Diana I. Pérez

In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.

In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism (in terms of the supervenience relation), there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two arguments that Kim mentions against physicalism: the inverted spectrum / zombies argument and the intrinsicality argument. I shall try to show that these three arguments depend upon a misconception of the nature of our ordinary mental concepts.

En este artículo examinaremos un caso de aplicación de la hipótesis de la relatividad lingüística : la influencia del género gramatical de las lenguas sobre la cognición o el pensamiento de los hablantes. Dado que las lenguas difieren tanto en sus repertorios léxicos como sobre todo en sus gramáticas de género para referir a las personas, a otras entidades animadas e incluso a entidades inanimadas, nuestro propósito será, en primer lugar, revisar la evidencia experimental reciente que avalaría la HRL en este dominio, al comprobar una variedad de impactos cognitivos y psicológicos, variables según las lenguas de los hablantes. En particular, identificaremos cuáles son los “efectos relativistas” en el caso de los rasgos morfosintácticos de las lenguas con carga de género, y en relación con la universalización del género masculino. Sobre la base de la evaluación realizada e incorporando los aportes de los estudios de “género y lenguaje” de los enfoques feministas, concluiremos señalando de qué diversas maneras es viable e importante promover usos inclusivos del lenguaje e incluso cambios más profundos hacia un lenguaje inclusivo, con especial referencia al español.

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assumptions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inadequacy of this notion in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emergence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts

In this paper I shall discuss McGinn's transcendental naturalism and the reasons he gives in order to show that philosophy will always be just a cluster of mysteries without answers. I shall show that the three main arguments he gives for TN are inconclusive and that a modular architecture of the mind he presupposes is not committed to the epistemic thesis of TN, the idea that we are "cognitively closed" to answering some questions about consciousness, meaning, knowledge and the like. /// En este trabajo discutiré el naturalismo trascendental que defiende McGinn y las razones que ofrece para mostrar que la filosofía será por siempre un cúmulo de misterios sin respuesta. Mostraré que ninguno de los tres argumentos principales que McGinn propone en favor de su positión es concluyente y que la estructura modular de la mente que presupone no está comprometida con la tesis epistémica del NT, esto es, con la idea de que estamos "cognitivamente cerrados" para responder preguntas acerca de la conciencia, el significado, la libertad, el conocimiento, etc.

Hornsby defiende una interpretación muy particular de la distinción personal-subpersonal tal como fue propuesta por Dennett y de la doctrina filosófica en la que está enraizada esta distinción. Según Hornsby de la aceptación de la distinción y la doctrina se sigue una defensa de la autonomía explicativa del nivel personal. Esta defensa nos compromete con un nivel personal genuino de explicación y la idea de que los hechos subpersonales no explican hechos personales. Hornsby sostiene, además, que mientras que en Dennett se defiende la autonomía del nivel explicativo personal, en Dennett post-1969 al modificarse la doctrina de base cambia la manera de entender la distinción y con ello se reniega de ambos compromisos, de lo cual se sigue un abandono de la tesis de la autonomía del nivel explicativo personal. La tesis que vamos a sostener en este trabajo es que si bien la distinción de Dennett nos compromete con , no nos compromete con . Dado que una defensa de la autonomía explicativa del nivel personal, tal como Hornsby la entiende, abarca ambos compromisos, se sigue que no hay tal defensa. En consecuencia, si bien hay algunas cuestiones que en Dennett no se plantean de manera tan explícita y clara como en Dennett post-1969, no hay un cambio sustancial en su concepción de la distinción.According to Hornsby , Dennett's personal-subpersonal distinction has as one of its consequences a defense of the autonomy of personal level explanation, and this defense is based on two commitments: the personal level is a genuine level of explanation, and subpersonal facts do not explain personal facts. Moreover, Hornsby argues that Dennett post-1969 rejects both commitments, and that he consequently abandons the autonomy thesis. In this paper we shall argue that, although Dennett's distinction is committed to , it is not committed to . Given that a defense of the autonomy, as Hornsby understands it, presupposes both commitments, it follows that there is no such defense. We hold that there is no substantial change in Dennett's conception of the distinction, although some of these issues are not as clear and explicit in Dennett 1969 as in Dennett post-1969

In this paper I propose a series of arguments in order to show that it is preferable for analytic philosophy to be practiced in different languages. In the first section, I show that the analytic tradition includes people developing their philosophical work in different natural languages. In the second section, I will address the question of the role of language in thought, and more specifically in philosophical thought, concluding that it is preferable to allow for the use of different languages as a vehicle for philosophical ideas. Finally, I make some suggestions regarding changes that could be made in academic practices to better allow a plurality of languages and voices within the analytic tradition.

