•  3269
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (2): 113-134. 2014.
  •  2485
    On following orders in an unjust war
    Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2). 2007.
  •  774
    Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem
    Theory and Decision 36 (2): 131-162. 1994.
  •  679
    Political Quality
    Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (1): 127. 2000.
    Political equality is in tension with political quality, and quality has recently been neglected. My thesis is that proper attention to the quality of democratic procedures and their outcomes requires that we accept substantive inequalities of political input in the interest of increasing input overall. Mainly, I hope to refute political egalitarianism, the view that justice or legitimacy requires substantive political equality, specifically equal availability of power or influence over collecti…Read more
  •  575
    Debate: On Christiano's the constitution of equality
    Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2): 241-252. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  454
    The papers published in this special issue can fairly be unified under the heading “Epistemic Democracy,” but there is more variety among them than this might indicate. They exhibit the broad range of ways in which epistemological considerations are figuring in contemporary philosophical discussions of democracy. The authors range from young and promising to established and distinguished. I'd like to introduce a few of the issues that run through the papers, sprinkling references to the actual p…Read more
  •  412
    Jeremy Waldron on law and disagreement
    Philosophical Studies 99 (1): 111-128. 2000.
    Waldron argues that recent treatments of justice have neglected reasonable disagreement about justice itself. So Waldron offers a procedural account of democratic legitimacy, in which contending views of justice can be brought together to arrive at a decision without deciding which one is correct. However, if there is reasonable disagreement about everything, then this includes his preferred account of legitimacy. On the other hand, it is not clear that Waldron is right to count so much disagree…Read more
  •  351
    The place of self-interest and the role of power in deliberative democracy
    with Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin, and José Luis Martí
    Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1): 64-100. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  333
    Mutual benevolence and the theory of happiness
    Journal of Philosophy 87 (4): 187-204. 1990.
  •  329
    Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 821-825. 1999.
  •  318
    Democratic theory
    In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 208--30. 2005.
  •  306
    The Democracy/Contractualism Analogy
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (4): 387-412. 2003.
  •  268
    Democracy without preference
    Philosophical Review 99 (3): 397-423. 1990.
  •  199
    Liberal associationism and the rights of states
    Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2): 425-449. 2013.
    It is often argued that if one holds a liberal political philosophy about individual rights against the state and the community, then one cannot consistently say that a state that violates those principles is owed the right of noninterference. How could the rights of the collective trump the rights of individuals in a liberal view? I believe that this debate calls for more reflection, on the relation between liberalism and individualism. I will sketch a conception of liberalism () in which there…Read more
  •  183
    On Sunstein's Infotopia
    Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 56 (119): 14-29. 2009.
    Sunstein argues that democratic theory has recently rested its normative claims on a vast but empirically uninformed optimism about the ability of collective deliberation to lead to morally and rationally better decisions. Once that question is considered empirically, he argues, deliberation turns out to be mixed at best, and a disaster at worst. I want to suggest that Sunstein exaggerates the claims of the deliberative democrats, and interprets the empirical literature against deliberation in a…Read more
  •  125
    Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
    Princeton University Press. 2008.
    Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions.Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Es…Read more
  •  95
    The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 2012.
    This volume includes 22 new pieces by leaders in the field on both perennial and emerging topics of keen interest to contemporary political philosophers.
  •  66
    The persuasiveness of democratic majorities
    with Robert E. Goodin
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2): 131-142. 2004.
    Under the assumptions of the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, majority verdicts are virtually certain to be correct if the competence of voters is greater than one-half, and virtually certain to be incorrect if voter competence is less than one-half. But which is the case? Here we turn the Jury Theorem on its head, to provide one way of addressing that question. The same logic implies that, if the outcome saw 60 percent of voters supporting one proposition and 40 percent the other, then average …Read more
  •  56
    The Epistemic Dimension of Democratis Authority
    Modern Schoolman 74 (4): 259-276. 1997.
  •  52
    Methodological moralism in political philosophy
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (3): 385-402. 2017.
  •  48
    What’s So Rickety?: Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 204-204. 2005.