•  58
    What is so magical about a theory of intrinsic intentionality?
    Philosophical Papers 32 (1): 83-96. 2003.
    Abstract Curiously missing in the vast literature on Hilary Putnam's so-called model-theoretic argument against semantic realism is any response from would-be proponents of what Putnam would call magical theories of reference. Such silence is surprising in light of the fact that such theories have occupied a significant position in the history of philosophy and the fact that there are still several prominent thinkers who would, no doubt, favor such a theory. This paper develops and examines vari…Read more
  •  106
    Parfit on Personal Identity
    Idealistic Studies 31 (2-3): 169-181. 2001.
    This paper examines Parfit's argument that personal identity is not what matters, focusing on his case against reductionist theories of personal identity. I argue that Parfit's reasons for rejecting reductionist views do not take the physical criterion for personal identity seriously enough. I outline a thoroughly naturalistic version of the reductionist theory that, if true, would escape Parfit's criticism. Such a view would be a plausible candidate for a relation that would matter as much as, …Read more
  •  52
    Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non-co-extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact tends to inflate deflationary theories of truth. Wright’s inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms. This paper will examine that claim. Wright’s argument for the claim that truth and warranted ass…Read more
  •  44
    In a recent article, Sam Page distinguishes four kinds of mind-dependence : ontological, causal, structural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact that the metaphysical realism/antirealism debate has been frequently characterized as a debate between those who accept and those who deny that the world is causally and/or structurally dependent on minds, many antirealists are primarily interested in defending the claim that the world is individuatively mind-dependent. In this article, …Read more
  •  19
    Objective Prescriptions and Other Essays (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 55 (3): 638-639. 2002.
    R. M. Hare’s last book is a collection of his essays from the 1980s and 1990s. There is a unity and structure to this collection that is not entirely captured in Hare’s introductory remarks in the preface. The essays fall into three main categories. One group is purely theoretical, developing and motivating Hare’s moral theory, objective prescriptivism. A second group is polemical in nature and aimed at philosophers and philosophical methodologies hostile to objective prescriptivism. The third g…Read more
  •  70
    In _Truth and Objectivity_, Crispin Wright argues that the notion of superassertibility affords the antirealist (with respect to a given range of discourse) a viable alternative to the realist’s more robust notion of truth. Toward this end, he endeavors to prove that a superassertibility predicate can satisfy the traditional equivalence schema: it is true that P iff P. (Wright takes satisfaction of this schema to be a criterion of adequacy for any viable truth predicate.) In this paper, I wil…Read more
  •  58
    Mind-independence and the logical space of Wright's realist-relevant axes
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2): 164-191. 2011.
    This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-tr…Read more
  •  51
    Properties, laws, and worlds
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4): 471-489. 2015.
    Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’…Read more
  •  42
    The Case for Metaphysical Realism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3): 411-419. 2002.
    This work defends a modest version of metaphysical realism. The commitments of the view are spelled out and the strongest argument for it is presented. It is suggested that failure to find this argument persuasive frequently arises from either a failure to distinguish between trivial and nontrivial dependence of minds on minds or a tendency to equivocate between metaphysical and theoretical timelines. The notion of mind-dependence is then explored in more detail. It is argued that, while the met…Read more
  •  1
    The metaphysical realist asserts, while the metaphysical antirealist denies, that there are individuals that exist independently of the existence and workings of any mind or minds. I begin by distinguishing the thesis of metaphysical realism from other theses that are also called ' realism '. Of particular interest in this discussion is the relation between metaphysical realism and views such as moral realism and scientific realism. ; Metaphysical realism is commonly thought to be the default po…Read more
  •  90
    Quid Quidditism Est?
    Erkenntnis 81 (2): 237-257. 2016.
    Over the last decade or so, there has been a renewed interest in a view about properties known as quidditism. However, a review of the literature reveals that ‘quidditism’ is used to cover a range of distinct views. In this paper I explore the logical space of distinct types of quidditism. The first distinction noted is between quidditism as a thesis explicitly about property individuation and quidditism as a principle of unrestricted property recombination. The distinction recently drawn by Dus…Read more
  •  48
    A Hole in the Defense of Pure Reason
    Journal of Philosophical Research 28 345-360. 2003.