Dirk Schlimm

In this chapter, we will provide an overview of Richard Dedekind's work on continuity, both foundational and mathematical. His seminal contribution to the foundations of analysis is the well-known 1872 booklet Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen (Continuity and irrational numbers), which is based on Dedekind's insight into the essence of continuity that he arrived at in the fall of 1858. After analysing the intuitive understanding of the continuity of the geometric line, Dedekind characterized the property of continuity for the real numbers in terms of what are nowadays called 'Dedekind cuts' on the rational numbers. This treatment, which can be characterized as being 'arithmetical' as well as 'axiomatic', will be presented in detail. To better position Dedekind's contributions in their historical context, we will also consider some of his more mathematical treatments of continuity in addition to his foundational work. Of particular interest is the definition of the Riemann surface in his joint work with Heinrich Weber (1882). Moreover, Dedekind's reflections on space and continuity in his unpublished papers 'Allgemeine Sätze über Räume' (General theorems about spaces; before 1870) and 'Beweis und Anwendungen eines allgemeinen Satzes über mehrfach ausgedehnte stetige Gebiete' (Proof and applications of a general theorem about multiply extended continuous domains; 1892) illustrate the wide range and general coherency of his thoughts. By discussing Dedekind's works in which the notion of continuity plays a central role, we will show how Dedekind's approaches became increasingly abstract, while at the same time retaining a common methodology.

In "Plato's Ghost" Jeremy Gray presented many connections between mathematical practices in the nineteenth century and the rise of mathematical platonism in the context of more general developments, which he refers to as modernism. In this paper, I take up this theme and present a condensed discussion of some arguments put forward in favor of and against the view of mathematical platonism. In particular, I highlight some pressures that arose in the work of Frege, Cantor, and Gödel, which support adopting a platonist position. The aim of this discussion is to provide an historically informed introduction to the philosophical position of mathematical platonism and to point at some of its mathematical and philosophical roots in the nineteenth century.

We propose a characterization of mathematical experiments in terms of a setup, a process with an outcome, and an interpretation. Using a broad notion of process, this allows us to consider arithmetic calculations and geometric constructions as components of mathematical experiments. Moreover, we argue that mathematical experiments should be considered within a broader context of an experimental research project. Finally, we present a particular case study of the genesis of a geometric construction to illustrate the experimental use of hand drawings and computers in mathematical practice.

By way of a close reading of Boole and Frege’s solutions to the same logical problem, we highlight an underappreciated aspect of Boole’s work—and of its difference with Frege’s better-known approach—which we believe sheds light on the concepts of ‘calculus’ and ‘mechanization’ and on their history. Boole has a clear notion of a logical problem; for him, the whole point of a logical calculus is to enable systematic and goal-directed solution methods for such problems. Frege’s Begriffsschrift, on the other hand, is a visual tool to scrutinize concepts and inferences, and is a calculus only in the thin sense that every possible transition between sentences is fully and unambiguously specified in advance. While Frege’s outlook has dominated much of philosophical thinking about logical symbolism, we believe there is value—particularly in light of recent interest in the role of notations in mathematics and logic—in reviving Boole’s idea of an intrinsic link between, as he put it, a ‘calculus’ and a ‘directive method’ to solve problems.

J. S. Silverberg, The Most Obscure and Inconvenient Tables ever Constructed.- D. J. Melville, Commercializing Arithmetic: The Case of Edward Hatton.- C. Baltus, Leading to Poncelet: A Story of Collinear Points.- R. Godard, Cauchy, Le Verrier et Jacobi sur le problème algébrique des valeurs propres et les inégalités séculaires des mouvements des planètes.- A. Ackerberg-Hastings, Mathematics in Astronomy at Harvard College Before 1839 as a Case Study for Teaching Historical Writing in Mathematics Courses.- J. J. Tattersall, S. L. McMurran, "Lectures for Women" and the Founding of Newnham College, Cambridge.- D. Waszek, Are Euclid's Diagrams "Representations"? On an Argument by Ken Manders.- B. Buldt, Abstraction by Embedding and Constraint-Based Design.- W. Meyer, The Birth of Undergraduate Modern Algebra in the United States.- P. Liu, History as a Source of Mathematical Narrative in Developing Students' Interpretations of Mathematics.- F. Kamareddine, J. P. Seldin, Thoughts on Using the History of Mathematics to Teach the Foundations of Mathematical Analysis.

