•  79
    Epicurean prolepsis
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 175-217. 1985.
  •  72
    Augustine’s Hermeneutics and the Principle of Charity
    Ancient Philosophy 17 (1): 135-157. 1997.
    Augustine advances the view that morally devout interpreters of a Biblical text, such as the Psalter, can each advance contradictory interpretations of the very same portion of the text and yet both interpretations can be true. But the moral character of the interpreter is paramount in weighing the validity of the interpretation. I explore this hermeneutical principle Augustine advances with Donald Davidson’s secular “Principle of Charity”.
  •  61
    Aristotelian Perception and the Hellenistic Problem of Representation
    Ancient Philosophy 4 (2): 119-131. 1984.
    The understanding of perception advanced by Aristotle and Theophrastus is largely physiological in character, describing the mechanism of perception and its resulting epistemic value. Like Epicurean views, theirs is not a theory of sensory ideas. The Stoics develop a competing approach to perception that describes sensory phenomena in terms of conceptual, linguistic representations.
  •  54
    Protagorean relativism and physis
    Phronesis 20 (3): 209-227. 1975.
  •  50
    From Pyrrhonism to Post-Modernism
    Ancient Philosophy 10 (2): 263-267. 1990.
  •  50
    The Lysis on Loving One's Own
    Classical Quarterly 31 (01): 39-. 1981.
    Cicero, Lucullus 38: ‘…non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod accommodatum ad naturam adpareat …’ From earliest childhood every man wants to possess something. One man collects horses. Another wants gold. Socrates has a passion for companions. He would rather have a good friend than a quail or a rooster. In this way, Socrates begins his interrogation of Menexenus. He then congratulates Menexenus and Lysis for each having what he himself still does not possess. How is it that one gets a fri…Read more
  •  47
    Skeptic Semiotics
    Phronesis 28 (3): 213-255. 1983.
    This article presents a detailed exploration of what Sextus and Pyrrhonists regarded as mnemonic signs, where one experience reminds us of another, such as seeing smoke reminds us of a fire that is not yet evident to our present observations. For the skeptic the use of mnemonic signs obviates the need for reasoned, theoretical interpretations or elaborated belief formation. It allows the skeptic or the theory-free physician, for that matter, to live a life or practice symptomatic medicine witho…Read more
  •  44
  •  34
    Descartes and Augustine (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 19 (2): 440-451. 1999.
  •  33
    Mimetic Ignorance, Platonic Doxa, and De Re Belief
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (4). 1985.
    A close reading of what Plato writes about DOXA, misleadingly translated as ‘belief’, reveals that DOXA exhibits the logical form of what it is now referred to as “de re belief.” A DOXA makes a claim on the nature of reality, not a claim about the speaker’s thoughts about that reality. Consequently a doxastic claim is either true or meaningless when it fails of reference to the portion of reality it is naming. This insight has deep implications for Plato’s epistemology in general and his “Meno,…Read more
  •  32
    I. F. Stone, "The Trial of Socrates" (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (4): 601. 1990.
  •  29
    The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (3): 460-462. 1998.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” by Benson MatesDavid K. GliddenBenson Mates. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s “Outlines of Pyrrhonism.” New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 335. Cloth, $55.00, Paper, $22.95.Benson Mates’s translation and commentary of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism appears nearly half a century after Mates first began his pioneering work on Sextus and…Read more
  •  26
    Marcello Gigante and the Sceptical Epicurean (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 6 (n/a): 169-176. 1986.
  •  24
    Borderline disorders
    Philosophy and Geography 5 (1). 2002.
    An exploration of the roots of terrorism suggests one primal source arises from so-called “self-made” males who find difficulty forming community attachments. Those who fail to see that they live within the boundaries of humanity fail to recognize where dark ambitions of their souls fester and where inter-subjective reality begins. They suffer from what psychiatrists call borderline disorders. Cut off from a lived community, they become monsters of humanity.
  •  22
    The Cynics (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 18 (2): 440-458. 1998.
  •  21
    Method in Ancient Philosophy (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1): 111-113. 2000.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Method in Ancient PhilosophyDavid K. GliddenJyl Gentzler, editor. Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. viii + 398. Cloth, $72.00.The fifteen papers in this collection constitute revisions of conference proceedings and reflect the varied interests of participants. The ensemble exhibits a thoroughly modern methodology. Whatever and however various ancient methods of philosophy may have been, in A…Read more
  •  20
    Friendship in the Classical World (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (2): 359-361. 1999.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Friendship in the Classical World by David KonstanDavid K. GliddenDavid Konstan. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv + 206. Paper, $18.95.Despite its brevity, Konstan’s history of friendship in classical antiquity speaks volumes. With admirable precision and economy of expression, Konstan cites and surveys scores of ancient authors—poets, playwrights, politicians, noveli…Read more
  •  18
    Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (review)
    Noûs 27 (1): 109-110. 1993.
    Book synopsis: Reissued in 1997 with corrections and a new Afterword, this book fully explores for the first time an idea common to Plato and Aristotle, which unites their treatments - otherwise very different - of love and friendship. The idea is that although persons are separate, their lives need not be. One person's life may overflow into another's, and as such, helping another person is a way of serving oneself. The author shows how their view of love and friendship, within not only persona…Read more
  •  17
    Royce on the Rivalry between Buddhism and Christianity
    The Pluralist 13 (3): 45-71. 2018.
    Within an interpretive community, conversation will not cease until voices are silenced by circumstance.1 Less than three months after lecturing at Lake Forest College in November of 1911, Royce suffered a stroke.2 Within a year, Royce had adequately recovered and recuperated, so as to redouble his preparations for a lecture series on Christianity, initially presented in part at the Lowell Institute and then in a more completed version at Oxford. These lectures would come to constitute The Probl…Read more
  •  16
    The Elusiveness of Moral Recognition and the Imaginary Place of Fiction
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1): 123-141. 1991.
  •  15
    Infinity in the Presocratics (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1): 133-136. 1974.
  •  15
    The Theaetetus of Plato
    Noûs 27 (3): 408-409. 1993.