David Guez

The scientific understanding of cognition and consciousness is currently hampered by the lack of rigorous and universally accepted definitions that permit comparative studies. This paper proposes new functional and un- ambiguous definitions for cognition and consciousness in order to provide clearly defined boundaries within which general theories of cognition and consciousness may be developed. The proposed definitions are built upon the construction and manipulation of reality representation, decision making and learning and are scoped in terms of an underlying logical structure. It is argued that the presentation of reality also necessitates the concept of ab- sence and the capacity to perform transitive inference. Explicit predictions relating to these new definitions, along with possible ways to test them, are also described and discussed

Beckers et al. (2006) published intriguing results, obtained in the rat fear condi- tioning paradigm, challenging classical associativist theories of learning. One of the main findings of Beckers et al. (2006) is that what they called subad- ditive pretraining abolished the expres- sion of blocking. Haselgrove (2010) proposed an expla- nation, based on the well known Rescorla- Wagner Model (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). We will demonstrate here that the account offered by Haselgrove (2010) is contradictory to the basic assumptions of the Rescorla-Wagner Model.

This article provides the foundation for a new predictive theory of animal learning that is based upon a simple logical model. The knowledge of experimental subjects at a given time is described using logical equations. These logical equations are then used to predict a subject’s response when presented with a known or a previously unknown situation. This new theory suc- cessfully anticipates phenomena that existing theories predict, as well as phenomena that they cannot. It provides a theoretical account for phenomena that are beyond the domain of existing models, such as extinction and the detection of novelty, from which “external inhibition” can be explained. Examples of the methods applied to make predictions are given using previously published results. The present theory proposes a new way to envision the minimal functions of the nervous system, and provides possible new insights into the way that brains ultimately create and use knowledge about the world.

The scientific understanding of cognition and consciousness is currently hampered by the lack of rigorous and universally accepted definitions that permit comparative studies. This article proposes new functional and unambiguous definitions for cognition and consciousness in order to provide clearly defined boundaries within which general theories of cognition and consciousness may be developed. The proposed definitions are built upon the construction and manipulation of reality representation, decision making, and learning and are scoped in terms of an underlyinglogical structure. It is argued that the presentation of reality also necessitates the concept of absence and the capacity to perform transitive inference. Explicit predictions relating to these new definitions, along with possible ways to test them, are also described and discussed