•  219
    Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration
    American Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 248-58. 2003.
    Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but because his prudential approach and practica ljudgments led him to traditiona ltexts. I make this argumentfirst by outlining the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important continuities betweenc onventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings on tolerat…Read more
  •  45
    Gladstone, Religious Freedom and Practical Reasoning
    History of Political Thought 26 (1): 90-119. 2005.
    W.E. Gladstone’s changing and inconsistent views on religious oaths and established churches present an intriguing puzzle. This article compares and contrasts his early and later stances on these topics with the purpose of evaluating the place of practical judgments in his arguments. This exploration reveals that the prevailing description of Gladstone’s views, which privileges the role practicality played in his later support for a more liberal set of policies governing church–state relations, …Read more
  • Gladstone, Religious Freedom and Practical Reasoning
    History of Political Thought 26 (1): 90-119. 2005.
    W.E. Gladstone's changing and inconsistent views on religious oaths and established churches present an intriguing puzzle. This article compares and contrasts his early and later stances on these topics with the purpose of evaluating the place of practical judgments in his arguments. This exploration reveals that the prevailing description of Gladstone's views, which privileges the role practicality played in his later support for a more liberal set of policies governing church-state relations, …Read more