David Sztybel

Humanism – in the sense that humans alonehave moral standing, or else a surpassing degree of it– has traditionally dominated all of ethicaldiscourse. However, its past formulations havesuccumbed to the temptation merely to stipulate sucha criterion, such as rationality, which nonhumans areoften deemed (without sufficient argument) to failwithout exception. Animal liberationistarguments do exist in counterpoint to traditionalhumanism, but one current difficulty seems to be asimple clash of basic assumptions, with an indecisiveresult. Although the author of this paper is anonanthropocentrist, he attempts to further the moraltheoretical debate by constructing a more powerfulversion of humanism, based in a pursuit of the good,per se. The theory is premised upon viewing humans asgenerally having and leading lives of greater value,in some relevant sense. This essay prefigures theauthor's refutation of humanism, more generally, inthe understanding that such a world view cannot trulybe refuted unless its best version is answered.Whatever the status of this paper's offering of``Obligatory'' Anthropocentrism, the theory can be seento have a great deal more success than itspredecessors in parrying, and apparently outdoing,contemporary animal liberationist philosophies.

: The treatment of animals and the Holocaust have been compared many times before, but never has a thoroughly detailed comparison been offered. A thirty-nine-point comparison can be constructed, whether or not one believes that animals are oppressed. The question of whether or not the comparison ought to be expressed merely brings into question whether animal liberationists have liberal-democratic rights to express themselves, which they surely do. Four objections are considered: Is the comparison offensive? Does the comparison trivialize what happened to the victims of the Nazis, overlook important differences, or ignore supposed affinities between animal liberationists and Nazis? These four lines of attack are shown to fail. The comparison stands to help us to reflect on the significance of how animals are treated in contemporary times

Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier.

There is no doubt that Marx and Engels rejected animal rights. However, they did embrace the communist principle, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his need." Furthermore, they acknowledged that nonhuman animals have needs. So the principle can enjoin us to respect animals' needs, even if they lack certain abilities (e.g., tool-making, perhaps even self-consciousness). I argue that it is essentially speciesist to restrict this principle to human beings, and that its acceptance implies either animal rights or a substantive equivalent. Marxism may have to undergo a profound dialectical transformation in light of the implications of its own maxim.

The book under review is found to be peerless in its quality as an offering in its niche. This collection also surpasses its predecessor-volume, Beyond Animal Rights, in being open to rights discourse. The call for an ethic that embodies what Marti Kheel calls a "unity of reason and emotion" rings as true today as ever. Yet the new version still carries unsustainable stereotypes about rights. Simply depending on empathy or sympathy is an insufficient guide for ethics. Caring about seeking the good and avoiding the bad is suggested as a partial route for the development of this problematic ethic of care family of theories in animal ethics.

The treatment of animals and the Holocaust have been compared many times before, but never has a thoroughly detailed comparison been offered. A thirty-nine-point comparison can be constructed, whether or not one believes that animals are oppressed. The question of whether or not the comparison ought to be expressed merely brings into question whether animal liberationists have liberal-democratic rights to express themselves, which they surely do. Four objections are considered: Is the comparison offensive? Does the comparison trivialize what happened to the victims of the Nazis, overlook important differences, or ignore supposed affinities between animal liberationists and Nazis? These four lines of attack are shown to fail. The comparison stands to help us to reflect on the significance of how animals are treated in contemporary times.

abstract Many people assume that invasive research on animals is justified because of its supposed benefits and because of the supposed mental inferiority of animals. However probably most people would be unwilling to sign a living will which consigns themselves to live biomed‐ical experimentation if they ever, through misfortune, end up with a mental capacity equivalent to a laboratory animal. The benefits would be greater by far for medical science if living will signatories were to be used, and also the mental superiority boast would no longer apply. Ultimately, it is argued that invasive biomedical experiments would be unacceptable in a democratic society whose members are philosophically self‐consistent.

The purpose of this dissertation is to present a new ethical theory, ethical empathism. Before introducing that view, it is necessary to assess the prospects of another, contrary outlook: anthropocentrism. The object is to construct the most convincing possible version of human-centredness in ethics. The idea of arguing that humans are, by and large, beings of greater value than nonhumans is explored. This idea, although more plausible than other anthropocentric views, is rejected as unempathetic, however, since it does not allow one simply to identify with conscious beings as they are, regardless of capacities for rationality, language use, etc. It is important to identify with beings , for a conscious point of view is a central reality of conscious beings, from which we transact all our lives, and find all of our quality of life. Seeking to identify with others is also the best way that we have of getting a sense of that key reality. Such a reality cannot be ignored. We also cannot neglect the possibility of risking harm to others by assuming any kind of reductive outlook. Reductionistic views include denying that animals have minds, and also that moral agents are free. Ethical empathy and the associated concern of anti-oppression also have implications as to which normative theories are acceptable. It is argued that ethical empathy is crucial for identifying fundamental flaws in diverse views such as Kant's theory of ethics, contractariansim, natural law, and deep ecology. Utilitarianism is found to be the most formidable of opposing normative views, although its view of the good is found to be less than fully empathetic. Ethical empathy is also a rich source of possible moral guidance. Implications are discussed for specific moral problems concerning humans and nonhumans. Also, an understanding is sought as to how to confront genuine ethical dilemmas