•  758
    Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism about Rules
    Philosophical Topics 38 (2): 131-156. 2010.
    Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challeng…Read more
  •  475
    Identities, Distinctnesses, Truthmakers, and Indiscernibility Principles
    Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170): 145-183. 2000.
    After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly sub…Read more
  •  281
    Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival
    In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3, Oxford University Press. pp. 3-32. 2007.
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a si…Read more
  •  248
    Re-identifying matter
    Philosophical Review 91 (3): 317-341. 1982.
  •  81
    Can amoebae divide without multiplying?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3). 1985.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  63
    This paper explores a variety of kinds of apparent disagreement of which it may be held that they involve failure to disagree in that, at least in some broad sense, the disputants use the same words to express different meanings or concepts. It is argued that it is hard to rebut the claim that some apparent disagreements about personal identity fall into a particular sub-category of this broad type. I conclude both that a "constrained" relativism which I call "quasi-relativism" is appropriate in…Read more
  •  33
    I hold a view I call “Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism,” PIQR for short.
  •  6
    Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties
    Philosophical Studies 69 (1): 1-34. 1993.