We present some aspects of the genesis of a geometric construction, which can be carried out with compass and straightedge, from the original idea to the published version (Fernández González 2016). The Midpoint Path Construction makes it possible to multiply the length of a line segment by a rational number between 0 and 1 by constructing only midpoints and a straight line. In the form of an interview, we explore the context and narrative behind the discovery, with first-hand insights by its author. Finally, we discuss some general aspects of this case study in the context of philosophy of mathematical practice.´´aa

Tables are widely used for storing, retrieving, communicating, and processing information, but in the literature on the study of representations they are still somewhat neglected. The strong structural constraints on tables allow for a clear identification of their characteristic features and the roles these play in the use of tables as representational and cognitive tools. After introducing syntactic, spatial, and semantic features of tables, we give an account of how these affect our perception and cognition on the basis of fundamental principles of Gestalt psychology. Next are discussed the ways in which these features of tables support their uses in providing a global access to information, retrieving information, and visualizing relational structure and patterns. The latter is particularly important, because it shows how tables can contribute to the generation of new knowledge. In addition, tables also provide efficient means for manipulating information in general and in structured notations. In sum, tables are powerful and efficient representational tools.

The standard notion of iconicity, which is based on degrees of similarity or resemblance, does not provide a satisfactory account of the iconic character of some representations of abstract entities when those entities do not exhibit any imitable internal structure. Individual numbers are paradigmatic examples of such structureless entities. Nevertheless, numerals are frequently described as iconic or symbolic; for example, we say that the number three is represented symbolically by '3', but iconically by '|||'. To address this difficulty, I discuss various alternative notions of iconicity that have been presented in the literature, and I propose two novel accounts.

The design of good notation is a cause that was dear to Charles Babbage's heart throughout his career. He was convinced of the "immense power of signs" (1864, 364), both to rigorously express complex ideas and to facilitate the discovery of new ones. As a young man, he promoted the Leibnizian notation for the calculus in England, and later he developed a Mechanical Notation for designing his computational engines. In addition, he reflected on the principles that underlie the design of good mathematical notations. In this paper, we discuss these reflections, which can be found somewhat scattered in Babbage's writings, for the first time in a systematic way. Babbage's desiderata for mathematical notations are presented as ten guidelines pertinent to notational design and its application to both individual symbols and complex expressions. To illustrate the applicability of these guidelines in non-mathematical domains, some aspects of his Mechanical Notation are also discussed.

Since Sun-Joo Shin's groundbreaking study (2002), Peirce's existential graphs have attracted much attention as a way of writing logic that seems profoundly different from our usual logical calculi. In particular, Shin argued that existential graphs enjoy a distinctive property that marks them out as "diagrammatic": they are "multiply readable," in the sense that there are several di erent, equally legitimate ways to translate one and the same graph into a standard logical language. Stenning (2000) and Bellucci and Pietarinen (2016) have retorted that similar phenomena of multiple readability can arise for sentential notations as well. Focusing on the simplest kinds of existential graphs, called alpha graphs (AGs), this paper argues that multiple readability does point to important features of AGs, but that both Shin and her critics have misdiagnosed its source. As a preliminary, and because the existing literature often glosses over such issues, we show that despite their non-linearity, AGs are uniquely parsable and allow for inductive de nitions. Extending earlier discussions, we then show that that in principle, all propositional calculi are multiply readable, just like AGs: contrary to what has been suggested in the literature, multiple readability is linked neither to non-linearity nor to AGs' dearth of connectives. However, we argue that in practice, AGs are more amenable to multiple readability than our usual notations, because the patterns that one needs to recognize to multiply translate an AG form what we call complex symbols, whose structural properties make it easy to perceive and process them as units. Nevertheless, we show that such complex symbols, though largely absent from our usual notations, are not inherently diagrammatic and can be found in seemingly sentential languages. Hence, while ultimately vindicating Shin's idea of multiple readability, our analysis traces it to a di erent source and thus severs its link with diagrammaticity.

