My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism The question is too unclear to answer I'm a realist, but I accept that our means for justifying claims about reality are contingent and defeasible. So that makes me a naturalistic realist (I think) not a non-skeptical one.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: no free will
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Reject all I don't think contexts or frameworks are well defined or delineated entities. So I argue that the choice between invariantism, contextualism and relativism is not well-defined either.
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean The question is too unclear to answer I'm sympathetic to the claim that empirical regularities are generated by the ways in which powers of particular entities are amplified or inhibited in assemblages or machines.
Logic: classical and non-classical The question is too unclear to answer I'm a pragmatist in matters of logic.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Skip
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Skip
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Skip
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Skip
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view There is no fact of the matter
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Skip
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Skip
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Skip
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: inconceivable