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2Iterated attitudes. CommentaryIn J. W. Davis (ed.), Philosophical logic, D. Reidel. pp. 85-158. 1969.
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8ConditionalsIn Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell. 2017.It is controversial how best to classify conditionals. According to some theorists, the forward‐looking indicatives (those with a ‘will’ in the main clause) belong with the subjunctives (those with a ‘would’ in the main clause), and not with the other indicatives. The easy transition from typical ‘wills’ to ‘woulds’ is indeed a datum to be explained. Still, straightforward statements about the past, present or future, to which a conditional clause is attached—the traditional class of indicative …Read more
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Schiffer on Indeterminacy, Vagueness, and ConditionalsIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Counterfactual conditionalsIn Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality, Routledge. 2018.
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Philosophy and meIn Lee Walters & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington., Oxford University Press. 2021.
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66Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals: Timothy Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. viii + 278 pp. £30.00. ISBN 978-0-19-886066-2History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (2): 188-195. 2021.Conditional judgements—judgements employing ‘if’—are essential to practical reasoning about what to do, as well as to much reasoning about what is the case. We handle them well enough from an early...
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The Pragmatics of the Logical ConstantsIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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83Frank RamseyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019.Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–30) made seminal contributions to philosophy, mathematics and economics. Whilst he was acknowledged as a genius by his contemporaries, some of his most important ideas were not appreciated until decades later; now better appreciated, they continue to bear an influence upon contemporary philosophy. His historic significance was to usher in a new phase of analytic philosophy, which initially built upon the logical atomist doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgen…Read more
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39I-CounterfactualsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1): 1-21. 2008.I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, wh…Read more
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13What if? Questions About ConditionalsMind and Language 18 (4): 380-401. 2003.Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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1Analysis 52.4 october 1992In Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Vagueness, Ashgate. pp. 27--207. 2002.
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252Possible knowledge of unknown truthSynthese 173 (1). 2010.Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unkno…Read more
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21The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 220. £2.10.)Philosophy 47 (182): 375-. 1972.
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Un argumento de Orayen en favor del condicional materialRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 13 (1): 54. 1987.
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3Conditionals, truth and assertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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1Sorensen on Vagueness and ContradictionIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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159Mellor on chance and causation (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 411-433. 1997.Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to…Read more
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55Verificationism and the Manifestations of MeaningAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1). 1985.
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175What if ? Questions about conditionalsMind and Language 18 (4). 2003.Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |