•  235
    Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a “Myth”
    Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1): 11-18. 2002.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as opp…Read more
  •  224
    The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality
    Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 281-308. 1999.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions o…Read more
  •  169
    This paper will present two contributions to teaching introductory logic. The first contribution is an alternative tree proof method that differs from the traditional one-sided tree method. The second contribution combines this tree system with an index system to produce a user-friendly tree method for sentential modal logic.
  •  112
    Dennett’s Overlooked Originality
    Minds and Machines 16 (1): 43-55. 2006.
    No philosopher has worked harder than Dan Dennett to set the possibility of machine mentality on firm philosophical footing. Dennett’s defense of this possibility has both a positive and a negative thrust. On the positive side, he has developed an account of mental activity that is tailor-made for the attribution of intentional states to purely mechanical contrivances, while on the negative side, he pillories as mystery mongering and skyhook grasping any attempts to erect barriers to the concept…Read more
  •  108
    Zombies, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4): 3-4. 2010.
    This paper explores the viability of rejecting a largely unchallenged third premise of the conceivability argument against materialism. Fittingly labeled 'type-Z' , this reply essentially grants to the zombie lover, not just the possibility of zombies, but also their actuality. We turn out to be the very creatures Chalmers has taken such great pains to conceive and more conventional materialists have tried to wipe off the face of the planet. So consciousness is a wholly material affair. What is …Read more
  •  87
    Donald Davidson's argument that non-linguistic creatures lack beliefs rests on two premises: (1) to be a believer, one must have the concept of belief, and (2) to have the concept of belief, one must interpret the utterances of others. However, Davidson's defense of these premises is overly compressed and unconvincing. In a recent issue of Philosophy, Roger Fellows provides new arguments for these premises. In this paper, I explain why I'm not persuaded by Fellows' attempt to bolster Davidson's …Read more
  •  59
  •  58
    Motivating Inferentialism Commentary on Mark McCullagh's "Motivating Inferentialism"
    Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2): 151-154. 2006.
  •  51
    Zombies and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
    Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1): 207-216. 2009.
  •  43
    The Force and Content of the Geach-Frege Problem
    Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2): 93-97. 2011.
  •  35
    “From the Grunts and Groans of the Cave….” Presidential Address
    Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1): 1-11. 2013.
  •  22
    The Importance of Being Erroneous
    Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 281-308. 1999.
  •  21
    Review of Andrew Brook, Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (11). 2002.
  •  16
    Denial Has Its Consequences: Peirce's Bilateral Semantics
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 55 (4): 361. 2019.
    In at least a few of his formulations of the pragmatic maxim around 1905—those in which he sought to inoculate his brand of pragmatism against misappropriation by other pragmatists and also to supply a demonstration of its truth—Charles Peirce instructs us to look not only at the consequences of affirming some claim or concept, but also at the consequences of denying it. Referring to himself in the third person as "the author," Peirce writes: Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, t…Read more
  •  16
    Ask A Sellarsian!
    Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2): 47-50. 2017.
  •  12
    Finding a Right Price
    Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2): 67-71. 2018.
  •  11
    On Peter Olen’s Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (3). 2019.
    All contributions included in the present issue were originally prepared for an “Author Meets Critics” session organized by Carl Sachs for the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Savannah, Georgia, on 5th January, 2018.
  •  9
    John & Susan & Bill & Smith
    Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2): 35-38. 2016.
  •  8
    Excessively Fluid?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2): 27-31. 2007.
  •  8
    Normative Functionalism and its Pragmatist Roots
    Normative Funcitonalism and the Pittsburgh School. 2012.
    I shall characterize normative functionalism and contrast it with its causal counterpart. After tracing both stripes of functionalism to the work of the classical American pragmatists, I then argue that they are not exclusive alternatives. Instead, both might be required for an appropriately illuminating account of human rational activity.
  •  7
    Impressions, and the logic of 'what it's like'
    Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception 1 137. 2005.
  •  5
    Emotional Cognitivism without Representationalism
    Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1): 113-122. 2019.
    In _Knowing Emotions_, Rick Anthony Furtak seeks an account that does justice to both the cognitive and corporeal dimensions of our emotional lives. Concerning the latter dimension, he holds that emotions serve to represent axiological features of the world. Against such a representationalist picture, I shall suggest an alternative way to understand how our emotions gear in with the rest of our cognitive states.