Mathematical notation includes a vast array of signs. Most mathematical signs appear to be symbolic, in the sense that their meaning is arbitrarily related to their visual appearance. We explored the hypothesis that mathematical signs with iconic aspects—those which visually resemble in some way the concepts they represent—offer a cognitive advantage over those which are purely symbolic. An early formulation of this hypothesis was made by Christine Ladd in 1883 who suggested that symmetrical signs should be used to convey commutative relations, because they visually resemble the mathematical concept they represent. Two controlled experiments provide the first empirical test of, and evidence for, Ladd's hypothesis. In Experiment 1 we find that participants are more likely to attribute commutativity to operations denoted by symmetric signs. In Experiment 2 we further show that using symmetric signs as notation for commutative operations can increase mathematical performance.

Peano was one of the driving forces behind the development of the current mathematical formalism. In this paper, we study his particular approach to notational design and present some original features of his notations. To explain the motivations underlying Peano's approach, we first present his view of logic as a method of analysis and his desire for a rigorous and concise symbolism to represent mathematical ideas. On the basis of both his practice and his explicit reflections on notations, we discuss the principles that guided Peano's introduction of new symbols, the choice of characters, and the layout of formulas. Finally, we take a closer look, from a systematic and historical perspective, at one of Peano's most striking innovations, his use of dots for the grouping of subformulas.

This volume contains ten papers that have been collected by the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics/Société canadienne d’histoire et de philosophie des mathématiques. It showcases rigorously-reviewed contemporary scholarship on an interesting variety of topics in the history and philosophy of mathematics from the seventeenth century to the modern era. The volume begins with an exposition of the life and work of Professor Bolesław Sobociński. It then moves on to cover a collection of topics about twentieth-century philosophy of mathematics, including Fred Sommers’s creation of Traditional Formal Logic and Alexander Grothendieck’s work as a starting point for discussing analogies between commutative algebra and algebraic geometry. Continuing the focus on the philosophy of mathematics, the next selections discuss the mathematization of biology and address the study of numerical cognition. The volume then moves to discussing various aspects of mathematics education, including Charles Davies’s early book on the teaching of mathematics and the use of Gaussian Lemniscates in the classroom. A collection of papers on the history of mathematics in the nineteenth century closes out the volume, presenting a discussion of Gauss’s “Allgemeine Theorie des Erdmagnetismus” and a comparison of the geometric works of Desargues and La Hire. Written by leading scholars in the field, these papers are accessible not only to mathematicians and students of the history and philosophy of mathematics, but also to anyone with a general interest in mathematics.

Mathematics is a powerful tool for describing and developing our knowledge of the physical world. It informs our understanding of subjects as diverse as music, games, science, economics, communications protocols, and visual arts. Mathematical thinking has its roots in the adaptive behavior of living creatures: animals must employ judgments about quantities and magnitudes in the assessment of both threats (how many foes) and opportunities (how much food) in order to make effective decisions, and use geometric information in the environment for recognizing landmarks and navigating environments. Correspondingly, cognitive systems that are dedicated to the processing of distinctly mathematical information have developed. In particular, there is evidence that certain core systems for understanding different aspects of arithmetic as well as geometry are employed by humans and many other animals. They become active early in life and, particularly in the case of humans, develop through maturation. Although these core systems individually appear to be quite limited in application, in combination they allow for the recognition of mathematical properties and the formation of appropriate inferences based upon those properties. In this overview, the core systems, their roles, their limitations, and their interaction with external representations are discussed, as well as possibilities for how they can be employed together to allow us to reason about more complex mathematical domains.

In their recent paper on “Challenges in mathematical cognition”, Alcock and colleagues (Alcock et al. [2016]. Challenges in mathematical cognition: A collaboratively-derived research agenda. Journal of Numerical Cognition, 2, 20-41) defined a research agenda through 26 specific research questions. An important dimension of mathematical cognition almost completely absent from their discussion is the cultural constitution of mathematical cognition. Spanning work from a broad range of disciplines – including anthropology, archaeology, cognitive science, history of science, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology – we argue that for any research agenda on mathematical cognition the cultural dimension is indispensable, and we propose a set of exemplary research questions related to it.

Our epistemic access to mathematical objects, like numbers, is mediated through our external representations of them, like numerals. Nevertheless, the role of formal notations and, in particular, of the internal structure of these notations has not received much attention in philosophy of mathematics and cognitive science. While systems of number words and of numerals are often treated alike, I argue that they have crucial structural differences, and that one has to understand how the external representation works in order to form an advanced conception of numbers. The relation between external representations and mathematical cognition will be discussed by drawing on experimental results from cognitive science and mathematics education, and I argue for the constitutive role of external representations for the development of an advanced conception of numbers.

