•  72
    The extra ingredient
    Biology and Philosophy 36 (2): 1-4. 2021.
    Birch et. al. see their model as incompatible with higher-order-thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, on which a state is conscious if one is in some suitable way aware of that state. They see higher-order (HO) awareness as an “extra ingredient”. But since Birch et al go on to say that “[t]his is not the place for a detailed discussion of HOT theories,” they don’t address why they take HO awareness to be an extra ingredient or why HOT theorists are convinced that it’s needed. In this comme…Read more
  •  57
    Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology
    Journal of Philosophy 73 (9): 240-252. 1976.
  •  9
    The Nature of Consciousness
    Mind 113 (451): 581-588. 2004.
  •  21
    Chalmers' Meta-Problem
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 194-204. 2019.
    There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we m…Read more
  • Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  21
    The Disappearance of Introspection (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 425. 1992.
  •  15
    Memory (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 66 (1): 17-22. 1969.
  •  93
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de …Read more
  •  17
    Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case
    Analysis 62 (2): 167-171. 2002.
  •  42
    Quality-space theory in olfaction
    with Benjamin D. Young and Andreas Keller
    Frontiers in Psychology 5. 2014.
    Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space (QS) could be construc…Read more
  •  8
    XV-Unity of Consciousness and the Self
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 325-352. 2003.
  •  14
    The necessity of foreknowledge
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1): 22-25. 1976.
  •  18
    Sensory quality and the relocation story
    Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 321-50. 1999.
  •  203
    Measuring away an attentional confound?
    with Jorge Morales, Yasha Mouradi, Claire Sergent, Ned Block, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, and Hakwan Lau
    Neuroscience of Consciousness 3 (1): 1-3. 2017.
    A recent fMRI study by Webb et al. (Cortical networks involved in visual awareness independent of visual attention, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2016;113:13923–28) proposes a new method for finding the neural correlates of awareness by matching atten- tion across awareness conditions. The experimental design, however, seems at odds with known features of attention. We highlight logical and methodological points that are critical when trying to disentangle attention and awareness.
  •  88
    , encapsulates his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, and is meant to point up a nice parallel and is meant to point up a nice parallel my argument has with a schematic my argument has with a schematic aspect of Marx’s thinking. aspect of Marx’s thinking.
  •  138
    A striking difference between those fields we classify as humanities and those we regard as sciences is the attitude within each field toward its history. Learning about literature, music, or the visual arts requires becoming knowledgeable about a significant amount of the history of those areas. And education in these fields, at whatever level, invariably involves some study of great accomplishments in the past. By contrast, scientific work and standard scientific textbooks make little referenc…Read more
  •  1
    Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory (edited book)
    with David M. Rosenthal and Fadlou Shehadi
    University of Utah Press. 1988.
  •  30
    Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story
    Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 321-350. 1999.
  •  433
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input
  •  9
    Introspection and Self-Interpretation
    Philosophical Topics 28 (n/a): 201-234. 2000.
  •  42
    Neural Antecedents of Spontaneous Voluntary Movement: A New Perspective
    with Aaron Schurger and Myrto Mylopoulos
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (2): 77-79. 2016.
  •  54
    Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness
    Philosophical Psychology 6 (2): 155-66. 1993.
    Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. Natsoulas finds most promising the st…Read more
  •  514
    The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness
    In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2002.
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
  •  148
    The timing of conscious states
    Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2): 215-20. 2002.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioningRead more