The present paper makes three contentions with regard to the respective Kantian and Bradleyian accounts of the intrinsically problematic status of our epistemic predicament. First, it is in consequence of their common adherence to a view of the human intellect as both inherently qualified by its cognitive dependence upon the conditional phenomena of sensible experience and rationally committed to the pursuit of knowledge of the unconditional, that Kant and Bradley regard rational cognition as ac…
Read moreThe present paper makes three contentions with regard to the respective Kantian and Bradleyian accounts of the intrinsically problematic status of our epistemic predicament. First, it is in consequence of their common adherence to a view of the human intellect as both inherently qualified by its cognitive dependence upon the conditional phenomena of sensible experience and rationally committed to the pursuit of knowledge of the unconditional, that Kant and Bradley regard rational cognition as accountable to a standard which it cannot match. Second, Kant and Bradley are committed to differing idealist positions which carry significant implications for their respective outlooks on the ontological commitments we incur in pursuit of the highest standards of reason. Third, and, finally, whereas Kant's transcendental idealism permits him to hold that theoretical reason does not entail ontological commitment to any object which lies beyond the scope of our cognitive powers, Bradley finds himself in the more awkward position of having to concede that our capacity for knowledge necessarily commits us to the existence of an Absolute which is ultimately beyond the grasp of the human intellect. Hence it shall be argued that it is Bradley, and not Kant, whose idealism results in unintelligible ontological commitments
