•  11
    Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order Model
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-22. forthcoming.
    If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based o…Read more
  • Pensamiento y lenguaje
    In Mariela Aguilera, Laura Danón, Carolina Scotto & Elisabeth Camp (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición, Editorial Universidad Nacional De Córdoba. 2015.
  •  1
    Peirce y lo incognoscible. Respuesta a Damiani
    Tópicos 22 265-276. 2011.
    El presente artículo responde algunas objeciones que Damiani, en su trabajo “Comunidad, realidad y pragmatismo”, efectúa a un artículo anterior mío sobre lo incognoscible en Peirce: “Lo incognoscible y los límites del sentido”. Señalo que nuestros desacuerdos conciernen principalmente a dos puntos: si tiene sentido sostener que no podemos saber si hay incognoscibles, y si cabe defender la tesis de Peirce sin comprometerse con el idealismo. Al argumentar por una respuesta afirmativa al primer pun…Read more
  •  23
    Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge
    Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1): 49-70. 2022.
    According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this arti…Read more
  •  18
    Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer
    Critica 54 (161): 95-108. 2022.
    Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer, Gedisa, México, 2021, 272 pp.
  •  34
    A new case of the Myth of the Given?
    Theoria 88 (5): 927-942. 2022.
    For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with the…Read more
  •  42
    Perception as a contentful relation
    European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 740-754. 2022.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 740-754, June 2022.
  •  23
    Naïve realism and seeing aspects
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1-16. forthcoming.
    Naïve realism is the view according to which perception is a non-representational relation of conscious awareness to mind-independent objects and properties. According to this approach, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by just the objects, properties, or facts presented to the senses. In this article, I argue that such a conception of the phenomenology of experience faces a clear counter-example, i.e., the experience of seeing aspects. The discussion suggests that, to accomm…Read more
  •  1
    Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue …Read more
  •  29
    Perception as a propositional attitude
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 35 (2): 155-174. 2020.
    It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propo…Read more
  •  13
    Perceiving Mental States: Co-presence and Constitution
    Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57 29-34. 2018.
    Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis and the hybrid model. We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving other peo…Read more
  •  37
    Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1): 36-55. 2020.
    In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual...
  •  42
    Perception as a propositional attitude
    Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. forthcoming.
    It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositiona…Read more
  •  52
    Non‐conceptualism and the Myth of the Given
    Dialectica 72 (3): 331-363. 2018.
  •  13
    Percepción y mentes animales
    Revista de Filosofía 43 (2): 201-221. 2018.
    En este artículo propongo una variedad de conceptualismo contra la objeción no conceptualista de acuerdo con la cual los enfoques no conceptualistas no serían capaces de explicar apropiadamente la percepción animal. En primer lugar, sintetizo la posición de McDowell sobre las mentes animales. En segundo lugar, señalo algunos problemas conceptuales en ella. En tercer lugar, sugiero una extensión del conceptualismo al reino animal a fin de resolver las inconsistencias de McDowell y de acomodar cie…Read more
  •  35
  •  27
    Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (3): 425. 2017.
    In Part VIII of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, after criticizing one of the forms that the Myth of the Given adopts, Sellars presents his own conception of epistemic justification. This conception, along with his criticism of the framework of the Given, has had a great impact on the analytic philosophy of the second half of twentieth century, an impact that still persists today.1 In this article, I aim to examine Sellars's theory of epistemic justification in order to highlight two impor…Read more
  •  67
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of accepta…Read more
  •  21
    The Experience Not Well Lost
    Contemporary Pragmatism 11 (1): 43-56. 2014.
  •  7
    Dewey y el mito de lo dado
    Endoxa 26 157. 2010.
  •  46
    Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as
    Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1): 123-144. 2015.
    According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thes…Read more
  •  2
    Dewey y el mito de lo dado
    Endoxa 26 157-186. 2010.
  •  38
    Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson: coincidencias anti-escépticas
    Areté. Revista de Filosofía 20 (2): 217-232. 2008.
    “Peirce, Wittgenstein and Davidson: Anti-skeptic Coincidences”. This paper shows some similarities among Peirce’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consist in pointing out the contradictory character of the skeptical doubt in itself. More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (i…Read more
  • Dewey and the myth of the given
    Endoxa 26 157-186. 2010.