•  143
    Theories of Vagueness
    Philosophical Review 112 (2): 259-262. 2003.
    The goal of this book is to defend a supervaluationist theory of vagueness. Keefe begins by laying out a series of desiderata for an adequate theory of vagueness generally: among other things, such a theory will need to solve the sorites paradox, provide a plausible analysis of borderline cases, preserve so-called penumbral connections among borderline predications, accommodate the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness, and comport with as many of our ordinary linguistic intuitions as possible. S…Read more
  •  2374
    In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.
  •  1
    Similarity spaces
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
  •  211
    Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This 'state of the art' collection honours one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic…Read more
  •  40
    Thinking about Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 171-186. 2005.
  •  40
    Contextualism and the Sorites Paradox
    with Inga Bones
    In Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox, Cambridge University Press. pp. 63-77. 2019.
  •  73
    Sorites Paradox
    with Dominic Hyde
    In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
  •  14
    This paper explores the implications of some experimental data for views that identify colors with objective physical properties such as reflectance profiles. Those who reject objectivist views often argue from the existence of intersubjective differences in color categorization ; but objectivists have managed to stand their ground by identifying colors with sets or ranges of reflectances individuated by the ways in which they stimulate the visual system. In the interest of moving the debate for…Read more
  • Marcus, Ruth Barcan
    with G. Schumm
    In Donald Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Simon and Schuster Macmillan. pp. 322--323. 1996.
  •  47
    First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs
    In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford University Press. 1998.
  • The thesis develops a cognitivist account of the supposed ineffability of musical experience. It is contended that, when the ineffability is viewed as adhering to a certain kind of perceptual knowledge of a musical signal, its nature can be illuminated by the adoption of a recent cognitivist theory of perception in conjunction with a generative grammar for tonal music . On this two-headed view, music perception consists in a rule-governed process of computing a series of increasingly abstract me…Read more
  •  79
    Vagueness and Observationality
    In Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide, Springer Verlag. pp. 107--121. 2011.
    Of the many families of words that are thought to be vague, so-called observational predicates may be both the most fascinating and the most confounding. Roughly, observational predicates are terms that apply to objects on the basis of how those objects appear to us perceptually speaking. ‘Red’, ‘loud’, ‘sweet’, ‘acrid’, and ‘smooth’ are good examples. Delia Graff explains that a “predicate is observational just in case its applicability to an object (given a fixed context of evaluation) depends…Read more
  •  28
    Review: Some Thoughts about "Thinking about Consciousness" (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.
  •  146
    Is twelve-tone music artistically defective?
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27 (1). 2003.
    Worries about the artistic integrity (for lack of a better term) of twelve-tone music are not new. Critics, philosophers, musicians, even composers them- selves have assailed the idiom with a fervor usually reserved for individual artists or works. Just why it is supposed to be defective is not entirely clear, however. I want to revisit these questions by way of putting some insights from music history and theory together with some insights from the philosophy and psychology of music. To find out…Read more
  •  118
    Demoting higher-order vagueness
    In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. pp. 509--22. 2009.
    Higher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases—borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higherorder vagueness, what I will call ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates co…Read more
  •  39
    Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1): 127-132. 1995.
  •  222
    On the persistence of phenomenology
    In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ]
  •  109
    Representationalist solutions to the qualia problem are motivated by two fundamental ideas: first, that having an experience consists in tokening a mental representation1; second, that all one is aware of in having an experience is the intentional content of that representation. In particular, one is not aware of any intrinsic features of the representational vehicle itself. For example, when you visually experience a red object, you are aware only of the redness of the object, not any redness o…Read more
  •  218
    Borderline cases and bivalence
    Philosophical Review 114 (1): 1-31. 2005.
    It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that borderline cases fo…Read more
  •  51
    Responses to Discussants
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 483-501. 2015.
  •  36
    Language, Music, and Mind
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (3): 360-362. 1993.
  •  23
    Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation (review)
    Philosophical Review 98 (4): 576. 1989.
  •  83
    In Unruly Words, Diana Raffman advances a new theory of vagueness which, unlike previous accounts, is genuinely semantic while preserving bivalence. According to this new approach, called the multiple range theory, vagueness consists essentially in a term's being applicable in multiple arbitrarily different, but equally competent, ways, even when contextual factors are fixed.
  •  67
    Précis of Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 452-456. 2015.
  •  239
    accounts in general, contrary to what he seems to think. Stanley’s discussion concerns the dynamic or ‘forced march’ version of the sorites, viz. the version framed in terms of the judgments that would be made by a competent speaker who proceeds step by step along a sorites series for a vague predicate ‘F’. According to Stanley, the contextualist treatment of the paradox is based on the idea that the speaker shifts the content of the predicate whenever necessary to make it the case that each suc…Read more
  •  8
    Transvaluationism: Comments on Horgan
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1): 127-132. 1995.
  •  110
    Some Thoughts About Thinking About Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 163-163. 2007.
    David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness tells a skillful, inventive, and plausible story about why, given that the phenomenal character of conscious experience is an unproblematically physical property, we continue to suffer from “intuitions of dualism”. According to Papineau, we are misled by the peculiar structure of the phenomenal concepts we use to introspect upon that phenomenal character. Roughly: unlike physical concepts, phenomenal concepts exemplify the kind of experience they are…Read more