David Rocheleau-Houle

Julia Markovits’ Moral Reason is a defense of internalism about moral reasons and a desire-based account of reasons for action. Even though she defends this position, she does not consider herself committed to relativism and to a desire-based understanding of what reasons there are. Indeed, it is crucial to make a distinction between two kinds of inquiry about reasons for action. On one side, we find “analytic inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons are. On the other, we find “substantive inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons there are (pp. 1–11). According to Markovits, a desire-based defense on the analytic side does not imply a desire-based defense on the substantive side.Internalism and externalism are the most prominent views about reasons for action. Markovits understands internalism as the theory according to which what reasons we have do depend fundamentally on what ends we already have. On the other hand, externalism is understood as the theory acco ..

Michael Ridge’s Impassioned Belief is part of an important new wave in metaethics: hybrid theories. Ridge is a pioneer of hybrid expressivism; his own version is called “ecumenical expressivism.” His book is not only a collection of papers published in the last ten years. It covers more topics, and he also proposes some important improvements to his theory. Ridge’s work is an expansive one; in this review I shall limit myself to present what I consider to be the most important aspects of Ridge’s book.Ridge’s thesis is, in a sense, quite simple: normative judgments express hybrid mental states. According to Ridge, hybrid theories are in better position to explain what looks like both belief-like and desire-like features of normative judgments; these features are responsible for what Ridge calls the Janus-faced aspect of normative judgments. Normative judgments have belief-like features in the sense that it is possible to know that p is wrong, that we can believe that p is wrong, etc. An ..

Susan Haack présente dans Evidence and Inquiry une théorie de la justification épistémique qu’elle appelle le fondhérentisme. Elle développe sa théorie dans la perspective d’occuper l’espace logique qu’elle considère disponible entre le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. Ainsi, elle vise un « juste milieu » entre les théories traditionnelles en épistémologie analytique en proposant une théorie de la justification à double aspect : causal et évaluatif. Cependant, Peter Tramel, dans une critique du projet de Haack, essaie de démontrer que le fondhérentisme est un fondationnalisme faible. Ces critiques viennent remettre en question la capacité de Haack à réaliser son projet, soit de présenter une théorie qui n’est ni un cohérentisme ni un fondationnalisme. Étant donné qu’il n’y a aucune réponse connue de Haack à la critique de Tramel, je propose de discuter la critique de ce dernier et de défendre le projet fondhérentiste

Quantitative genetics provides one of the most promising frameworks with which to unify the fields of macroevolution and microevolution. The genetic variance–covariance matrix (G) is crucial to quantitative genetic predictions about macroevolution. In spite of years of study, we still know little about how G evolves. Recent studies have been applying an increasingly phylogenetic perspective and more sophisticated statistical techniques to address G matrix evolution. We propose that a new field, comparative quantitative genetics, has emerged. Here we summarize what is known about several key questions in the field and compare the strengths and weaknesses of the many statistical and conceptual approaches now being employed. Past studies have made it clear that the key question is no longer whether G evolves but rather how fast and in what manner. We highlight the most promising future directions for this emerging field.