•  13
    Wynn on Mathematical Empiricism
    Mind and Language 7 (4): 333-358. 1992.
  •  45
    Deductive Intuitions and Lay Rationality
    Journal of Philosophical Research 39 1-15. 2014.
    This is a discussion of L. Jonathan Cohen’s argument against the possibility that empirical psychological research might show that lay deductive competence is inconsistent. I argue that, within the framework Cohen provides, the consistency of lay deductive practice is indeterminate
  •  140
    Man the rational animal?
    Synthese 122 (1-2): 165-78. 2000.
      This paper considers well known results of psychological researchinto the fallibility of human reason, and philosophical conclusionsthat some have drawn from these results. Close attention to theexact content of the results casts doubt on the reasoning that leadsto those conclusions
  •  8
    Deductive Intuitions and Lay Rationality
    Journal of Philosophical Research 39 1-15. 2014.
    This is a discussion of L. Jonathan Cohen’s argument against the possibility that empirical psychological research might show that lay deductive competence is inconsistent. I argue that, within the framework Cohen provides, the consistency of lay deductive practice is indeterminate.
  •  69
    Seeing sequences
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 93-112. 1999.
    This article discusses Charles Parsons’ conception of mathematical intuition. Intuition, for Parsons, involves seeing-as: in seeing the sequences I I I and I I I as the same type, one intuits the type. The type is abstract, but intuiting the type is supposed to be epistemically analogous to ordinary perception of physical objects. And some non-trivial mathematical knowledge is supposed to be intuitable in this way, again in a way analogous to ordinary perceptual knowledge. In particular, the suc…Read more
  •  52
    Without Good Reason
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 234-237. 2000.