Vehicle externalism maintains that the vehicles of our mental representations can be located outside of the head, that is, they need not be instantiated by neurons located inside the brain of the cogniser. But some disagree, insisting that ‘non-derived’, or ‘original’, content is the mark of the cognitive and that only biologically instantiated representational vehicles can have non-derived content, while the contents of all extra-neural representational vehicles are derived and thus lie outside the scope of the cognitive. In this paper we develop one aspect of Menary’s vehicle externalist theory of cognitive integration—the process of enculturation—to respond to this longstanding objection. We offer examples of how expert mathematicians introduce new symbols to represent new mathematical possibilities that are not yet understood, and we argue that these new symbols have genuine non-derived content, that is, content that is not dependent on an act of interpretation by a cognitive agent and that does not derive from conventional associations, as many linguistic representations do.

This volume contains thirteen papers that were presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics/Société canadienne d’histoire et de philosophie des mathématiques, which was held at Ryerson University in Toronto. It showcases rigorously reviewed modern scholarship on an interesting variety of topics in the history and philosophy of mathematics from Ancient Greece to the twentieth century. A series of chapters all set in the eighteenth century consider topics such as John Marsh’s techniques for the computation of decimal fractions, Euler’s efforts to compute the surface area of scalene cones, a little-known work by John Playfair on the practical aspects of mathematics, and Monge’s use of descriptive geometry. After a brief stop in the nineteenth century to consider the culture of research mathematics in 1860s Prussia, the book moves into the twentieth century with an examination of the historical context within which the Axiom of Choice was developed and a paper discussing Anatoly Vlasov’s adaptation of the Boltzmann equation to ionized gases. The remaining chapters deal with the philosophy of twentieth-century mathematics through topics such as an historically informed discussion of finitism and its limits; a reexamination of Mary Leng’s defenses of mathematical fictionalism through an alternative, anti-realist approach to mathematics; and a look at the reasons that mathematicians select specific problems to pursue. Written by leading scholars in the field, these papers are accessible to not only mathematicians and students of the history and philosophy of mathematics, but also anyone with a general interest in mathematics.

Well over a century after its introduction, Frege's two-dimensional Begriffsschrift notation is still considered mainly a curiosity that stands out more for its clumsiness than anything else. This paper focuses mainly on the propositional fragment of the Begriffsschrift, because it embodies the characteristic features that distinguish it from other expressively equivalent notations. In the first part, I argue for the perspicuity and readability of the Begriffsschrift by discussing several idiosyncrasies of the notation, which allow an easy conversion of logically equivalent formulas, and presenting the notation's close connection to syntax trees. In the second part, Frege's considerations regarding the design principles underlying the Begriffsschrift are presented. Frege was quite explicit about these in his replies to early criticisms and unfavorable comparisons with Boole's notation for propositional logic. This discussion reveals that the Begriffsschrift is in fact a well thought-out and carefully crafted notation that intentionally exploits the possibilities afforded by the two-dimensional medium of writing like none other.

This article looks at recent work in cognitive science on mathematical cognition from the perspective of history and philosophy of mathematical practice. The discussion is focused on the work of Lakoff and Núñez, because this is the first comprehensive account of mathematical cognition that also addresses advanced mathematics and its history. Building on a distinction between mathematics as it is presented in textbooks and as it presents itself to the researcher, it is argued that the focus of cognitive analyses of historical developments of mathematics has been primarily on the former, even if they claim to be about the latter.

Three different ways in which systems of axioms can contribute to the discovery of new notions are presented and they are illustrated by the various ways in which lattices have been introduced in mathematics by Schröder et al. These historical episodes reveal that the axiomatic method is not only a way of systematizing our knowledge, but that it can also be used as a fruitful tool for discovering and introducing new mathematical notions. Looked at it from this perspective, the creative aspect of axiomatics for mathematical practice is brought to the fore.

This paper is a contribution to the question of how aspects of science have been perceived through history. In particular, I will discuss how the contribution of axiomatics to the development of science and mathematics was viewed in 20th century philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics. It will turn out that in connection with scientific methodology, in particular regarding its use in the context of discovery, axiomatics has received only very little attention. This is a rather surprising result, since axiomatizations have been employed extensively in mathematics, science, and also by the philosophers themselves.