•  1052
    Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association (3): 1-19. 2020.
    This paper aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research, the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have “essences”. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be…Read more
  •  643
    What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?
    Philosophia 39 (1): 5-19. 2011.
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an ‘explanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a ‘explanatory gap’ arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind–brain relation in a dualist way
  •  547
    Probability as a guide to life
    In David Papineau (ed.), The Roots of Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 217-243. 2003.
  •  541
    Teleosemantics, selection and novel contents
    Biology and Philosophy 34 (3): 36. 2019.
    Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant cond…Read more
  •  489
    Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal Explanation
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 97-136. 1986.
  •  485
    Précis de "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory Of Phenomenal Consciousness" (Spanish version)
    with Reinaldo Bernal, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, Jérôme Dokic, Juan Diego Morales Otero, and Jaime Ramos
    Ideas Y Valores 62 (152): 267-297. 2013.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of PhenomenalConsciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experienciasubjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
  •  483
    David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1): 153-169. 2004.
    In 'How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.
  •  448
    Phenomenal and perceptual concepts
    In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144. 2006.
    1 Introduction 2 Perceptual Concepts 2.1 Perceptual Concepts are not Demonstrative 2.2 Perceptual Concepts as Stored Templates 2.3 Perceptual Semantics 2.4 Perceptually Derived Concepts 3 Phenomenal Concepts.
  •  419
    Mind the gap
    Philosophical Perspectives 12 373-89. 1998.
    On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness , Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states? How can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?" Many philosophers feel that questions like these pose an unanswerable challenge to physicalism. They argue that there is no way of bridging the "explanatory gap" between the material brain and the lived world of conscious experience , and that physicalism about the mind can therefore provide no …Read more
  •  389
    The poverty of analysis
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1): 1-30. 2009.
    I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actual…Read more
  •  387
    Physicalism decomposed
    Analysis 65 (1): 33-39. 2005.
    In this paper we distinguish two issues that are often run together in discussions about physicalism. The first issue concerns levels. How do entities picked out by non-physical terminology, such as biological or psychological terminology, relate to physical entities? Are the former identical to, or metaphysically supervenient on, the latter? The second issue concerns physical parts and wholes. How do macroscopic physical entities relate to their microscopic parts? Are the former generally deter…Read more
  •  381
    I shall begin with the "anti-psychiatry" view that the lack of a physical basis excludes many familiar mental disorders from the category of "illness". My response to this argument will be that anti-psychiatrists are probably right to hold that most mental disorders do not involve any physical disorder, but that they are wrong to conclude from this that these mental disorders are not illnesses
  •  374
    The rise of physicalism
    In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), , Cambridge University Press. 2000.
  •  352
    The Statistical Nature of Causation
    The Monist 105 (2): 247-275. 2022.
    Causation is a macroscopic phenomenon. The temporal asymmetry displayed by causation must somehow emerge along with other asymmetric macroscopic phenomena like entropy increase and the arrow of radiation. I shall approach this issue by considering ‘causal inference’ techniques that allow causal relations to be inferred from sets of observed correlations. I shall show that these techniques are best explained by a reduction of causation to structures of equations with probabilistically independent…Read more
  •  344
    Causation is macroscopic but not irreducible
    In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 126. 2013.
    In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible
  •  340
    Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’
    Analysis 59 (1): 25-29. 1999.
    David Spurrett, David Papineau; A note on the completeness of ‘physics’, Analysis, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 January 1999, Pages 25–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/anal.
  •  340
    I_– _David Papineau
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1): 17-43. 1999.
    It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548)
  •  319
    Thinking About Consciousness
    Oxford University Press UK. 2002.
    The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. David Papineau argues that there is no real puzzle here. Consciousness seems mysterious, not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. Papineau exposes the confusion, and dispels the mystery: we see consciousness in its place in the material world, and we are on the way to a proper understanding of the mind.
  •  317
    Theories of consciousness
    In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 353. 2003.
    My target in this paper is "theories of consciousness". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology first. When we do this, we will see that theories of consciousn…Read more
  •  273
    Since the publication of Elga's seminal paper in 2000, the Sleeping Beauty paradox has been the source of much discussion, particularly in this journal. Over the past few decades the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 1 has also been much debated. There is an interesting connection between the way these two topics raise issues about subjective probability assignments.This connection is often alluded to, but as far as we know Peter J. Lewis's ‘Quantum Sleeping Beauty’ is the first att…Read more
  •  271
    Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness"
    with Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, and Jérôme Dokic
    Ideas Y Valores 62 (152): 268-297. 2013.
    El libro "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness" presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de la conciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real, y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
  •  260
    Peter J. Lewis argued that the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics implies the unpopular halfer position in the Sleeping Beauty debate. We retorted that it is perfectly coherent to be an Everettian and an ordinary thirder. In a recent reply to our paper Lewis further clarifies the basis for his thinking. We think this brings out nicely where he goes wrong: he underestimates the importance of metaphysical considerations in determining rational credences.
  •  256
    Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 100-109. 2006.
    Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary intuitions are misbegotten. …Read more
  •  256
    Teleosemantics and indeterminacy
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 1-14. 1998.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation
  •  252
    Reliabilism, induction and scepticism
    Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166): 1-20. 1992.
    Book chapter