•  553
    Are emotions perceptual experiences of value?
    Ratio 25 (1): 93-107. 2012.
    A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But I also say why the usua…Read more
  •  502
    On the Appearance and Reality of Mind
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 37 (1): 47-70. 2016.
    According to what I will call the “appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind,” conscious mental states are identical to how they subjectively appear or present themselves to us in our experience of them. The doctrine has had a number of supporters but to date has not received from its proponents the comprehensive and systematic treatment that might be expected. In this paper I outline the key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with the case for thinking that doctrine to be true. I…Read more
  •  454
    The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions
    European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 281-303. 2009.
    Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend t…Read more
  •  233
    It is well documented that people with moderate-to-severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) can undergo personality changes, including becoming more impulsive in terms of how they behave. Legal guidance and academic commentary support the view that impulsiveness can render someone decisionally incompetent as defined by English and Welsh law. However, impulsiveness is a trait found within the healthy population. Arguably, impulsiveness is also a trait that gives rise to behaviours that should normally…Read more
  •  221
    Standing up for an affective account of emotion
    Philosophical Explorations 9 (3): 261-276. 2006.
    This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for exam…Read more
  •  158
    In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre highlights how emotions can transform our perspective on the world in ways that might make our situations more bearable when we cannot see an easy or happy way out. The point of this chapter is to spell out and discuss Sartre’s theory of emotion as presented in the Sketch with two aims in mind. The first is to show that although emotions have the power to transform our perspectives on the world in ways described by Sartre, Sartre is mistaken to thin…Read more
  •  96
    The General Medical Council instructs doctors not to allow their personal beliefs to interfere with their practice. But if attitudes can threaten to impact negatively on a doctor's practice then the question arises: should doctors ever be professionally required to change their attitudes? In this paper I suggest that doctors should be required to amend their attitudes if two conditions are met, namely: (1) the doctor has an attitude that if neglected by the doctor will (or is very likely to) com…Read more
  •  94
    Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (4): 533-553. 2018.
    I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.
  •  88
    Emotional disorder
    Ratio 17 (1): 90-103. 2004.
    In this paper I aim to provide a characterisation of emotional disorder. I begin by criticising the thought that an agent can be judged to be experiencing an emotional disorder if his emotion causes him some type of harm. This then leads me to develop the claim that emotional disorder relates to sufficiently inappropriate emotion, where (sufficiently) inappropriate emotion relates to emotion that fails to be (sufficiently) responsive to the agent's beliefs and/or desires. Finally, I conclude the…Read more
  •  88
    Abortion and referrals for abortion: is the law in need of change?
    Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17 (5): 1006-1008. 2011.
    In an article published recently in this journal Daniel Hill argues that it is unacceptable that British law allows doctors to refuse to terminate non-emergency pregnancies but not to refuse to refer given that many doctors who are opposed to non-emergency abortion will be opposed also to any action that aids non-emergency abortion, including the action of referral. In this reply, I argue that Hill’s argument fails to describe properly the correct function of the law, which has never been about …Read more
  •  80
    This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emot…Read more
  •  80
    Evaluating Medico-Legal Decisional Competency Criteria
    Health Care Analysis 23 (2): 181-196. 2015.
    In this paper I get clearer on the considerations that ought to inform the evaluation and development of medico-legal competency criteria—where this is taken to be a question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for a patient to be found competent in medico-legal contexts. In the “Decisional Competency in Medico-Legal Contexts” section I explore how the question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for decisional competence is to be interpreted. I begin by considering an in…Read more
  •  79
    Does decision-making capacity require the absence of pathological values?
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4): 341-344. 2009.
    Decision-making capacity (DMC) is normally taken to include (1) understanding (and appreciation); (2) the ability to deliberate or weigh up; and (3) the ability to express a choice. In an article published recently in PPP, Jacinta Tan and her colleagues (2006) suggest that DMC requires also (4) the absence of 'pathological values' (i.e., values that arise from mental disorder). In this paper, I argue that although (1)–(3) might be necessary for DMC, (4) is not necessary (barring cases where path…Read more
  •  64
    Why Treating Problems in Emotion May Not Require Altering Eliciting Cognitions
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3): 237-246. 2006.
    In this paper, I challenge the popular belief shared by cognitive-minded theorists and therapists that the treatment of "inappropriate" or "dysfunctional" emotion should primarily be about challenging the eliciting cognitions. Although I acknowledge that sometimes therapy should proceed in this way, I point out that in some cases it is clearly the case that therapy should not proceed in this way—namely, in those cases where there are no eliciting cognitions, or in those cases where our concern l…Read more
  •  54
    Serious professional misconduct and the need for an apology
    Clinical Ethics 5 (3): 130-135. 2010.
    In this paper I argue that doctors who are found guilty of serious professional misconduct should be required to apologize as a condition of their registration. I argue that such a requirement is to be justified on the basis of the need to protect patients, maintain public confidence in the profession, and declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and behaviour. I also answer an objection that might be made to the position I defend. Finally, I consider whether there should be any exceptions…Read more
  •  42
    The author outlines a number of reasons why morally inappropriate attitudes may give rise to concerns about fitness to practise. He argues that inappropriate attitudes may raise such concerns because they can lead to harmful behaviours , and because they are often themselves harmful . He also outlines some of the challenges that the cultivation and assessment of attitudes in students raise for medical educators and some of the ways in which those challenges may be approached and possibly overcom…Read more
  •  33
    Some More Reflections on Emotions, Thoughts, and Therapy
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3): 255-257. 2006.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some More Reflections on Emotions, Thoughts, and TherapyDemian Whiting (bio)Keywordsdepression, pedophilia, phenomenology, noncognitive, treatmentThe primary objective of my paper was to show that where a person's representations of the world are eliciting the wrong emotions then treatment of those problems in emotion cannot be about treating the eliciting representations. And it is worth clarifying two points about my claim here. Fi…Read more