David Martínez

Buena parte del nervio metafísico radica en el esfuerzo, en ocasiones ímprobo, de remontarse al plano de lo quoad se (lo que es «en sí») sin dejarse eclipsar por la seductora inmediatez de lo quoad nos (lo que es «para nosotros», anclados en nuestra propia perspectiva), aun cuando, como en el caso del conocimiento, el objeto tematizado nos toque tan de cerca. De hecho, no se logra abordar satisfactoriamente la realidad del conocimiento en su taleidad, si se parte, en exclusiva, de un primado indiscutible en la línea de lo receptivo, puesto que en tal caso sólo cabe entender el proprium del conocimiento como mero mecanismo «ordenador», entregado sin residuos a la tarea de interconectar y desmadejar una serie de impresiones o datos de conciencia que ya siempre aparecen en él en calidad de «huellas», presumiblemente procedentes desde un «afuera» nouménico que resulta ignoto por principio. Por esto mismo, desde el tomismo, el estudio del conocimiento humano no se puede realizar a espaldas de la íntegra y fundamental constitución metafísica de la persona humana, en cuanto acto de ser esencializado humanamente y singularizado por una materia signada, cuyo fundamento último descansa en la participación ontológica por la que Dios, Ser y Entender subsistente, da el ser a las creaturas.

According to David Miller, immigration is not a human right. Conversely, Kieran Oberman makes a case for immigration as a human right. We agree with the latter view, but we show that its starting point is mistaken. Indeed, both Miller and Oberman discuss the right to immigration within the liberal paradigm: it is a right or not depending on the correct balance between the interests of the citizens of a given national state and the interests of the immigrants. Instead, we claim that public justification can underpin immigration as a human right. That said, the public justification of the right to immigration has several counterarguments to rebut. Before we deal with that issue, relying on Jürgen Habermas’s social theory, we examine the legal structures that could support the right to immigration in practice. To be sure, this does not provide the normative justification needed, instead it shows the framework that allows the institutional realization of this right. Then, through a combination of civic and cosmopolitan forms of solidarity, the article discusses the formation of a public sphere, which could provide the justification of the right to immigration.

ResumenEn la ética del discurso, Habermas afirma que la solidaridad es el reverso de la moralidad. Sin embargo, en 2013 rechaza esta tesis y ahora es vista como un concepto ético-político. Según Andrew Pierce, el giro post-secular de Habermas explica este cambio, pues él se habría vuelto escéptico hacia la razón secular. Habermas ha tratado de encontrar un recurso en la religión en lugar de la moralidad para sustentar la solidaridad. Pierce afirma que este movimiento es innecesario. En cierta medida, Pierce tiene razón: Habermas no debería haber rechazado la tesis del reverso, en el sentido de que todavía la moral tiene una relación con la solidaridad. Sin embargo, el argumento de Pierce no es totalmente satisfactorio, en la medida en que existen buenas razones para proporcionar una revisión de la tesis. Basándose en estudios recientes sobre post-secularismo, el artículo desarrolla una noción de moralidad que puede tener la solidaridad como su reverso.Palabras clave: Habermas; solidaridad; post-secular; moralidad.

Este estudio buscó describir e interpretar las teorías subjetivas sobre la identidad profesional docente que se construyen y difunden noticiosamente durante la educación de emergencia por la pandemia de COVID 19. Se utilizó un estudio de análisis documental, metodología cualitativa y un diseño de estudio de casos. El muestreo intencionado y por conveniencia corresponde a 40 noticias de prensa escrita en español, sobre el profesor(a) en pandemia y publicadas en diferentes medios que fueron recolectadas a través de Google Noticias desde el 11 de marzo de 2020 y hasta el 01 de noviembre de 2020. A partir de una codificación temática, los resultados evidenciaron teorías subjetivas asociadas a las exigentes características, roles, funciones y valores con los que se identifica al profesorado durante la pandemia. El análisis mostró los distintos sentidos del ejercicio profesional y las competencias asociadas a su desempeño en la prensa. En la discusión, se utilizaron estudios relativos a la práctica docente para interpretar estos resultados.

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main-themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. Temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory for non-interactive social experience.

In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: (1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness?, (2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis?, and (3) what are its properties? Here we analyse and compare Jim Russell's core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: continuous organismic sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological, and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science.

