My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Skip
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept both There is, I am fairly sure, a common denominator of any two legs that walk parallel.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Skip
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Skip
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept more than one
God: theism and atheism Other I both accept theism and lean toward theism. Were I to select only one or the other, such would not be fully expressive of my view. But, I also have a certain measure-and-means of agnosticism and atheism, which often renders me somewhat off-balance, or at least in near- or partial- agreement with some 'naturalistic' views.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism The question is too unclear to answer
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Skip
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Skip
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Skip
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Skip
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism It is my personal view that the only things which genuinely can meaningfully be said to exist, or to apply, or to serve either as epistemological or ontological constraints, are concrete things. But, it seems to me that the exact nature of the relation between the seemingly merely concrete and the sentient-ly concrete is somewhat beyond me. For example, it seems to me (and I could be wrong) that the concept of the merely concrete may well be a concept which is more a product of the cognitive efficiency of limited cognizing agents than an actual accurate representation of the essential or irreducible nature of the concrete. Much by the efforts of Albert Einstein, even the concept of space as both concretely fully accommodating/indifferent and ontologically independent of matter/energy is today commonly accepted as an example of the illusion which cognitive efficiency can paint for us limited cognizing agents.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Skip
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Skip
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Skip
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Skip
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept an intermediate view
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Skip
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Skip
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death The question is too unclear to answer
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory Change of conditions within the ever-present seems to me the reasonable, if cognitively more energic, definition of time. I do not think that the past moments or the future moments are fields like points in space distinct from a current location. Rather, I think that the sense of the 'passage of time' as an independently empty field of 'time' filled with 'events' is a phenomenon of cognitive efficiency modeled after the sense of space. In other words, I think that an 'over there' in terms of space is real, but that 'the past' is not a continuum of former 'present moments' which have flowed out of the 'room' of 'the present'. The present never passes, while conditions within the present change; our sense of 'time' as an outward-bound flow of 'filled' moments passing and an inward-bound flow of initially 'empty moments' of the 'future' is informed, for sake of cognitive efficiency, on the realities of extensive space, the ever-present, and change-of-conditions within space-and-the-present. This is the thinking that I'm leaning toward.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Other Assuming this is about people getting run down either way, and with no possibility of stopping the trolley, the question is largely impractical. Of course, the simplest formulation involves equality of each person in terms of right to live (though, since we all are destined to die, and are ethically flawed, there is some question of whether any of us is entirely worthy to live), and that each of them is equally either determined to live or resigned to die. In that case, the pure math solution is simple: switch the track to save the most people. But, the problem with this solution is that it never, ever, is the case that it is that simple, and the subtleties of the complexities weigh on the poor SOB who one might ideally suppose has to make a 'pro-active' choice either to switch or not to switch. Such an ideal is never the case either; though, in some cases, it can seem to be ideal by the self-description of the poor SOB. So, the question is largely impractical.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Skip
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: inconceivable A zombie simulating what extent of awareness? I am much for observing the illusory logical power of psychological projection, including such projection involved in thought experiments and their science fiction instantiations. Photographs and mannequins mainly fool the paranoid, but seem not to be recognized by those who nevertheless would project even to such objects. The basic question is: is genuine 'subjective personal experience' (a triple-redundant term) a product of 'simply concrete' actions, or not? If not, then whence such genuine awareness? Is such genuine awareness uselessly redundant to merely functional awareness? If it is uselessly redundant, then what a WACKY world we live in! :) LOL. So, I have a hunch that zombies are, in fact, inconceivable, and that people who think zombies are conceivable are unwittingly playing tricks on themselves (similar to how I think that not all theories of time are cognitively accurate to the subject of 'time').