Diana Perez

Tsirelson’s problem deals with how to model separate measurements in quantum mechanics. In addition to its theoretical importance, the resolution of Tsirelson’s problem could have great consequences for device independent quantum key distribution and certified randomness. Unfortunately, understanding present literature on the subject requires a heavy mathematical background. In this paper, we introduce quansality, a new theoretical concept that allows to reinterpret Tsirelson’s problem from a foundational point of view. Using quansality as a guide, we recover all known results on Tsirelson’s problem in a clear and intuitive way

In this paper I shall offer a reconsideration of three main arguments in the current debate on the mind-body problem, on the light of a peculiar way of conceiving mental concepts: I shall defend the view that mental concepts have to be considered as natural kind concepts. In the first part, I shall develop this proposal and in the second part I shall examine Kripke´s arguments against the identity theory, the zombi´s argument against functionalism and Churchland´s argument for eliminativism. I conclude the paper with an sketchy answer to the mind-body problem, in the middle of the road between functionalism and the identity theory