the rule, not the exception. Who knows what consequences this essay may have? This essay is concerned with the problems of justice created by spillovers. After characterizing such spillovers more precisely and relating the concept to the economist's notion of an externality, I shall th…Read more
  •  93
    What's wrong with health inequalities?
    Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1). 2007.
  •  92
  •  92
    Sympathy, commitment, and preference
    Economics and Philosophy 21 (1): 33-50. 2005.
    While very much in Sen's camp in rejecting revealed preference theory and emphasizing the complexity, incompleteness, and context dependence of preference and the intellectual costs of supposing that all the factors influencing choice can be captured by a single notion of preference, this essay contests his view that economists should recognize multiple notions of preference. It argues that Sen's concerns are better served by embracing a single conception of preference and insisting on the need …Read more
  •  91
    Motives and Markets in Health Care
    Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (2): 64-84. 2013.
    The truth about health care policy lies between two exaggerated views: a market view in which individuals purchase their own health care from profit maximizing health-care firms and a control view in which costs are controlled by regulations limiting which treatments health insurance will pay for. This essay suggests a way to avoid on the one hand the suffering, unfairness, and abandonment of solidarity entailed by the market view and, on the other hand, to diminish the inflexibility and ineffic…Read more
  •  84
    Benevolence, justice, well-being and the health gradient
    Public Health Ethics 2 (3): 235-243. 2009.
    The health gradient among those who are by historical standards both remarkably healthy and well-off is of considerable moral importance with respect to benevolence, justice and the theory of welfare. Indeed it may help us to realize that for most people the good life lies in close and intricate social ties with others which can flourish only when inequalities are limited. The health gradient suggests that there is a story to be told in which egalitarian justice, solidarity, health and well-bein…Read more
  •  83
    John Stuart mill's philosophy of economics
    Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 363-385. 1981.
    John Stuart Mill regards economics as an inexact and separate science which employs a deductive method. This paper analyzes and restates Mill's views and considers whether they help one to understand philosophical peculiarities of contemporary microeconomic theory. The author concludes that it is philosophically enlightening to interpret microeconomics as an inexact and separate science, but that Mill's notion of a deductive method has only a little to contribute.
  •  79
    Manipulation and the causal Markov condition
    Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 846-856. 2004.
    This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
  •  75
    Why don't effects explain their causes?
    Synthese 94 (2). 1993.