New troublemakers threaten the nonexistents' realm. These are vaguely identical and vaguely existent in stories. Anthony Everett argued that Fictional Realism implies that such creatures exist and thus, as vague objects can't exist, that Fictional Realism is false. Based on the observation that Everett's notion of vagueness-in-a-story is ambiguous, I argue that reading it as a story's leaving matters open leads to the problem of fictional general existential claims and that reading it as a story…
Read moreNew troublemakers threaten the nonexistents' realm. These are vaguely identical and vaguely existent in stories. Anthony Everett argued that Fictional Realism implies that such creatures exist and thus, as vague objects can't exist, that Fictional Realism is false. Based on the observation that Everett's notion of vagueness-in-a-story is ambiguous, I argue that reading it as a story's leaving matters open leads to the problem of fictional general existential claims and that reading it as a story's incorporating innerfictional ontic vagueness leads to the problem of fictional inconsistency. Further, I show how both problems are solvable within Terence Parsons' Neo-Meinongian framework
