Daniel Wack

In saying that meaning is a physiognomy, Wittgenstein invokes a philosophical tradition of critical physiognomy, one that developed in opposition to a scientific physiognomy. The form of a critical physiognomic judgment is one of reasoning that is circular and dynamic, grasping intention, thoughts, and emotions in seeing the expressive movements of bodies in action. In identifying our capacities for meaning with our capacities for physiognomic perception, Wittgenstein develops an understanding of perception and meaning as oriented and structured by our shared practical concerns and needs. For Wittgenstein, critical physiognomy is both fundamental for any meaningful interaction with others and a capacity we cultivate, and so expressive of taste in actions and ways of living. In recognizing how fundamental our capacity for physiognomic perception is to our form of life Wittgenstein inherits and radicalizes a tradition of critical physiognomy that stretches back to Kant and Lessing. Aesthetic experiences such as painting, poetry, and movies can be vital to the cultivation of taste in actions and in ways of living

Artistic medium is an art critical concept that first arose in 18th century European discourse about art. Medium analysis has, historically, attempted to identify that out of which works of art and, more generally, art forms are created, in order to better articulate norms or standards by which works of art and art forms can be evaluated. Since the 19th century, medium analysis has emerged in two different forms of art critical and theoretical discourse. Within traditional art forms such as painting and sculpture, modernist artists and critics began to interrogate an art form and the history of its possibilities in order to discover the necessary conditions for instances of that form. This modernist interest in medium aimed to strip away unnecessary traditional artistic conventions in order to identify that which is essential to the form. Within newly emergent forms of popular art, such as movies, comics, and video games, artists and critics have attempted to articulate the ways the norms of these forms of popular art arise from new material and technological modes of creating and interacting with reproducible images. The possibilities for an art form, whether traditional or newly emergent, can only be discovered by artists in acts of artistic creation. For this reason, the relation between art forms and their media develops and changes as the art forms continue to be discovered and reimagined by artists.

The possibility of a love strong enough to overcome the corruption and violence of the world of film noir is a promise that frequently seduces the protagonist, but it ultimately proves to be illusory—and often fatal. Many film noirs share three major elements with Veronica Mars: a corrupt world in which the story is set; a love interest; and protagonist who becomes obsessed with uncovering the truth whatever the costs. The centerpiece of Veronica Mars's transformation of the film noir paradigm is making the noir detective a teenage girl. In film noir the inhabitants of a corrupt world attempt to free themselves from bad situations but find themselves doomed to fail. One of the most radical and interesting ways in which Veronica Mars reimagines the genre is by reversing the genders between the film noir's protagonist and its femme fatale.

In introducing his discussion of seeing as in Part II of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two uses of the verb ‘to see’. On the one hand, there is a use of ‘to see’ in which one succeeds in seeing in the relevant sense if one is able to represent the object seen. On the other, there is a use of ‘to see’ in which one succeeds if one recognizes a resemblance between two objects. In clarifying the relation between these two uses of ‘to see’ and thus the relation between perception and understanding, I articulate a Wittgensteinian account of perception in which one’s perception is organized and oriented by the demands of what one is going to do. Perception does not, for Wittgenstein, happen in stages, wherein understanding is brought to bear on a perceptual given. Instead, a practically oriented understanding orients and organizes our experience of what is salient, allowing us to go on in response.