Daniel M. Mittag

It is widely recognized that in order for one's belief to be justified (in the sense of justification thought to be necessary for knowledge, i.e., doxastic justification) one's belief must be based on that which justifies it. Epistemologists, however, differ about the exact relation that the evidence must bear to one's belief in order for that belief to be doxastically justified. The various analyses of the basing relation that have been proposed can be divided into two main categories: causal accounts and non-causal accounts. In the second chapter I will explicate the central issues involved in providing an adequate causal account of the basing relation. I will consider various attempts to salvage causal accounts in light of Keith Lehrer's counterexample to such formulations of the basing relation, and I will argue that no satisfactory defense of causal theories has so far been given. Consequently, the correct explication of the basing relation must be noncausal. Through the consideration of various non-causal formulations of the basing relation in chapter three, I argue that the correct non-causal account must be reflective in nature. As a result, I argue that Lehrer's account is inadequate, and I conclude that the reflective account provided by Richard Foley is correct

The original Meno problem is to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In this paper I argue that evidentialists face an additional Meno problem, a Meno problem that, to date, no evidentialist has considered. Specifically, evidentialists must account for the additional epistemic value of a doxastically justified doxastic attitude as compared to a doxastic attitude that is merely propositionally justified. I consider the nature of the problem facing evidentialism and critically discuss two attempts to account for this additional epistemic value. Then, I highlight the remaining options and present the alternative I favor. According to this alternative, while the nature of doxastic justification is analyzed in terms of propositional justification, the value of doxastic justification is not. Holding a doxastic attitude on the basis of propositionally justifying evidence is a fundamental epistemic good. In virtue of this, doxastically justified doxastic attitudes have fundamental epistemic value