University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1991
Burlington, Vermont, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
  •  2107
    Experimental moral philosophy
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1-32. 2018.
    Experimental moral philosophy emerged as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth century, as a branch of the larger experimental philosophy (X-Phi) approach. Experimental moral philosophy is the empirical study of moral intuitions, judgments, and behaviors. Like other forms of experimental philosophy, it involves gathering data using experimental methods and using these data to substantiate, undermine, or revise philosophical theories. In this case, the theories in question concern the…Read more
  •  393
  •  238
    The Argument from Moral Experience
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5): 469-484. 2007.
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objectiv…Read more
  •  209
    Gastronomic Realism - A Cautionary Tale
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1): 30-49. 2003.
    Moral realism, the view that there are moral facts that are independent of our beliefs about them, has many defenders. But much less has been said about realism concerning other sorts of value. One of these, gastronomic realism is likely to seem implausible on its face. This paper argues, however, that much of the reasoning used to defend moral realism is about as well suited for defending gastronomic realism. Although these considerations do not directly undermine moral realism, they do suggest…Read more
  •  144
    Moral explanations of moral beliefs
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1). 2005.
    Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must st…Read more
  •  117
    Ethical norms, particular cases
    Philosophical Review 111 (1): 127-129. 2002.
    This book aims to recast the way we think about ethics by defending an alternative to more conventional approaches and illustrating its plausibility through detailed discussions of several important cases. The book is styled as an attack on “Plato’s Thesis”
  •  116
    Generality and moral justification
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 79-96. 1996.
    Demands for generality sometimes exert a powerful influence on our thinking, pressing us to treat more general moral positions, such as consequentialism, as superior to more specific ones, like those which incorporate agent-centered restrictions or prerogatives. I articulate both foundationalist and coherentist versions of the demands for generality and argue that we can best understand these demands in terms of a certain underlying metaphysical commitment. I consider and reject various argument…Read more
  •  109
    Full-Information Theories of Individual Good
    Social Theory and Practice 21 (1): 1-30. 1995.
    This paper is a criticism of full-information theories of welfare. Such theories unsuccessfully attempt to accommodate an internalist intuition (that one's good depends in some way on one's desires or hypothetical desire) with a rationalist intuition (that only fully-informed desires are relevant to one's good).
  •  93
    Experimental Moral Philosophy
    In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
    Experimental moral philosophy began to emerge as a methodology inthe last decade of the twentieth century, a branch of the largerexperimental philosophy approach. From the beginning,it has been embroiled in controversy on a number of fronts. Somedoubt that it is philosophy at all. Others acknowledge that it isphilosophy but think that it has produced modest results at best andconfusion at worst. Still others think it represents an important advance., Before the research program can be evaluated,…Read more
  •  45
    Must a Moral Irrealist Be a Pragmatist?
    American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (2). 1996.
  •  41
    Ethical Norms, Particular Cases (review)
    Philosophical Review 111 (1): 127. 2002.
    This book aims to recast the way we think about ethics by defending an alternative to more conventional approaches and illustrating its plausibility through detailed discussions of several important cases. The book is styled as an attack on “Plato’s Thesis”
  •  26
    Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 193-208. 2007.
    Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non‐moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must st…Read more
  •  26
    Standards of proof as competence norms
    Jurisprudence 13 (3): 349-369. 2022.
    In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant’s claim has been proven. In so doing, they allocate the risk of error among litigants (and potential litigants), minimizing the risk of certain types of error. Specificationism is meant as a description of the way the rules actually function. We argue, however, that its…Read more
  •  20
    Generality in Moral Reflection
    Dissertation, University of Michigan. 1991.
    Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler and Shelly Kagan demand a general justification for certain agent-centered features of morality. I argue, however, that these demands are often unjustified. My aim is to level the playing field between our more specific and our more general moral convictions, allowing neither to win by default. ;I begin by distinguishing generality from universality and consistency, and go on to identify several commo…Read more
  •  14
    Generality and Moral Justification
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 79-96. 1996.
    In recent years it has become fashionable to criticize a family of approaches to moral thinking, loosely collected under the heading, “moral theory.” Unfortunately, these criticisms have often lacked a sharp focus. To do better, we will have to sort out the various elements of moral theory, and carefully consider them one at a time. One element which has heretofore received too little attention is generality. Demands for generality have become so central to the way many philosophers do ethics th…Read more