The study investigated the influence of resilience and dispositional optimism on, first, emotional distress and, second, the intention to self-isolate, experienced by people with a lower and higher illness risk, during the lockdown imposed in Spain during the first COVID-19 wave. These effects were investigated against the background of the Health Belief Model. A convenience sample of N = 325 participants completed an online survey including an ad-hoc questionnaire measuring the HBM core factors: Perceived health threat, and perceived quarantine benefits and costs. Self-efficacy and perceived social pressure were also measured. Based on reviews regarding pandemic outbreaks, quarantine benefits were conceptualized as the perceived effectiveness and solidary contribution of self-isolating in line with the quarantine protocols. Quarantine “psychosocial” costs were conceptualized as a composite of perceived boredom, loneliness, and economic concerns. Findings revealed an asymmetrical pattern of results so that people at higher risk were more distressed by the perceived severity of getting infected whereas people at lower risk were more distressed by the psychosocial costs. Moreover, resilience and optimism were more “protective” against distress within the lower and higher risk groups, respectively. In addition, quarantine benefits and self-efficacy promoted the intention to self-isolate within both groups. However, optimism hindered such intention. This finding is discussed in the light of links between dispositional optimism and optimistic bias; the underestimation of experiencing negative events, which can relax the perceived health risk. Based on these findings, communication campaigns should prioritize information about the effectiveness of the implemented preventive behaviors rather than the costs of not implementing them, and be cautionary in encouraging excessive optimism.

Resumen: El artículo analiza la noción de subjetividad de Levinas y se examinan sus posibles vínculos con la noción desarrollada por Kant, entendida esta última como una visión ejemplar de la explicación moderna acerca de la subjetividad. Se discute la posición de Hofmeyr, quien argumenta que hubo un cambio paradigmático entre un “Levinas temprano” centrado en la libertad de tipo kantiana, y un “Levinas posterior” centrado en la pasividad y que trasciende a Kant. El artículo muestra que la subjetividad en Levinas nunca puede entenderse como actividad en el sentido kantiano.: The article analyses Levinas’s notion of subjectivity and examines its possible links with the notion developed by Kant, understood the latter as an exemplary vision of the modern explanation of subjectivity. Hofmeyr’s position is discussed, who argues that there was a paradigmatic shift between an “early Levinas” centred on a freedom of Kantian type, and a “later Levinas” focused on passivity and that transcends Kant. The article shows that subjectivity in Levinas can never be understood as an activity in the Kantian sense.

El artículo analiza la noción de subjetividad de Levinas y se examinan sus posibles vínculos con la noción desarrollada por Kant, entendida esta última como una visión ejemplar de la explicación moderna sobre la subjetividad. Se discute la posición de Hofmeyr, quien argumenta que hubo un cambio paradigmático entre un “Levinas temprano” centrado en la libertad de tipo kantiana, y un “Levinas posterior” centrado en la pasividad y que trasciende a Kant. El artículo muestra que la subjetividad en Levinas nunca puede entenderse como actividad en el sentido kantiano.

With no doubt, Robert Alexy is one of the most relevant legal theorists of the last decades. Among his multiple and valuable contributions to legal theory, his thoughts about legal principles and balancing should be highlighted, to the point that it is not possible to engage any serious analysis on these topics without considering the contributions of the German philosopher. I will try to argue, though, that his positions suffer from some problems that should be addressed. First, regarding the distinction between rules and principles, I try to show that the ‘optimisation’ criterion does not seem to work as intended, i.e. to explain a structural or categorial difference between both types of norms. Second, regarding Alexy’s conception of balancing and the proportionality principle, I conclude that it is problematic in at least the following aspects: The link between legal principles and balancing; ~The link between balancing and the proportionality principle; The universalist or particularist character of Alexy’s conception of balancing; and The plausibility of the ‘weight formula’.

This paper argues that there is a thread in the philosophy of E. Tugendhat binding together his moral and justice theories with his conceptual analysis. Oriented by the thesis that a conceptual analysis is necessary to explain what justice is, this paper reconstructs some aspects of Tugendhat’s philosophy. It is divided in four sections: First, I delve into the author’s definition and use of conceptual analysis. Second, I describe some features of Tugendhat’s moral theory of contractualism. Third, I examine his theory of justice. Fourth, I conclude by framing my analysis within the debate between Rawls’s and Tugendhat’s theories of justice.

Resumen: El artículo discute el componente kantiano en la teoría democrática deliberativa. Parte sosteniendo que Kant no solo incorpora derechos individuales sino que también la idea de soberanía popular. Este pensador considera la democracia, pero un sistema de principios tiene prioridad normativa respecto de la práctica de autolegislación colectiva. Después, el escrito muestra que la teoría democrática habermasiana elabora un argumento similar al kantiano. Por tanto, no reconstruye el balance entre derechos y democracia como pretende sino de forma similar a como lo hace Kant.: This article discusses the Kantian component in the theory of deliberative democracy. It begins claiming that Kant not only incorporates individual rights but also the idea of popular sovereignty: This author values democracy; however, a system of principles has normative priority over the practice of collective self-determination. The text later shows that Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy elaborates a Kantian justification. Thus, it does not reconstruct the balance between rights and democracy as it claims to do; it rather builds an argument similar to Kant’s.