David T. Echelbarger

In this paper, I seek to develop Aquinas’s view of the passions’ contribution to moral reasoning by discussing the role he sees the passions as playing in each of practical reason’s three acts. I begin by outlining why, on Aquinas’s account, the passions are capable of contributing to moral reasoning. I then turn to his proposal in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 44, a. 2 that certain passions can improve the act of counsel. I also address what appears to be a contradiction in his account. Next, I explain why Aquinas allows the passions to contribute to the act of counsel, but claims in De malo q. 3, a. 11 that they should not be given weight in our moral judgments. I end by briefly exploring whether Aquinas allows the passions to contribute to the act of command. I suggest that he does.

In this paper, I seek to develop Aquinas’s view of the passions’ contribution to moral reasoning by discussing the role he sees the passions as playing in each of practical reason’s three acts. I begin by outlining why, on Aquinas’s account, the passions are capable of contributing to moral reasoning. I then turn to his proposal in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 44, a. 2 that certain passions can improve the act of counsel. I also address what appears to be a contradiction in his account. Next, I explain why Aquinas allows the passions to contribute to the act of counsel, but claims in De malo q. 3, a. 11 that they should not be given weight in our moral judgments. I end by briefly exploring whether Aquinas allows the passions to contribute to the act of command. I suggest that he does.