•  8
    Facts, Values, and Norms
    Philosophical Review 115 (1): 105-107. 2006.
  •  2
    Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement
    The Journal of Ethics 12 (1): 25-55. 2007.
    This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments …Read more
  •  201
    Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement
    The Journal of Ethics 12 (1): 25-55. 2008.
    This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments …Read more
  • Moral Disagreement and Shared Meaning
    Dissertation, The Ohio State University. 2003.
    In order to have genuine disagreement, interlocutors must share terms, meanings, and concepts. Without this, their dispute is merely verbal; it rests on linguistic confusion. This is true of all conversation, but many philosophers have thought that moral discourse poses special problems. Moral discourse seems to contain intractable disagreements and lacks the sorts of authority and deference relations that are typical in straightforward empirical disagreement. This yields a potent philosophical …Read more
  •  122
    Return to Moral Twin Earth
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 207-240. 2002.
    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's ' moral twin earth argument' raises doubts about the naturalistic realist's ability to make sense of genuine disagreement. I offer three arguments the realist's behalf. First, I argue that the example at the heart of their argument is underdescribed; when fully developed, it loses its intuitive force. Second, I suggest that taking the stipulations of the Horgan-Timmons example seriously gives us reason to revise our initial judgments. Third, I propose combining …Read more
  •  36
    Facts, Values, and Norms
    Philosophical Review 115 (1): 105-107. 2006.
  •  15
    Reconceiving the Therapeutic Obligation
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (1): 55-74. 2014.
    The “therapeutic obligation” is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propos…Read more
  •  42
    Moral Convergence and the Univocity Problem
    American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4). 2007.
    None
  •  192
    Possessing moral concepts
    Philosophia 37 (3): 535-556. 2009.
    Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence ag…Read more