•  147
    Let’s be Reasonable
    Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1): 127-134. 2009.
    Feminist philosophy is highly critical of Cartesian, and more broadly Enlightenment, conceptions of rationality. However, feminist philosophers typically fail to address contemporary theories of rationality and to consider how more current thoeories address feminist concerns. I argue that, contrary to their protestations, feminists are “obsessing over an outdated conception of reason” and that even the most suspect of “malestream” philosophers express an understanding of rationality that is cl…Read more
  •  144
    The realism in quasi-realism
    Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1): 75-83. 1996.
  •  137
    Can Mind Be a Virtue?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1): 119-128. 2015.
    While feminist philosophy has had much to say on the topic of reason, little has been done to develop a specifically feminist account of the concept. I argue for a virtue account of mind grounded in contemporary approaches to rationality. The evolutionary stance adopted within most contemporary theories of mind implicitly entails a rejection of central elements of Cartesianism. As a result, many accounts of rationality are anti-modern is precisely the sorts of ways that feminists demand. I …Read more
  •  118
    Being Reasonable
    Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1): 187-195. 2012.
    Although feminists have spilled a great deal of ink criticizing Enlightenment conceptions of rationality, the time has come to consider constructing a positive account. Recent attempts to construct an account of rationality as a virtue concept reflect many feminist complaints concerning Enlightenment rationality, and, thus, I maintain that feminism should take seriously such a conception. Virtue rationality offers a more diverse account of rationality without sacrificing the fundamental normat…Read more
  •  106
    The bias paradox emerges out of a tension between objectivism and relativism.If one rejects a certain the conception objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality (i.e., if all views are biased), how, then, can one hold that some epistemic perspectives are better than others? This is a problem that has been most explicitly dealt with in feminist epistemology, but it is not unique to feminist perspectives. In this paper, I wish to clearly lay out the nature of the paradox and the vari…Read more
  •  81
    Wittgenstein and the private language of ethlcs
    Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2): 27-38. 2004.
    Beyond “A Lecture on Ethics,” Wittgenstein says little on the topic of ethics, despite professing a great respect for ethics. I argue that while Wittgenstein ceases to speak of ethics, his account fits equally within his Tractarian and post-Tractarian writing. On both accounts of language, ethics remains nonsense, but it is not insignificant nonsense. However, because Wittgenstein holds ethics to concern absolute values that are in principle inexpressible, his anti-theoretical conception of e…Read more
  •  45
    Don’t be Ignorant
    Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1): 49-57. 2018.
    “Ignorance” is receiving an increased amount of philosophical attention. The study of it even has its own name, “agnotology.” Some ignorance remains simply a case of not having enough information, but increasingly philosophers are recognizing a whole other type of ignorance, one that is socially constructed and often actively promoted. In the first section of this paper I examine perhaps the best known type of socially constructed ignorance, “white ignorance.” White ignorance reflects a lack of …Read more
  •  38
    Exploring the history of the concept of 'rationality', Deborah K. Hakes argues that feminism should seek to develop a virtue theory of rationality.
  •  22
    The bias paradox
    In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2011.
    Feminist philosophers are often concerned with rejecting Cartesian notions of objectivity which eliminate all subjectivity on the part of knowers. However, this rejection of a notion of pure (non-subjective) neutrality has led the dilemma that Louise Antony calls the “bias paradox” (Antony 1993, 188-90). At the heart of this paradox lies the seeming choice between objectivism and relativism. It has two fundamental commitments that clearly focus this dilemma: (1) the explicit rejection of the…Read more
  •  14
  •  9
    On Being Reasonably Different
    Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1): 53-61. 2017.
    The age of Enlightenment has, upon refl ection, turned out to be an age of exclusion. Part of the explanation for this is that Descartes’ inward turn leaves reason unable to rely on anything other than its own resources. Rather than give in to cultural relativism, philosophers of the time deny the epistemic and moral agency of those who are different from themselves. Even as philosophy rejects its Cartesian heritage, the same dilemma faces us: fi nd some uniformity and regularity within cognitio…Read more
  •  8
    Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility
    Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1): 93-100. 2020.
  •  8
    Concepts, Content, and Consciousness: A Kantian View of Mind
    Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 1998.
    The mind is, for Kant, a functional system whereby bare sensations are combined into representations of objects and unified within a single consciousness. I argue that this picture allows for realistic mental content and provides a useful explanation of the nature of consciousness. ;However, despite its insights, a Kantian view of mind has two significant difficulties: the first concerns the relationship between mental concepts and objects in the world while the second concerns the relationship …Read more
  •  6
    Let’s be Reasonable: Feminism and Rationality
    Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1): 127-134. 2009.
  •  2
    Towards a Liberatory Epistemology
    Springer Verlag. 2019.
  •  1
    In The Virtue of Feminist Rationality the author develops a specifically feminist account of rationality, an account which treats reason as a virtue concept. Contrary to some feminists claims that reason is inherently and irredeemably masculine, Heikes argues that the coherence of feminism demands a rational ground and that feminists must be willing to challenge the masculine connotations that have been historically linked to reason. While acknowledging contemporary philosophy’s vehement rejec…Read more
  • Philosophy’s Ambivalent Future
    Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 22 39-43. 2018.
    Philosophy today is undergoing a transformation away from modernism. The problem is that it is far from clear what this transformation is moving toward. I examine the transition from the premodern to the modern philosophical world and contrast it with our current situation. While the moderns were clear in their rejection of Aristotelian scholasticism and sure of their methods, in our own time we are neither clear about the extent to which we reject modernism nor our methodology moving forward. I…Read more
  • Schema, language, and two problems content
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2): 155-168. 2003.
    Human cognition is often taken to be a rule-governed system of representations that serve to guide our beliefs about our actions in the world around us. This view, though, has two problems: it must explain how the conceptually governed contents of the mind can be about objects that exist in a non-conceptual world, and it must explain how the non-conceptual world serves as a constraint on belief. I argue that the solution to these problems is to recognize that cognition has both empirical and apr…Read more
  • Out of the Cave: Understanding Rationality
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (3-4): 237-252. 2010.
    The history of philosophy is in many ways a history of how we understand rationality. However, philosophers have historically adopted a fairly narrow approach toward rationality, focusing almost exclusively on issues of structure and the justification of beliefs. In this essay, I argue that considerations of reflective equilibrium should lead philosophers to take into account the empirical features of rationality. After all, our philosophical understanding of rationality must ultimately reflect …Read more