•  8
    Disarming causation in the service of agency: Tallis on Hume
    Human Affairs 32 (4): 373-388. 2022.
    I argue that, in his effort to overcome causation as an obstacle to agency or free will, Raymond Tallis’ self-described “Humean” re-working of David Hume’s analysis of causation falters on historicotextual and conceptual grounds.
  •  20
    Leviathan and the Wars of the Three Kingdoms
    with Sarah Mortimer
    Journal of the History of Ideas 76 (2): 259-270. 2015.
  •  16
    Learning from Six Philosophers (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 57 (4): 828-830. 2004.
    Claiming to learn something from a philosopher can be fraught with difficulty. I may dispute your claim that Descartes taught you the tenability of voluntarism because I dispute the tenability of Descartes’s voluntarism: I just don’t think it is there to be learned. The idea of learning from a philosopher becomes even more charged given that what one learns is in some sense relative to what one already holds true. What Jonathan Bennett learns from Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and from the empiri…Read more
  •  44
    Learning from Six Philosophers (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 57 (3): 603-605. 2004.
    Mostly what Bennett learns from these six philosophers is not their positive doctrines. Rather, his learning takes the form of reconstruction and analysis of what he deems to be otherwise incorrect views. A good example is found in his treatment of Berkeley’s attack on the conceptual defects of materialism. On Bennett’s analysis Berkeley’s case rests on a flawed theory of representation, but Bennett sticks with Berkeley nonetheless. We see the same kind of learning in his excellent chapter 29 on…Read more
  •  61
    Supplement: on the work of david hume
    Angelaki 16 (2): 181-188. 2011.
    In this supplement to a work co-authored with André Cresson, David Hume, sa vie, son œuvre, left untranslated until now, Deleuze lays the groundwork for what he will later develop as an “ethics without morality.” Contrary to morality, ethics engenders its general rule for action out of the immanence that grants it the power to affect and to be affected, that is, to increase or decrease its capacity to compose new empowering relations between beings, and between beings and the world. The power to…Read more
  •  29
    How Do We Recognise Deleuze and Simondon Are Spinozists?
    Deleuze and Guatarri Studies 11 (4): 555-579. 2017.
    While typically unapologetic in expressing admiration, notably Gilles Deleuze admits his concern one time, in passing, that Gilbert Simondon's thought might hide a pernicious kind of ‘disguised moralism’, in which the form of the transcendent lurks, the enemy of the philosophy of immanence. Might there in fact be an ulterior motive in Deleuze's concern? But might this potential critique invite its own reversal? That is, might Deleuze's accusation be in fact a strategy for teasing out what, perha…Read more
  •  35
    Anti-Oedipus: A Practical Metaphysics?
    The European Legacy 14 (4): 463-466. 2009.
    No abstract
  •  25
    Merleau-Ponty And Deleuze Ask “What Is Philosophy?”
    Chiasmi International 13 259-283. 2011.
    Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité (Geschichte) de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histo…Read more
  • Reading Proust's mottled screen
    Semiotica 131 (3-4): 377-381. 2000.
  •  4
    Book review (review)
    with J. A. Sheppard, Yasuhiko Tomida, Udo Thiel, Graham Bird, Josie D'Oro, Ross Harrison, and J. M. Vienne
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2): 421-446. 1996.
  •  1
    Treatise of Nature and Grace
    Philosophical Books 34 (4): 226-227. 1993.
  • Book reviews (review)
    with Desmond Paul Henry, Vere Chappell, Beverley Southgate, Antonio Clericuzio, D. A. Rees, Philip Stratton‐Lake, and Alan Richardson
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 2 (1): 175-198. 1994.
  •  28
    Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire ». Dans l…Read more
  •  170
    The topic to be addressed in this paper, that is, the distinction between the “concept” of time and the being of the clock, divides into two parts: first, in the debate between Albert Einstein and Henri Bergson, one discovers the ground for the diverging concepts of time characterized by physics in its opposing itself to philosophy. Bergson’s durée or “duration” in opposition to Einstein’s ‘physicist’s time’ as ‘public time,’ one can argue, sets the terms for Martin Heidegger’s extending, his on…Read more