There exists an ongoing debate about the nature of incomparability. In this paper, I argue that incomparability is most usefully seen as a practical, rather than a metaphysical, issue. When confronted with an important choice between two options, an agent often will be at a loss as to how to decide between them. A common response to this problem is to assert that the options must therefore be equal, and that it is perfectly rational to be indifferent and decide between them in some arbitrary fas…
Read moreThere exists an ongoing debate about the nature of incomparability. In this paper, I argue that incomparability is most usefully seen as a practical, rather than a metaphysical, issue. When confronted with an important choice between two options, an agent often will be at a loss as to how to decide between them. A common response to this problem is to assert that the options must therefore be equal, and that it is perfectly rational to be indifferent and decide between them in some arbitrary fashion. Contrary to this common view, this paper shows that equality should be seen as the result of indifference and not the cause of it. I will show that the judgment between whether options are either equal or incomparable is actually a decision, made by an agent, that can in turn be judged as more or less rational.