En este trabajo presento dos líneas de argumentación que desembo-can en la tesis eliminativista, una proveniente de consideraciones relativas a la re-lación entre nuestra psicología de sentido común y la ciencia psicológi-ca/neurociencia madura, y otra proveniente de consideraciones metafísicas acerca de la naturaleza de los fenómenos mentales y su interacción causal con el mundo físico, y trato de mostrar la inadecuación de ambas líneas argumentativas. En se-gundo lugar, menciono tres líneas de crítica a los intentos eliminativistas, mos-trando sus debilidades. Finalmente, ofrezco una línea argumentativa alternativa para sostener la implausibilidad del eliminativismo basada en consideraciones acerca de los alcances de un posible cambio conceptual radical en nuestros con-ceptos mentalistas ordinarios que el eliminativismo parece suponer.In this paper I outline two lines of argumentation which lead to the eliminativist thesis, one of them based on a peculiar understanding of the rela-tionship between common sense and scientific knowledge, and the other one based on metaphysical ideas about the nature of mental phenomena and their causal interaction with the physical world. I try to show the inadequacy of both kinds of arguments. In the second place, I review three critics to the eliminativist thesis, showing their flaws. Finally, I offer my own reasons for rejecting elimina-tivism considering the difficulties that a radical conceptual change of our mental-istic concepts like the one supposed by the eliminativist pose

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a phenomenal concept is, and I show the difficulties each of them have. Finally, I develop my own account of phenomenal concepts. My thesis claims that phenomenal concepts are complex concepts whose possession conditions depend upon the mastery of many other concepts, in fact, quite complex concepts such as the distinction between appearance and reality (which belongs to our theory of mind system), and color concepts (at least in the case of the phenomenal concepts needed in order to account for Mary's case). And these later concepts are concepts that have special possession conditions: they include the deployment of nonconceptual recognitional capacities.

This work promotes the thesis that humans are naturally transhuman. In order to achieve this, we present in the first two sections some examples of technological devices assembled to human beings, and we critically review the assumptions and dichotomies on which the idea of human enhancement is based according to the ordinary transhumanist vision. Thirdly, we present the thesis of the Extended Mind to support our intuition. Fourthly, we dismantle the most relevant philosophical dichotomies that structure the transhumanist position. Finally, we recapitulate the reasons why we should wake up from the transhumanist dream.

En este artículo me ocupo de la cuestión de cómo en las teorías de proceso dual se puede dar cuenta del autoengaño y su conexión con la racionalidad. Presento las versiones intencionalista y no intencionalista del autoengaño y muestro cómo el debate entre ellas puede dirimirse de manera más completa y satisfactoria en el marco de una teoría dual. En éste suelen aceptarse dos sistemas de razonamiento, uno heurístico y otro analítico, que compiten por el control de nuestras inferencias y acciones, pero a veces interactúan y colaboran entre sí. Se defiende que si predomina la respuesta de S1, se puede ver el patrón del autoengaño como una forma de razonamiento heurístico y no únicamente como un vínculo causal. Se sugiere que las evaluaciones en cuanto a la racionalidad del proceso del autoengaño, dependerá del modo en que intervenga en el patrón de razonamiento y del sistema desde el cual se lleve a cabo. In this paper I discuss the phenomenon of self-deception and its connection with the notion of rationality linked to the dual process theories. I present the intentionalist and nonintentionalist accounts of self-deception and aim to show how the debate between them can be resolved in a more comprehensive and satisfactory manner, if it is placed in the frame of the dual process theories. The dual model usually accepts two kinds of reasoning processes, heuristic and analytic, referred to two different systems, S1 and S2. These processes compete for control of our inferences and actions, but sometimes they interact and collaborate. It is suggested that in a dual model, the evaluations in terms of the rationality of the process will depend on the way in which self-deception participates in the reasoning process and on the system from which the evaluation takes place.

In this paper I shall offer a reconsideration of three main arguments in the current debate on the mind-body problem, on the light of a peculiar way of conceiving mental concepts: I shall defend the view that mental concepts have to be considered as natural kind concepts. In the first part, I shall develop this proposal and in the second part I shall examine Kripke´s arguments against the identity theory, the zombi´s argument against functionalism and Churchland´s argument for eliminativism. I conclude the paper with an sketchy answer to the mind-body problem, in the middle of the road between functionalism and the identity theory

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar la aparente interna del Programa Fuerte de la Sociología del Conocimiento, que parte de principios donde se apoya una explicación causal a través de leyes generales y al mismo tiempo se defiende un reativismo cognitivo para estudiar su objeto de manera simétrica; ta la propuesta de que los mismos tipos de causa deberán explicar tanto las creencias consideradas falsas como las verdaderas. A través de este análisis se pretende constatar la consistencia del programa y, principalmente, aproximarnos a la elucidación de su concepto de ciencia. The aim of this work is to analyze the aparent internal tension of the strong programme of sociology of knowledge, wich support a casual explanation thougout general rules and in the same time a cognitive relativism to study its aim in a symmetrical way; such is the purpose that in the same sort of cause that will ought to explain both the false and the true beief. Throughout this analysis its pretended to verify the programme consistence and, mainly, to approach to elucidation on its science concept

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assump-tions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inade-quacy of this notion in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emer-gence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts.

