•  133
    Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological `laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion …Read more
  •  131
    Concepts and Action. Know-how and Beyond
    In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. forthcoming.
    Which role do concepts play in a person's actions? Do concepts underwrite the very idea of agency in somebody's acting? Or is the appeal to concepts in action a problematic form of over-intellectualization which obstructs a proper picture of genuine agency? Within the large and complicated terrain of these questions, the debate about know-how has been of special interest in recent years. In this paper, I shall try to spell out what know-how can tell us about the role of concepts in action. I wil…Read more
  •  78
    ›Wissen, dass‹ und ›Wissen, wie‹
    In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie, J.b. Metzler. pp. 116-121. 2019.
    This is an introduction to the debate about Know-how.
  •  188
    A Uniform Account of Regress Problems
    Acta Analytica 32 (3). 2017.
    This paper presents a uniform general account of regress problems in the form of a pentalemma—i.e., a set of five mutually inconsistent claims. Specific regress problems can be analyzed as instances of such a general schema, and this Regress Pentalemma Schema can be employed to generate deductively valid arguments from the truth of a subset of four claims to the falsity of the fifth. Thus, a uniform account of the nature of regress problems allows for an improved understanding of specific regres…Read more
  •  113
    Regresse und Routinen. Repliken auf Brandt und Jung
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1): 110-113. 2018.
    This paper responds to comments and criticisms by Stefan Brandt and Eva-Maria Jung, directed at the book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
  •  109
    Précis zu Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1): 95-99. 2018.
    This is a précis of my book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
  •  209
    Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning
    In Theodora Achourioti, Edgar Andrade & Marc Staudacher (eds.), Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference. Meaning and Truth. Amsterdam, October 1-3, 2009, Illc Publications. pp. 52-66. 2010.
    It is widely held that truth and reference play an indispensable explanatory role in theories of meaning. By contrast, so-called deflationists argue that the functions of these concepts are merely expressive and never explanatory. Robert Brandom has proposed both a variety of deflationism — the anaphoric theory —, and a theory of meaning — inferentialism — which doesn’t rely on truth or reference. He argues that the anaphoric theory counts against his (chiefly referentialist) rivals in the debat…Read more
  •  117
    Weiter Denken - Über Philosophie, Wissenschaft Und Religion (edited book)
    with Gregor Betz, Dirk Koppelberg, and Anna Wehofsits
    De Gruyter. 2015.
    Wer philosophiert, argumentiert. Der Band vereint Beiträge zur Argumentationstheorie, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Existenzphilosophie, Religionsphilosophie und Metaphilosophie. Er zeigt auf, dass auch theoretische Fragen von lebenspraktischer Bedeutung sind.
  •  425
    What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it takes to do so. This idea is developed int…Read more
  •  14
    Analoge Argumente und Analogieargumente
    In Anna Wehofsits, David Löwenstein, Dirk Koppelberg & Gregor Betz (eds.), Weiter Denken - Über Philosophie, Wissenschaft Und Religion, De Gruyter. pp. 105-124. 2015.
    Analogien lassen sich aus unserem vernünftigen Nachdenken und Argumentieren kaum wegdenken. Ganz zurecht stellen sie eines der klassischen Themen der Argumentationstheorie dar. Doch wie genau sollte die argumentative Rolle von Analogien in Argumentrekonstruktionen dargestellt werden? Das ist die Leitfrage dieses Beitrags. Zunächst wird mit Michael Dummetts Schach-Analogie ein prominentes Beispiel dargestellt und eine genauere Charakterisierung des Analogiebegriffs vorgeschlagen. Danach wird die …Read more
  •  111
    Knowledge-how, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle's Return
    In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge, De Gruyter. pp. 269-304. 2011.
    How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something is the case? In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential aspect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert Ryle – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have tried to establish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This project – …Read more
  •  133
    Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism
    Dialectica 66 (1): 23-44. 2012.
    Whether or not deflationism is compatible with truth-conditional theories of meaning has often been discussed in very broad terms. This paper only focuses on Davidsonian semantics and Brandom's anaphoric deflationism and defends the claim that these are perfectly compatible. Critics of this view have voiced several objections, the most prominent of which claims that it involves an unacceptable form of circularity. The paper discusses how this general objection applies to the case of anaphoric de…Read more
  •  332
    The distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case is a piece of common sense. Still, it has been suggested that one of these concepts can be reduced to the other one. Intellectualists like Jason Stanley (2011) try to reduce know-how to propositional knowledge, while practicalists like Stephen Hetherington (2011) try to reduce propositional knowledge to know-how. I argue that both reductionist programs fail because they make the manifestations of the knowl…Read more