Dirk Louw

“Neo-inclusivism” is explained and assessed as an approach to the problem of the conflicting claims to truth of different religions, with reference to inter alia John B. Cobb (Jr.), Gavin D'Costa and Paul Ingram. For the neo-inclusivist the truth of a religious tradition depends on its inclusivistic capacity, i.e. its capacity to assimilate other traditions. For ex ample, by being enriched and transformed through “radical openness” to other traditions, while remaining “committed” to her own tradition – so the neo-inclusivist claims – the theology of the Christian can become “truly global”. Neo-inclusivism seemingly transcends the absolutist habits of inclusivists, i.e. to assess the religious other in view of criteria (the inclusivist's own religious tradition) with which the other does not identify himself or herself. However, the neo-inclusivist plays down the possible limits of inter religious openness and is overly optimistic about the possibility of a “truly global” theology. Moreover, whether the neo-inclusivist's “committed openness” significantly differs from the approach of those who arbitrarily use the definitive norms of their own religious tradition to assess other traditions, is at least debatable. Whatever the case may be, insofar as tolerance cannot tolerate intolerance, the neo-inclusivist is necessarily intolerant, and, in this sense, “absolutist”, towards those who make their own beliefs normative for all and shun themselves from the assessments and new insights of others. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(1) 2004: 82-107

The practice of ‘Philosophical Counselling’ (henceforth ‘PC’) is growing. But what exactly is PC? The variety of attempts to define PC can be summarised in terms of three overlapping sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; and substantive versus antinomous definitions. ‘Practical’ definitions of PC include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. ‘Theoretical’ definitions exclude such accounts. ‘Monistic definitions’ refers to definitions of PC that define it in terms of the work of one specific philosopher or approach in philosophy. ‘Pluralistic’ definitions draw on the work of a variety of philosophers or approaches. ‘Substantive’ definitions are definitions that purport to say what PC is, while ‘antinomous’ definitions of PC say what it is not . My aim is not to define PC definitively. The aim of this article is rather to: (i) provide an overview of the wide variety of efforts to define PC; and, (ii) briefly suggest a preliminary understanding of PC that seems to cover most of the other definitions thereof. For David Fourie (1946-2013)

The decolonization of Africa, of which the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa is the most recent example, has led to a greater recognition of the wide variety of religions practising on its soil. When confronted with this plurality, and the corresponding plurality of claims to truth or credibility, believers often resort to absolutism. The absolutist evaluates the religious other in view of criteria which violate the self-understanding of the latter. The religious other is thus being colonized by a hegemony of norms and values. This paper deals with an assessment of the faith of others which transcends absolutism without resorting to relativism. More specifically, it aims to show that an African philosophy and way of life called ‘Ubuntu’ significantly overlaps with such a ‘decolonized’ assessment of the religious other, and that this assessment can therefore also be explained, motivated or underscored with reference to the concept of Ubuntu.

Do adherents of different religious traditions communicate and, if so, how? What enables them to do so? What is interreligious “communication”? These issues are ad dressed with reference to Wilfred Cantwell Smith's hermeneutical rule, and to inter alia Paul Knitter, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, David Tracy, and John Dunne. Four responses to the question as to what permits interreligious communication are criticised. According to a fifth response, on which the author elaborates, interreligious communication is not – as the objectivist claims – possible because members of different religious traditions speak the very same language, or – as the relativist claims – impossible because they speak radically different languages. Adherents of different religions communicate, if at all, by means of an analogical language. This language is the product of persistent efforts to understand the religion/faith of the other as he or she understands it. Paradoxically, the language that permits inter religious communication is thus the product of such communication. Without thereby reverting to objectivism or an essentialist view of religion, the author identifies five “less unstable” similarities between religions. These and other “less un stable” similarities might assist believers in their efforts to under stand the religious other.

How may or should adherents of a particular religion assess other religious traditions? Whether they can avoid both absolutism and relativism depends on the availability of “ecumenical criteria”, i.e. a common scale in view of which the adherents of different religious traditions may jointly judge these traditions. It is argued that such a scale may exist even if we assume that the adherents of the different religions do not have any religious beliefs or criteria in common. This scale may exist insofar as believers may share certain meta-religious criteria, e.g. the coherence of beliefs, their existential relevance and efficiency – i.e. their capacity to meet needs and concerns, including ethical-political and scientific concerns – and the impressiveness of beliefs. As such these criteria coincide with conditions that regulate the effective functioning of religions as ultimate frames of reference. However, it is not assumed that these criteria constitute ahistorical foundations. Adherents of the different religious traditions may not agree on the coherence, the existential relevance and efficiency, or the impressiveness of beliefs. Neither will they necessarily agree that these considerations are appropriate. Whether such an agreement exists will only, if at all, become apparent through inter religious dialogue. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(3) 2004: 302-326

The African ubuntu ethic upholds the identification with, and compassion for, others. As such, many have hailed it as the antidote for Africa’s social ailments. However, the author argues that ubuntu harbours a number of controversies, which suggests that it needs critical and creative re-evaluation. These controversies centre around: the existence of ubuntu, so-called “bi-polar thinking‘, the aim of consensus and the concomitant danger of hegemony, the inclusivity of the ubuntu community, ubuntu’s religious roots, and ubuntu’s potential to accommodate plurality and individuality. The author concludes that for those who are willing to rearticulate ubuntu critically and imaginatively, this ancient wisdom has a great deal to offer to the many challenges facing contemporary African society. The ideal of an African Renaissance does not call for the romanticization of an indigenous past, but for countering a restrictive culturalism with an emancipatory understanding of African communalism.