•  77
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they pr…Read more
  •  79
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief–desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief–desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief–desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's prac…Read more
  •  79
    Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3): 499-517. 2011.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Final…Read more
  •  310
    Abstract: In this article, we explore what are ethical forms of holding service users responsible in mental health care contexts. Hanna Pickard has provided an account of how service users should be held responsible for morally wrong or seriously harmful conduct within contexts of mental health care, called the clinical stance. From a clinical stance one holds a person responsible for harm, but refrains from emotionally blaming the person and only considers the person responsible for this conduc…Read more
  •  22
    Reproach without Blameworthiness
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (4): 399-401. 2020.
    In her commentary, Kennett helpfully reiterates Pickard’s criticism of Strawsonian theories of blame. Angry forms of blame like resentment are, according to Pickard, characterized by a sense of entitlement and are counterproductive to therapy. Some disagree that entitlement is a necessary condition for emotional blame, but also more permissive understandings of Strawsonian emotional blame have been considered inappropriate and counterproductive in a therapeutic relationship and on a psychiatric …Read more
  •  80
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scoreke…Read more
  •  10
    Understanding lone actor grievance-fueled violence remains a challenge. We believe that the concept of grievance provides an opportunity to add an engaged, first-person perspective to the assessment of lone actor extreme violence. We propose an enactivist philosophical approach that can help to understand the why and how of the pathway from grievance to violent extremism. Enactivism sees grievance as a dynamic, interpersonal, and context-sensitive construct that indicates how offenders make sens…Read more
  •  8
    Matters of the Autistic Mind: What Is the Role of Material Objects in Social Interaction?
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 29 (3): 213-216. 2022.
    Is autism a condition internal to the person that causes problems in social interaction? Or should we conceive of autism primarily at the level of interaction, as a “two-way” phenomenon that develops in the relation between the person with autism and her social-material environment? Over the last decade or so, this issue has increasingly gained interest, not only in academia, but also in the field of mental health care and in the wider public domain.Much is at stake here. Framing autism as an in…Read more
  •  11
    Causation in Self-Management
    with Marc Slors
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (4): 375-377. 2020.
    In his thoughtful commentary, De Bruin invites us to say more about the notion of causation in our two-dimensional model of self-management in health care. In particular, he thinks there is a tension between 1) self-management-as-facilitation being causally efficacious and 2) “surgical” self-management interventions on specific variables being practically impossible in psychiatric conditions due to their complex dynamic nature. In particular, he asks us: “How can we establish the causal efficacy…Read more
  •  13
    Self-Management in Psychiatry and Psychomatic Medicine—Part 2
    with Marc Slors
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (4): 329-332. 2020.
    This special issue is a follow-up on a previous issue in this journal on self-management in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. It is the concluding chapter of a research project that sought to unpack and develop the implications of an understanding of self-management in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine as “management of the self.”Over the last, 20 years, self-management has gained a central place in treatment programs across various medical disciplines. It positions patients as “expert-…Read more
  •  6
    Een balansbeslissing
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (2): 241-244. 2019.
    Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.
  •  79
    Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3): 499-517. 2011.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Final…Read more
  •  41
    Empirical evidence suggests that people often confabulate when they are asked about their choices or reasons for action. The implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different i…Read more
  •  11
    Eerste-persoons autoriteit, zelfregulatie en het probleem van confabulatie
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 110 (3): 273-289. 2018.
    First-person authority, self-regulation and the problem of confabulation In this paper we discuss the implications of confabulation studies for the everyday concept of first-person authority. We argue that the results of these studies are less problematic than they are often taken to be if we understand first-person authority in terms of a capacity for self-regulation. We discuss an example of clinical confabuluation to illustrate when confabulation does become a threat to first-person authority…Read more
  •  55
    Self-Knowledge in Psychotherapy: Adopting a Dual Perspective on One's Own Mental States
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1): 45-58. 2018.
    The development of self-knowledge or self-insight is a well-recognized therapeutic factor in psychotherapy. In some way or other, all evidence-based therapies seek to reframe and enrich patients’ own understanding of themselves. In this article, we focus on self-knowledge with respect to mental states, in particular those states that cause patients to seek treatment.As an example, imagine a person who enrolls in psychotherapy because he finds himself unable to commit himself to intimate relation…Read more
  •  20
    Reason attribution without belief-desire ascription
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1): 157-180. 2012.
  •  88
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specifi…Read more
  •  818
    Introduction: self-knowledge in perspective
    Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 123-133. 2015.
    This introduction is part of the special issue ‘ Self-knowledge in perspective’ guest edited by Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos. // Papers included in the special issue: Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge Dorit Bar-On -/- Self-knowledge and communication Johannes Roessler -/- First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal Kateryna Samoilova -/- Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation Franz Knappik -/- How do you know that you settled a question? Tillmann Vierk…Read more
  •  76
    Self-Interpretation as First-Person Mindshaping: Implications for Confabulation Research
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2): 297-307. 2015.
    It is generally acknowledged that confabulation undermines the authority of self-attribution of mental states. But why? The mainstream answer is that confabulation misrepresents the actual state of one’s mind at some relevant time prior to the confabulatory response. This construal, we argue, rests on an understanding of self-attribution as first-person mindreading. Recent developments in the literature on folk psychology, however, suggest that mental state attribution also plays an important ro…Read more
  •  34
    What Is the Philosopher's Role in Interdisciplinary Research?
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1): 17-19. 2017.
    Do psychopaths suffer from impairments that undermine their capacity for moral reasoning and behavior? And, if so, does that mean they are not morally responsible for their actions? The first, empirical question might seem to be rather straightforward, whereas the second, philosophical question might seem more complex and therefore more difficult to answer. In their rich and thought-provoking paper, Jalava and Griffiths target the first question. They forcefully remind us of the fact that answer…Read more
  •  70
    Mental Agency as Self-Regulation
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 815-825. 2015.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states. First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails to co…Read more