The aim of this paper is to review the controversy concerning the nature of nonconceptual content, and its philosophical implications. I will focus the presentation on three topics: (a) the different motivations behind the postulation of nonconceptual content, (b) the arguments for nonconceptual content, and (c) the different characterizations offered of nonconceptual content (and the problem these definitions pose). In the last section of the paper I will mention the presuppositions behind this notion and analyze a couple of paradoxical theses that emerged from this discussion.

En este trabajo hago un ejercicio filosófico de aplicación de una visión naturalista de la filosofía analizando desde esta perspectiva la discusión acerca de la naturaleza de la psicología folk, y mostrando la superioridad de la perspectiva de segunda persona para dar cuenta de este fenómeno. Para ello presentaré la perspectiva naturalista que adopto, luego presentaré brevemente las perspectivas clásicas cartesianas para, finalmente, presentar la perspectiva de segunda persona mostrando cómo se puede dar cuenta de las continuidades ontogenéticas y filogenéticas que subyacen al desarrollo de la psicología folk, incorporando en esta explicación tanto elementos filosóficos como científicos.

The discovery of the mirror neuron system, which occurred 25 years ago, was considered by some authors as a definitive proof of the superiority of one philosophical theory (the Simulation Theory) over another (the Theory of Theory). However, the claim to have found a definitive answer to the philosophical problem of understanding other minds from neuroscientific data is far from acceptable. In this work I will show that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations regarding the role of mirror neurons, and that one of the most plausible seems consistent with the second-person perspective (Pérez and Gomila 2021). The conclusion I seek to draw from this case study is that there are no direct paths from neuroscience to the solution of (at least some) philosophical problems.

En este trabajo se propone una caracterización de lo que la tradición filosófica denomina «qualia», a partir de cuatro rasgos principales: intrinsecalidad, inefabilidad, subjetividad y un peculiar acceso epistémico. Después de repasar brevemente las diversas teorías contemporáreas que pretenden responder al problema de cómo incorporar estos qualia al mundo físico, se propone una salida naturalista al problema de los qualia, consistente en dar una explicación independiente de cada uno de estos rasgos dentro de un marco naturalista, tomando como punto de partida nuestro lenguaje mentalista ordinario. La idea es que una vez explicados estos rasgos, la pregunta más abstracta acerca de cómo incorporar los qualia a una pintura naturalista del mundo, ya no necesita ser planteada.

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy.

In the last half century,there were several attempts to adopt the notion of supervenience in order to shed light on the claim of generality that is involved in aesthetic judgments. In this paper I will show the difficulties brought up by the transposition of the notion of supervenience from other areas of philosophy to the philosophy of art and I will also show the intrinsic difficulties of this project. First, I will revise the origins of the notion of supervenience in contemporary ethics and philosophy of mind, as well as the theoretical framework in which this notion was first introduced. Second, I will revise the arguments for and against aesthetic supervenience in the field of analytic philosophy of art. In the rest of this work, I will try to argue against the viability of applying this notion to the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. I will point out the difficulties of identifying the base properties of such relationship, and then the difficulties of identifying the supervenient properties. In this way I will show that there are good reasons to argue that it will not be fruitful to use the notion of supervenience in order to understand the peculiarities of aesthetic judgments. Finally, I will point out a number of additional difficulties for the thesis of aesthetic supervenience which do not seem able to be satisfactorily solved.

The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that mental concepts are natural kind concepts. By ‘mental concepts’ I mean the ordinary words belonging to our everyday languages that we use in order to describe our mental life. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I shall present the hypothesis: firstly, I shall present a theory about the meaning of natural kind concepts following Putnam's 1975 proposal, with some modifications; secondly, I shall present a taxonomy of mental concepts and, thirdly, I shall explain what the meaning of each kind of mental concept would be on the hypothesis defended in this paper. In the second part of the paper, I shall present two interesting consequences of the hypothesis proposed: first, that it is preferable to avoid a certain way of conceiving phenomenal concepts which does not fit with the hypothesis proposed; second, that folk psychology could fruitfully be considered a theory, and why, ultimately, it will not be eliminated.