•  64
    Does Artificial Intelligence Have Agency?
    In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts, Springer Verlag. pp. 83-104. 2021.
    To be said to possess agency, an individual or entity must act with intent. What constitutes an intentional action is, roughly, that the action is something an agent wishes or desires to do. In order to perform intentional actions however, there seems to be much that must underpin this process. For example, having a complex range of desires, beliefs, and deliberations which are involved in bringing those intentional actions about. A satisfactory account of agency should be able to explain how th…Read more
  •  17
    The possibility of deliberate norm-adherence in AI
    Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2): 157-163. 2020.
    Moral agency status is often given to those individuals or entities which act intentionally within a society or environment. In the past, moral agency has primarily been focused on human beings and some higher-order animals. However, with the fast-paced advancements made in artificial intelligence, we are now quickly approaching the point where we need to ask an important question: should we grant moral agency status to AI? To answer this question, we need to determine the moral agency status of…Read more
  •  14
    An Intergenerational Justice Approach to Technological Unemployment
    Asian Journal of Business Ethics 12 (2): 239-256. 2023.
    Technological unemployment is a very real phenomenon that should be addressed by governments and businesses alike. This paper argues that current approaches to technological unemployment are short-sighted in that they focus predominantly and primarily on current generations. This kind of approach results in harm such as ignoring impending meaning-crises and propagating a potential form of human-quota-driven tokenism in the process of implementing automation in the workplace. Arguably, current ge…Read more
  •  3
    Bifactualism: A New Physicalist Response to the Knowledge Argument
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4): 166-190. 2016.
    The knowledge argument is an argument for dualism that claims that there are both physical and non-physical facts, something we can know by reflecting on 'Mary' who is aware of all scientific data about colours but has yet to see any. I reject the dualist conclusion and instead provide a new physicalist response that I call 'bifactualism'. Bifactualism is a novel physicalist account comprising two elements. First, like dualism, it distinguishes between two kinds of facts: general and particular …Read more